

Final dissertation : "NATO in the Age of Multipolarism : Strategic Partnerships as the New Alliances"

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Diplôme : Master en sciences politiques, orientation générale

Année académique : 2019-2020

URI/URL : <http://hdl.handle.net/2268.2/9224>

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NATO in the Age of Multipolarism: Strategic Partnerships as the New Alliances

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Master Thesis

*in Sciences Politiques, orientation générale
Option Global Politics and Political Affairs*

2019-2020

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DECLARATION

Herewith I affirm that the following master thesis was written autonomously by myself and that I did not use any other sources and auxiliaries than declared in this work. Under the acknowledged rules of scientific work (lege artis) literal or analogous content borrowed from the work of others was appropriately identified in the bibliography.

In Liège, June 1, 2020



Silvie Leštinská

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Santander of University of Liège, who supervised my thesis, for his guidance, motivation and for sharing with me his research skills and knowledge. I would like to thank Dr. David Erkomaishvili for his continuous advice and expertise. I take this opportunity to show my appreciation to all of the Department faculty members, importantly Prof. Quentin Michel and Dr. Nina Bachkatov for their help and encouragement. Lastly and most importantly, I would like to thank my parents for trusting in my capacities and supporting me to write this thesis.

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to understand how NATO's strategic partnerships transformed the Alliance's perceptions of security in the post-Cold War context. Traditional NATO's collective security does not function through partnerships, as partners are not members. However, the cooperative approach to security, making partners a stakeholder in collective security, significantly elevates the role of strategic partnerships in enhancing security and projecting stability in Europe and beyond, due to partners' active engagements in operational activities led by NATO. Theoretically, the English School of International Relations theory is chosen. It analyses the principal reasons why strategic partnerships change NATO's perceptions of security in the post-Cold War context. Methodologically, it is an interpretive research design, following a post-Positivist approach along with the state-of-the-art structure stating that NATO strategic partnerships constitute the Alliance's de facto new operational model in Europe. Qualitative methodology helps to exemplify NATO-Turkey in the context of an inter-alliance crisis and NATO-Russia relations as an external crisis. The key findings of this thesis are that the concept of strategic partnerships is included in NATO's cooperative approach to security, meaning partners are at the centre and future of the Alliance's collective security and Strategic Concept.

Key words: NATO, strategic partnerships, multipolarism, collective security, security threats.

List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
BRIC	Brazil, India and China
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EU	European Union
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IR	International Relations
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IT	Information Technologies
MCD	Military Cooperation Division
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGC	NATO-Georgia Council
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIDC	NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine
NUC	NATO-Ukraine Council
PAtG	Partners Across the Globe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Figure 1. Strategic images of NATO

Introduction

The end of the Cold War resulted in the introduction of multipolarity along with bringing important changes to the structure of global politics. Common characteristics of this period have been instability of the international system and hardened security environment.¹ Europe is challenged by the shift towards multipolarism which brought a change in the nature of security threats and questioned the traditional role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).^{2,3} In addition to classic threats, current turbulent global landscape proliferates cyber threats, asymmetric conflicts, global terrorism, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, resources security, retrenchment from globalization⁴ and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Such challenges are identified by NATO as “hybrid threats”.⁵ Multipolarism and globalism are two geopolitical tendencies, which have a significant impact on NATO’s security due to the rise of regimes alternative to democracy, new global actors, proliferation of failed states and areas of limited statehood, contested areas and militant fundamentalism.⁶ It is vital to contextualize the role of strategic partnerships for NATO in the multipolar setting. It is of no less importance to understand the strategic role of partnerships, since they provide access to resources, extend diplomacy, along with security and defence.

¹ Fabio Petito, "Dialogue of Civilizations as an Alternative Model for World Order," *Civilizational Dialogue and World Order*, 2009. Doi.org/10.1057/9780230621602_3.

² Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (London: Routledge, 2007).

³ NATO or North Atlantic Treaty Organization: formed in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty, NATO is a security alliance of 30 countries from North America and Europe.

⁴ Globalization, or the increased interconnectedness and interdependence of peoples and countries, is generally understood to include two inter-related elements: the opening of international borders to increasingly fast flows of goods, services, finance, people and ideas; and the changes in institutions and policies at national and international levels that facilitate or promote such flows.

⁵ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 18-20, accessed December 3, 2019, <http://alturl.com/82xgi>.

⁶ William Durch, Joris Larik, and Richard Ponzio, *Just Security in an Undergoverned World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

NATO strategic partnerships constitute the Alliance's de facto new operational model in Europe. Partnerships tend to be least appreciated and not as known aspects of NATO's operations.⁷

The research question that this work addresses, focuses on partnerships: *How NATO's strategic partnerships transformed the Alliance's perceptions of security in the post-Cold War context?* Supporting questions include: What does NATO mean by partnerships in the post-1990s? What is the role of strategic partnerships for the Alliance in the context of NATO's rising external and internal challenges in the 21st century? This leads the author to analyse the geopolitics of the Alliance and its partnerships.

The main assumption of this work is: *Strategic partnerships are the 'new alliances', which allow NATO to widely operate, adapt and shape the increasingly contested world order in the 21st century.*

NATO is politically, economically and militarily challenged by the complexities of an interconnected globalized world. Strategic partnerships are a key asset to respond to the challenges that the bloc is facing and promote its political, economic and military objectives.⁸ Thus, among the main objectives of this work is to assess the political, economic and military role of NATO partnerships.

The work is divided into three main parts. The introduction of this work presents the structure of chapters and subchapters, emphasizing the general concepts, the research questions, hypotheses and core objectives. The first chapter entitled "Methodological and Theoretical Design" follows by explaining the methodological and research approaches this work adopts. This chapter is composed of three subchapters entitled "Survey of Relevant Literature", "Research Methodology" and "Theoretical Framework," where research methodology is subdivided into two parts – Conceptual Framework and Limitations. The theoretical framework is subdivided into two parts - The English School of International

⁷ The Security and Defence Agenda, "The Future of NATO's Partnerships," Brussels (2014): 7, accessed December 4, 2019, <http://alturl.com/9bqzu>.

⁸ Joseph Soeters, Paul C. Fenema, and Robert Beeres, *Managing Military Organizations: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2010).

Relations and The Strategic Images of NATO and its Partnerships, which are addressed through the English School.

The second chapter entitled "Theorising Partnerships in a Multipolar Setting" focuses on the Partnership for Peace program, the evolution of NATO's partnership framework during the Cold War and the emergence of "NATO Nouvelle" in multipolarism. It outlines NATO partnerships' development in the multipolar setting and examines events that led the Alliance to change its perceptions of security in the new world order by enhancing its partnership framework in the post-1990s. Moreover, it analyses the meaning and role of partnerships in NATO's cooperative approach to security, and how comprehensive partnerships can be used in place of a membership option.

The third chapter entitled "The Rising NATO's Challenges and the Use of Partnerships," analyses the struggle for greater power, security, and defence of Turkey and Russia that have a geographic presence in Europe. The case studies of NATO-Turkey and NATO-Russia, help exemplify mutual relations in the context of an inter-alliance crisis and external crisis of the Alliance. NATO-Turkey relations demonstrate a strategic schism, causing an internal turmoil in the Alliance.⁹ In case of Turkey, Syria are used as an example of a strategic partnership between states and non-state actors. In case of Russia, partners like Georgia and Ukraine are used carry out military exercises, political dialogue and to actively contribute to the NATO-led military operations. NATO-Russia relations epitomise the strategic shock, escalated by the Russo-Georgian war and later the Russo-Ukraine conflict close to NATO and EU borders. The strategic shock revealed the military vulnerability of NATO and the fact that territorial defence of the Alliance in case of Russia was neglected, resulting in uncoordinated forces and inflexible decision-making across NATO.¹⁰ Selected cases of Georgia, Ukraine and Syria represent the new world order, the age of multipolarism and the rise of new actors, new threats and new challenges.

⁹ Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, "Will the Recent Strategic Shock Galvanise Europe?," *European Security in Uncertain Times: Slovakia, Gazprom, EU Sanctions*, no. 1 (March 2016): 94-99.

¹⁰ Ibid., 94-99.

CHAPTER 1: Methodological and Theoretical Design

1. Survey of Relevant Literature

When it comes to understanding how NATO strategic partnerships transformed the Alliance's perceptions of security, several authors' contribution is particularly relevant to this work's focus. The concept of partnership has not received much of attention in the literature of IR, as it was mostly embedded into Alliance theory. Since the concept of partnership is theoretically rooted in Alliance theory, it is important to survey what the literature on alliance formation has to offer with respect to partnerships.

Until fairly recently, the concept of strategic partnership was associated with the end of the Cold War, EU-Russia and NATO-Russia relations in post-1990s. Alliance theorists employed this concept rather in relation to bilateral cooperation, as Lucyna Czechowska argues, that it is a new type of bilateral relations, that combines flexibility and deep rapprochement based on mutual share of common strategic goals, and belief that a long-term cooperation effectively reaches commonly identified objectives.¹¹ Building on this idea, the concept of partnerships is employed by NATO as a policy and strategy after the end of the Cold War, by shifting its security perception to collective security and defence with partnerships at its centre. Research shows that NATO strategic partnerships under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program have changed NATO's security and defence posture in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 context, when partnerships were situated at the centre of the Alliance's cooperative approach due to the emergence of new complex threats. In this respect NATO strategic partnerships have been in security and strategic studies associated to the concept of collective security, through which the Alliance conducts its military operations but also identifies and counters new security threats such as global terrorism, hybrid warfare and cyberwarfare with its partners. In the realist camp there is a consent regarding the fact that alliances make up the core of international politics. Dan Reiter, for instance, argues that "alliances are central to international relations: they are the primary foreign policy means by

¹¹ Lucyna Czechowska, "The Concept of Strategic partnership as an Input in the Modern Alliance Theory," *The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies*, no. 2(4), 2013: 37, accessed January 3, 2020 <http://alturl.com/xgsxs>.

which states increase their security.”¹² However, in relation to NATO’s present existence, specifically neorealists such as Kenneth N. Waltz and John Mearsheimer are critical of the Alliance’s necessity in the absence of common threat, which used to be the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War.^{13,14,15} Most of the neorealist thinkers agree that NATO does not have a reason to exist in multipolarism due to the rise of new powers.^{16,17} However, NATO security experts agree that the end of the Alliance would dramatically increase Russia's position in European security.¹⁸ Barry Buzan, advocate of the English School Theory, on the other hand contend that NATO still exists because of its concept of adaptation, which has fundamentally changed the Alliance through political institutionalisation.¹⁹

Over the years, a consensus was made over the fact that NATO’s perceptions of security²⁰ have been transformed due to the end of the Cold War, experiences from the post-1990s NATO-led operations, creation of NATO partnership framework under the PfP as the backbone of NATO’s cooperative approach to security, shift to multipolarism, post-9/11 context, emergence of new security threats and the rising internal and external challenges of NATO dominated by Russia and Turkey in Europe .^{21,22,23,24} As noted by Colin S. Gray, NATO’s perception of security²⁵ during the Cold War concentrated on regional defence and nuclear

¹² D. Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," *World Politics* 46, no. 4 (1994): 490-526, Doi.org/10.2307/2950716.

¹³ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993): 75-76, Doi.org/10.2307/2539097.

¹⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 5-41, Doi.org/10.1162/016228800560372.

¹⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-57, doi.org/10.2307/2538981.

¹⁶ Ibid., 5-57.

¹⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 5-41, Doi.org/10.1162/016228800560372.

¹⁸ Michael Rühle, "A World Without NATO?," NATO Review, last modified August 29, 2018, accessed December 28, 2019, <http://alturl.com/nmwmy>.

¹⁹ B. Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

²⁰ NATO’s perception of security is laid out in NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010, its official summits and declarations since 2010.

²¹ B. Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

²² M. Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honor of C. A. W. Manning*, ed. Alan James (London, 1973).

²³ H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Palgrave, 1977).

²⁴ T. Dunne, "Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).

deterrence in order to achieve peace and to stabilise the geopolitical tension between the two great powers.²⁶ In connection to this idea, the dissolution of the USSR was a game changer in geopolitics²⁷ due to the fact that NATO entered a multipolar world order, dominated by new threats and challenges, it adopted a new strategy – partnerships. Consensus was made in the security and strategic studies that NATO's collective security in the post-1990s was grounded on strategic partnerships to achieve maximised collective defence and security in its operations.

The realist camp rejects the concept of strategic partnership, mostly due to its flexibility and fairly oppose the notion of cooperation of states in security affairs.²⁸ They advocate a state-centric model focused on security and sovereignty where cooperation is hard to achieve, difficult to maintain and depends on the hard power of states.^{29,30,31} However, classical historical research showed that adding soft power to NATO in the post-1990s increased its political and military capabilities by embedding partnerships as the centrepiece of its Strategic Concept through institutional cooperation under the PfP program.

On the other hand, the liberal camp assumes that the biggest enemy of states are asymmetric threats, therefore, NATO uses its strategic partnerships during military operations, peacekeeping operations, military exercises and trainings in connection to hybrid and cyber threats along with diplomatic negotiations. Furthermore it advocates that the most important for NATO is cooperation between its allies and partners, promotion of democratic values and its role as an international institution since the multipolar setting is posing uncertainty to the Alliance in the sense of security and defence.^{32,33,34} The constructivists add emphasis on democratic values, emphasize that NATO strategic partnerships are founded

²⁶ Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for The Next Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 326.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Roger D. Spegele, *Political Realism in International Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

²⁹ Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 50-90, Doi.org/10.2307/2539079.

³⁰ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (2004): 1-52, Doi.org/10.2307/4152944.

³¹ David Clinton, Kenneth Thompson, and Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 7th ed., 2005).

³² Andrew Wyatt-Walter, "Adam Smith and the liberal tradition in international relations," *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (1996): 5-28, Doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500118431.

³³ Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151-169. Accessed January 21, 2020. Doi.org/10.2307/1960861.

³⁴ G. J. Ikenberry, *Power, Order, and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

upon democratic principles. Thus, research has shown that the Alliance is a community of like-minded states united not only by common opposition but also by its determination in order to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of its allies, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and human rights.^{35,36,37,38}

The English School Theory presents an opportunity to research the cases of Russia and Turkey, due to the fact it is based on the key ideas of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. Most of the theorizing in the English School relates to the research of NATO and examines six major historical events:

1. the dissolution of the USSR,
2. Multipolarism,
3. NATO military operations in 1990s,
4. NATO Strategic Concept adaptation,
5. NATO enlargement,
6. September 11 attacks.³⁹

These events have led to an operational and institutional transformation of the Alliance. Literature provides an exhaustive account of this change. For instance, Saul B. Cohen argues that the end of the Cold War brought a change in the balance of power in terms of moving away from bipolarity and entering the new world of multipolar forces along with the rise of new security threats such as global terrorism in connection to September 11 attacks.⁴⁰ In contrast, scholars visualised the 21st century as a nonpolar international system that is linked to globalization, full of increasingly powerful states and centres of powers from above (regional and global organizations), below (militias), NGOs and corporations.⁴¹ Furthermore, the current international system can be pictured as bi-multipolar, suggesting fusing both bipolarity and multipolarity.⁴² For other scholars, the 1990's marked major turning points for

³⁵ NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty 1949: Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949": 1, accessed December 20, 2019, <http://alturl.com/2dztz>.

³⁶ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425, [Doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027764](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027764).

³⁷ John G. Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 855-885, [doi:10.1162/002081898550770](https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550770).

³⁸ Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

³⁹ Zdeněk Kříž, *NATO after the End of the Cold War: A Brief History* (Brno: Masaryk University, 2015), 1-125.

⁴⁰ Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics of the World Systems* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003), 87.

⁴¹ Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance." *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2008): 44. Accessed January 17, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/20032650.

⁴² R.N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, multipolarity, and the future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10, no. 3 (1966): 331-335, doi.org/10.1177/002200276601000304.

NATO in the post-Cold War period such as, presenting multilateralism as NATO's main political process, emergence of the PfP program, the concept of enlargement and introducing the Alliance's New Strategic Concept.⁴³ Based on the reviewed data, NATO has never been only a military alliance based only on the idea of collective defence.^{44,45} Research exemplifies that the Alliance is a security alliance, an organization of states sharing common values, which makes war among members impossible due to a strong share of common democratic values.⁴⁶

This grand debate in security and strategic studies led authors to highlight the fact that the post-1990 period and post-9/11 context marks the concept of partnerships as the main political and military tool of NATO to manage stability in Europe.⁴⁷ Moreover, the 1990's and beginning of 2000's added the Alliance an institutional and political identity that embraces NATO's adaptation concept as a strong strategy in the new century to counter new global trends and unknown threats.⁴⁸ In specifically strategic studies, the NATO's adaptation strategy has been analysed and argued to cause significant changes inside the Alliance such as the process of widening thus, extending NATO's territorial interests, meaning that enlarging the Alliance will bring more power to provide security and defence during military operations.⁴⁹ In contrary, scholars like Sven Biscop have disagreed with these claims and stressed that NATO is not prepared to take the lead since it is not well equipped, it should rather focus on its core – hard security, both defence against threats and provide military crisis management.⁵⁰ However a consensus was made affirming that more soft power was added to the Alliance, for the purpose to help NATO not only survive the end of the Cold War, be effective in its military operations and to create the PfP but to shift its strategic focus to the concept of

⁴³ Charly S. Pasternak, "From Protecting Some to Security Many: NATO's Journey from A Military Alliance to a Security Manager." *The Finish Institute of International Affairs* 17 (2007): 46.

⁴⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North American Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁴⁵ Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, and Steve Smith, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁴⁶ David S. Yost *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington DC: United States Inst of Peace Press, 1998).

⁴⁷ Ivo H. Daalder, *NATO in the 21st Century: What Purpose? What Missions?* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), chapter 1, accessed January 10, 2020, <http://alturl.com/krkd7>.

⁴⁸ Joseph Lepgold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem." *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 81.

⁴⁹ Zdeněk Kříž, *NATO after the End of the Cold War: A Brief History* (Brno: Masaryk University, 2015), 21.

⁵⁰ Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, "NATO's New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment," NATO's New Strategic Concept. A Comprehensive Assessment, last modified 2011, 106-112, <http://alturl.com/6amuz>.

partnerships due to NATO-Russia's complicated relations and post-9/11 context.⁵¹ David Yost, in regards to Europe, highlights that allies are committed to collective defence, but they have increasingly endowed NATO with new roles as an instrument of collective security through its partnership framework in the Euro-Atlantic region.⁵²

Current literature on international organizations such as NATO have supported the following assertions: NATO is an "Alliance of Collective Defence" with military power and the objective to protect its members and partners.⁵³ It is an "Alliance of Collective Security" with institutional power, promoting values and democracy of the Atlantic community throughout Europe.⁵⁴ It is an "Alliance of Collective Interests", preserving its security interests in order to prevent any threats and harm dispersing to Europe and the US.⁵⁵ This work aims to merge all three assertions and hypothesises that NATO's strategic partnerships constitute the new alliances of the 21st century, which assist NATO with its current external crisis with Russia and internal crisis with Turkey.⁵⁶

Hence, this research aims to underline the significance and relevance of NATO's institutional and operational transformation through strategic partnerships. Thus, the understanding of strategic partnerships as a policy and strategy, will reveal its usage in the NATO's internal and external crises. The concept of partnership as a policy and strategy is particularly relevant in the cases of Russia and Turkey, where NATO uses its partners in case of Russia – Ukraine, to deter or address security threats coming from Russia and of Turkey – Georgia, to reach out to the Caucasus for assistance of the Georgia armed forces in operations in Afghanistan, since it cannot fully rely on Turkey as an ally.

To sum up, the reviewed authors suggest the biggest development since the end of the Cold War that affect NATO is the changing strategic global environment. It turned from bipolar to a multipolar landscape to, which NATO was forced to adapt. Thus, traditional

⁵¹ Markus Kaim, "Reforming NATO's Partnerships." Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin, 2017): 5-23, accessed January 16, 2020, <http://alturl.com/fy3tc>.

⁵² David S. Yost *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington DC: United States Inst of Peace Press, 1998).

⁵³ Ivo H. Daalder, *NATO in the 21st Century: What Purpose? What Missions?* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), chapter 1, accessed January 10, 2020, <http://alturl.com/krkd7>.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ted G. Carpenter, *NATO Enters the 21st Century* (London: Routledge, 2013).

alliance approach to security, which suggests establishing alliances and expanding them with new members, does not respond to this new global multipolar environment. NATO's strategic response to that has been adopting the policy of partnerships without a necessary enlargement and inclusion of new members.

2. Research Methodology

This section unfolds the methods employed in this work to investigate NATO's strategic partnerships. Principally, it relies on qualitative methods, academic publications, books, journal articles and policy reports. Qualitative methods in this work reflect the meaning and role of NATO strategic partnerships, how the partnership framework is constituted, how they are employed and utilised in crisis situation and how partnerships transformed NATO's concept of security. Hence, this research is based on the English School reasoning and interpretive epistemology, since NATO uses its partnerships to provide collective security to preserve a steady and well-secured international system, international society and world society on all three levels, which are interrelated. It employs a case study methodology and a post-positivist approach to demonstrate a practical usage of strategic partnerships during an external crisis of NATO-Russia along with an inter-alliance crisis of NATO-Turkey.

The case study of NATO-Turkey is selected due to the fact that Turkey had been one of the fundamental contributors to the integration and security of the Euro-Atlantic region since 1952 and supports NATO's transformation efforts. Turkey is also a strong supporter of NATO's strategic partnerships. Analysis of the case of NATO-Turkey is carried out in relation to the inter-alliance crisis, which has been worsened due to Ankara's interference in Syria, negotiated deals with Iran and Russia along with Turkey's present more assertive position within the Alliance. Moreover, this research positions Turkey as one of the key actors intensifying NATO's internal crisis due to divergences in security prioritization between Turkey and NATO allies.

The case of NATO-Russia is chosen because Russia was a strategic partner with a special status under the PfP framework, later transformed into the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). NATO is a security threat to Russia; thus, the Alliance uses its partnership program as a strategy to deter Russia. This work argues that in case of Russia, NATO reaches primarily out

to partners such as Ukraine, Belarus, Finland and Sweden in order to prevent Russia from interfering in the Alliance's area of operation.

This work follows an interpretive research design in order to understand in which way Russian and Turkish strategic interests are incompatible with NATO's security and strategic perceptions. By looking into ways of how the pursuit of security priorities by Russia and Turkey differ from NATO security priorities, this work presents a looming external and internal crisis of the Alliance characterized by the combination of identity, interest and power struggles.

2.1. Conceptual Framework

The work employs an *interpretive approach* to understand the practice and the effects of the concept of partnership in European security. Empiricism is avoided as the work does not aim to explain, observe and make scientific laws related to existing partnerships. Neither does it rely on the legal validity of data, as such approach is methodologically dogmatic and excludes multi-philosophical perspectives. This work avoids the cause-effect logic. Interpretivism is chosen over empiricism due to its non-unitary nature. Empiricism does not allow inter-relation of various concepts such as strategy, power politics, shared identities and norms. Inter-relating concepts makes up the key strategy of this research in understanding NATO partnerships under the PfP program and linking it to concepts such as 'policy' and 'strategy.' Interpretivism allows to follow the "Socratic Method", questioning and critically evaluating the core ideas of partnerships in a form of a cooperative argumentative dialogue supported by the English School Theory of International Relations.⁵⁷ This research aims to understand why partnerships are becoming a new norm for NATO policy-making and why it is the central core of NATO members' approach to security.

The assessment of NATO strategic partnerships is based on the following parameters and criteria:

- i. adherence to NATO values,
- ii. common threat perception as NATO,
- iii. contribution to security of NATO,
- iv. willingness to cooperate with NATO in areas of political affairs and security.

⁵⁷ Hugh H. Benson, *Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge and Plato's Early Dialogues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17.

The key objective of this work is to understand the meaning, role and the use of partnerships in NATO's political and military strategy. The meaning and practice of NATO partnerships is analysed by deploying case study methodology. The selected cases represent relations between NATO and Turkey on one hand and Russia on the other. The case study type used in this work is *Least-Similar Case Comparison*. This means that cases that are selected are different but share one dependent variable - shared outcomes. Both cases contribute to creating a crisis for NATO, being the shared outcome, but have all other different criteria of selection. The case study of NATO-Turkey was selected based on the following criteria:

- a. NATO member,
- b. Strategic partner to the EU,
- c. Creating an inter-alliance crisis.

The case study of NATO-Russia was selected based on the following criteria:

- a. NATO partner,
- b. Strategic threat to the EU and NATO,
- c. Creating NATO's external crisis.

The case study of NATO-Turkey highlights the inter-alliance crisis. By worsening internal relations between NATO members, it presents conflicting relations between the allies and Turkey. On the contrary, the case study of NATO-Russia highlights the essence of an external crisis, where damaged relations between NATO and Russia point to the fact that NATO uses the strategy of partnership in geopolitical terms, as seen in the actions adopted by NATO following the Russo-Georgian war.

Interpretivism helps understanding why NATO established and utilises partnerships in the current multipolar security landscape. Partnerships are a backbone of NATO's cooperative approach to security, contributing to security and defence of the Euro-Atlantic region as well as outside of the NATO-area. Furthermore, partners are part of NATO's core activities, which are shaping the policymaking, building defence capacity, developing interoperability and managing crises. This work shows that NATO partnerships are operative because, due to the current existing security threats, the Alliance no longer relies on only its members and its enlargement policy. There is a traceable and consistent pattern of NATO increasingly focusing on bilateral partnerships with countries outside of its regional partnership framework. This was demonstrated in Afghanistan in 2003-2014, one of the most challenging multicultural

operations with troops from 50 NATO and partner nations.⁵⁸ NATO strategically chooses its partners to achieve a higher level of protection and security of its area of operation.

The case study methodology of this research underpins the fact that NATO does not only rely on its allies, but on partners as well. In case of, for example, Sweden, a non-NATO member, it strongly supports NATO in military operations, as seen in case of Libya, it prefers partnership approach over membership. It shares the idea of extending partnership approach to other non-member states such as Georgia and Ukraine. This work aims to understand which factors make non-NATO states join the partnership program to tackle security threats jointly with NATO. What makes countries embrace the concept of partnership? What values does this concept entail?

There is an observed transformation of NATO's security agenda through the participation of partners. Empirical observations fail to question the social and power structures of international politics while interpretivist approach helps to unpack such concepts as partnerships. Interpretivism helps to understand the interaction of concepts in international politics, such as uncovering one of the meanings of partnership under the PfP as one of NATO's main policy and strategy.

The main subject of this thesis is - the *concept of partnership*. After the end of the Cold War and shift towards a multipolar world, strategic partnerships became NATO's new approach to international security and cooperation.⁵⁹ The concept of *strategic partnerships* stresses close and special relations between states and organizations.⁶⁰ Partnerships are utilised on the basis of commonly identified goals and established interests.⁶¹ Partnerships are part of the international system because states seek to achieve their common goals through a cooperative approach to security.⁶² The term "strategic partner" was firstly defined by the

⁵⁸ Public Intelligence, "ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide," accessed December 10, 2019, <http://alturl.com/fn89p>.

⁵⁹ Charly S. Pasternak, "From Protecting Some to Security Many: NATO's Journey from A Military Alliance to a Security Manager." *The Finnish Institute of International Affairs* 17 (2007): 46.

⁶⁰ Krzysztof Balon, "The Concept of Strategic Partnership," *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest* 2, no. 4(5), 2002, accessed January 4, 2020, <http://alturl.com/xqz5r>.

⁶¹ Razvan-Alexandru Gentimir, "A Theoretical Approach on the Strategic Partnership Between the European Union and the Russian Federation," *Centre for European Studies* 7, no. 2 (2015): 289-290.

⁶² Lucyna Czechowska, "The Concept of Strategic partnership as an Input in the Modern Alliance Theory," *The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies*, no. 2(4), 2013:42, accessed January 3, 2020 <http://alturl.com/xgsxs>.

EU, during the European Council's meeting in 1998, signifying a special strategic importance in the international domain in case of the EU-Russia relations. The EU defined the term "strategic partner" as "those who share our goals and values and are prepared to act in their support"⁶³. NATO defined a "strategic partner" as a country that shares common interests with the Alliance, acts in full support of it and therefore, is officially part of the partnership program.⁶⁴

The concept of *strategic partnerships* is in this work depicted as a policy and strategy.⁶⁵ The concept of strategy and policy can be understood in the following ways: according to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, strategy is "the art of distributing and applying means to fulfil the ends of a policy."⁶⁶ Raymond Aron suggests fusing both terms strategy and policy in a so-called praxeology.⁶⁷ Bernard Brodie expands Raymond's idea and blurs both terms into theory and practice, defining strategy as to "how to do it" and policy as to "how to theorize about it".⁶⁸ Robert Neild defined strategy as the pursuit of political aims by the use of military means, where the first step is to decide on political aims, this implies that policy, as a method, needs strategy, as practice.⁶⁹ Lastly, but most importantly, Carl von Clausewitz links policy with strategy as a tool, arguing that "war is an act of policy," which clarifies the fact that military force is an act of political reasoning. Thus, "strategy" and "policy" have both politico-economic and military-strategic roles and can be fused together.⁷⁰ Partnerships are a policy because it is a political framework of bilateral cooperation between countries (i.e. NATO allies and partners). Partnerships are part of NATO's defence policy; it generates collective cooperation through bilateral agreements and becomes in essence, a political tool for NATO to achieve

⁶³ Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, "EU Strategic Partnerships with Third Countries," Library of the European Parliament (2012): 2, accessed January 6, 2020, <http://alturl.com/hbf8t>.

⁶⁴ Razvan-Alexandru Gentimir, "A Theoretical Approach on the Strategic Partnership Between the European union and the Russian Federation," *Centre for European Studies* 7, no. 2 (2015): 289.

⁶⁵ Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 41.

⁶⁶ Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), 229.

⁶⁷ Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8.

⁶⁸ Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 452.

⁶⁹ Robert Neild, *An Essay on Strategy As It Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 1.

⁷⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), I: 1, 24.

strategic goals.⁷¹ Partnerships are a strategy under which nations learn to interoperate with NATO forces in various military operations through political and military planning.

The concept of *multipolarism* is according to Chantal Mouffe tied with democracy, globalization, pluralism and aspects of cosmopolitanism.⁷² Multipolar world order recognizes multiple understandings of organizations founded upon democratic principles, such as NATO thus, allows coexistence of different factors (i.e. regional conflicts, political disputes etc.).⁷³ Multipolar world consists of several poles, organised around different political principles, composed of variety regimes, allowing the emergence of new security threats.⁷⁴ Luk Van Langenhove politico-economically defines multipolarism as “the rise of the rest: the unprecedented economic growth” in countries all over the world.⁷⁵ In security terms, he argues that since the end of the Cold War, NATO has entered the multipolar world order, slowly shifting to non-polarity.⁷⁶ The effects of multipolarism can be demonstrated through the September 11 attacks, where unipolarity came officially to its end and it allowed the rise of global terrorism to become one of the globally recognized security threats of the 21st century.⁷⁷

Richard Haass defines multipolarity as a world dominated by several states, involving several distinct poles or concentrations of power.⁷⁸ According to Haass, “in a multipolar system, no power dominates nor do concentrations of power revolve around two positions.”⁷⁹ Furthermore, multipolarity can be cooperative, forming a 'concert of powers', in which a few major powers work jointly on setting the rules of the game and control those who violate

⁷¹ NATO Homepage, “What does the Military Cooperation / Outreach mean in practice?,” 1-7, accessed January 1, 2020, <http://alturl.com/7zzxb>.

⁷² Chantal Mouffe, “Which World Order: Cosmopolitan or Multipolar?,” *Ethical Perspectives* 15, no. 4 (2008): 453-467. [Doi.org/10.2143/ep.15.4.2034391](https://doi.org/10.2143/ep.15.4.2034391).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 453-467.

⁷⁴ Chantal Mouffe, “Democracy in a Multipolar World,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (2009): 556, [Doi.org/10.1177/0305829809103232](https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829809103232).

⁷⁵ Luk, Van Langenhove. The EU as a Global Actor in a Multipolar World and Multilateral 2.0 Environment. Egmont Paper No. 36, March 2010. 10. Accessed January 10, 2020, <http://alturl.com/iri93>.

⁷⁶ Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2008): 44. Accessed January 17, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/20032650.

⁷⁷ Luk, Van Langenhove. The EU as a Global Actor in a Multipolar World and Multilateral 2.0 Environment. Egmont Paper No. 36, March 2010. 9. Accessed January 10, 2020, <http://alturl.com/iri93>.

⁷⁸ Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2008): 44. Accessed January 17, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/20032650.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 44.

them.⁸⁰ However, multipolarity can also be more competitive, revolving around the balance of power, being able to trigger an external and internal crisis by its conflictual nature, when the balance breaks down.⁸¹

In a multipolar system, states are concerned with 'alliance management', cooperation between members, military interdependence, the power of persuasion, where each state has its own strategy and tactics.⁸² In relation to NATO's strategic partnerships, it is a cooperative framework of states which set the legal rules and principles in order to pursue similar interests for the sake of achieving commonly identified goals. In case of NATO, no power dominates, however in case of Turkey, the breakdown of the balance of power caused an inter-alliance crisis, enhancing the rising NATO's external and internal crises. In case of Russia, the conflictual nature of the state and violating its partnership obligations towards NATO after the end of the Cold War was broken down with the Russo-Georgian War and consequently, with the Russo-Ukraine conflict, triggering the rise of NATO's external challenges with Russia.

Strategic partnerships are in this work depicted as the new alliances in multipolarism, combining traditional definitions of a partnership and an alliance. In a strategic partnership, resources are shared between two partnered countries for the purpose of achieving shared strategic goals that they have agreed to partner on. In a partnership, the cooperation is based on identified security objectives, for which the partnership agreement is formed, meaning it is a strategic arrangement for a necessary security and defence objective. In case of an alliance, it is an association of states based on deeper and long-lasting relations, alliance treaty. Due to the presence of wider set of goals, allied countries tend to work more closely together and are more concerned with the shared outcomes than self-interest. A traditional alliance is based on a stronger cultural foundation of states with long-term security and defence objectives.⁸³

⁸⁰ Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance." *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2008): 44. Accessed January 17, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/20032650.

⁸¹ Ibid., 44.

⁸² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010), 168-169.

⁸³ Lucyna Czechowska et al., *States, International Organizations and Strategic Partnerships* (Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 8-43.

This work highlights the understanding of a *strategic partnership* as the *new alliances* in the context of NATO as merging of individual sovereign state's interests is based on a partnership agreement without initialisation of cooperative relationship, closely tied relations, sharing of resources, setting broader range of goals and the aspect of multiculturalism. In relation to NATO, a partnership agreement between the Alliance and its partners brings the mutual benefit of sharing resources between NATO allies and partners. Hence, closely tied relations between NATO and its partners helps establishing a strategic partnership. It is based on multiculturalism and a collaborative joint framework of states, achieving and pursuing common long-term strategic goals thus, taking into account the security self-interest of individual NATO partner states and sharing common values.⁸⁴

2.2. Limitations

This work primarily assesses NATO's strategic partnerships, focusing on the Euro-Atlantic region, the PfP, NATO-Russia with the cases of Georgia and Ukraine along with NATO-Turkey and the case of Syria. Due to scope and size limitations, this work does not cover the advantages and disadvantages of the PfP for NATO and partners. In relations to multipolarism and the rise of new powers countries like Brazil, India and China (BRIC) are excluded from the scope of research. This work does not encompass partnerships such as the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the Partners Across the Globe (PAtoG). In order to pursue the research question, this work analyses essentially the transformation of NATO's perceptions of security by strategic partnerships, the role and use of partnerships in the context of NATO's internal and external crises along with the meaning of strategic partnerships for the Alliance.

In relation to both case studies, the historical background is not extensively discussed and does not analyse all current states' actions in detail, only the ones relating to NATO's current internal and external crises and tensions with Russia and Turkey. Moreover, this work does not concentrate on new members or prospective members because it would not fit the research focus. Due to word limitations, this work does not further expand on the strategic triangle between Russia, Turkey and the US, meaning it only focuses on precise internal

⁸⁴ Lucyna Czechowska et al., *States, International Organizations and Strategic Partnerships* (Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 8-43.

tensions only between NATO-Turkey related to the inter-alliance crisis, partnerships and external tension between NATO-Russia.

Lastly, in regard to contextualising the partnership in cases of Georgia and Ukraine, the details of the conflicts, the reasoning behind the existence of these conflicts and an analysis of national motives are not encompassed in this work. Concerning the contextualisation of partnerships in case Syria, the history of NATO-Turkey relations is not analysed in detail. This work does not analyse the concept of proxy warfare and does not expand on this tactic of war. This work uses proxy warfare in connection to the case of Syria, to demonstrate how both actors Russia and Turkey indirectly fight through established strategic partnerships involving states and non-state actors. In relation to the Syrian conflict, specifics and the main actors' motivations will not be debated. Hence, due to word limitations, this research does not explore tangible reasons why engaged states are forming partnerships and what are their primary motives behind alliance formation. The contextualisation of partnerships focuses strictly on the existing partnerships.

3. Theoretical Framework

The English School of International Relations theory was chosen as the leading theoretical model, as it allows for a wide spectrum of analysis on how NATO's strategic partnerships transformed the Alliance's security perceptions since the end of the Cold War, and the post-1990s period. Moreover, it exemplifies how partnerships under the PfP serve as a strategy and policy tool for the Alliance. This section concentrates on the English School or the society of states approach, which helps to unfold how NATO operates with its partners during collective action and analytically assesses the *concept of partnership* through a three-dimensional framework encompassed by Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. This allows to analyse the concept of strategic partnership, making use of the benefits of English School, based on the three key traditions of International Relations (IR). NATO and its partnership framework are examined according to the English School's three different spheres: first, the 'international system'; second, the 'international society'; third, the 'world society'.⁸⁵ Each sphere helps to uncover the significance and relevance of NATO's use of its partnership as its new military and

⁸⁵ Robert W. Murray, *System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2013), 6.

political strategy of the 21st century. The English School best reveals why partners play a pivotal role in NATO's cooperative approach to security and how they transformed NATO's vision of security in the post-1990s and post-9/11 context. This work concentrates largely on the second sphere of the English School theory - *international society*, which deals with the idea of institutionalization of shared interests and identity among NATO members and partners, supported by rationalism, which has played a crucial role in the post-1990s in altering NATO's security approach. Rationalism⁸⁶ helps to unfold the creation of strategic partnerships under the PfP program, which is profoundly based on shared norms, rules and democratic principles of the Alliance.

This work classifies NATO's strategic partnership framework through the different spheres of the English School and explains its significance and relevance for this work. In the international system, NATO and its strategic partners underline the theory of power politics as a control mechanism of the distribution of power and interests for the maintenance of organisational cohesion, alliance-making and diplomacy among the allies and partners.⁸⁷ Within the international society, rationalism best depicts why after the establishment of NATO's strategic partnerships in the 1990s, the process of institutionalisation helps allies and partners share interests, norms and rules on behalf of NATO's new constructed identity during military operations, political dialogues and diplomatic rationalization in the current security landscape.⁸⁸ Revolutionism, explains NATO's concept of adaptation to the present security setting and multipolarism, which plays a pivotal role after the dissolution of the USSR, when NATO positions itself globally with its main purposes as a collective defence organization, politico-economic organization and a security community of values in the world society.⁸⁹ Hence, distinct spheres of the English School assist in analysing NATO mainly on the second sphere of international society with partnerships as its main operational model in Europe. Thus, the English School best portrays NATO's operational role influenced by the international

⁸⁶ Rationalism or the Grotian tradition in IR.

⁸⁷ Barry Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 03 (2001): 471-488, [Doi.org/10.1017/s0260210501004715](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210501004715).

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 471-488.

⁸⁹ Robert W. Murray, *System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2013), 8-10.

system and the world society in order to gain a more globalized perspective of the effects of multipolarism on the current security landscape.⁹⁰

Furthermore, in order to understand the transformation of NATO's security perception through its partnerships in the post 9/11 context, case studies of Russia and Turkey were selected. This work follows two distinct divisions of the English School because both, the pluralist and solidarist interpretations, adhere to the key realist, liberalist and constructivist insight of the English School's different spheres. Pluralism emphasizes on the primacy of states in an anarchic system, the protection of national sovereignty, and existing cooperation between states, despite the existence of self-interest.⁹¹ It places constraints on violence however, it approves the use of force and in case of hard security and defence it accepts war.⁹² NATO is an international organization ruled by states, adhering individual and common political and security interests of its members, with the main aim to protect and secure its allies and the trans-Atlantic region with the use of both - hard and soft power. It cooperates with non-member countries - its partners, through a partnership framework, based on bilateral cooperative agreements and shared interests. In contrast, solidarism is based on the liberal understanding of individual security and the promotion of peace through common norms and values. Moreover, a constructivist understanding stresses the fact that NATO uses its strategic partnerships to promote its democratic principles in non-member countries and helps its partners to acquire a strong individual security and defence posture through military trainings, shared norms and values.⁹³

3.1. The English School of International Relations Theory

The English School is the diversity of theoretical allegiances, which assist in comprehending the globalized world,⁹⁴ effects of multipolarism on states and organizations in the post-1990s

⁹⁰ Robert W. Murray, *System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2013), 1-4.

⁹¹ Ibid., 10,58.

⁹² Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 131.

⁹³ Robert W. Murray, *System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2013), 10,58.

⁹⁴ Ole Wæver, "International Society — Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?," *Cooperation and Conflict* 27, no. 1 (1992): Doi.org/10.1177/0010836792027001004.

based on the international system, international society and world society.^{95,96,97} The English School is represented in this work as the main theoretical backbone, serving to understand complex political and security issues regarding NATO-Russia and NATO-Turkey relations and NATO's transformation in the post-Cold War context with partnerships at the centre of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security. Thus, it analyses why NATO established its partnerships in the post-1990s based on common norms and values, shared interests as one of its main policy and strategy in the 21st century.

According to Hedley Bull, the English School gravitates around its four major axioms:

- i. Sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system,⁹⁸
- ii. In the international "system of states", nations establish strong mutual impact and close relations with each other,⁹⁹
- iii. Anarchy is present in any international system,¹⁰⁰
- iv. States in the international system are part of the international society and they recognize and share common interests, values, norms and beliefs in order to imply set of rules and governing relations amongst each other in order to function as an institution.¹⁰¹

Based on the following four axioms, NATO and its strategic partnerships are part of the international system, the international society and the world society. NATO is a principal actor in the area security and defence. It establishes strong relations with its partners, which have a significant impact on the society, system and the world through joint actions with NATO. Strategic partnerships are unified under the rules of the PfP program of NATO, as an institutional framework connected by common norms, democratic values along with shared strategic and security beliefs and goals.¹⁰²

⁹⁵ Robert W. Murray, *System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2013), 6.

⁹⁶ B. Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁹⁸ M. Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honor of C. A. W. Manning*, ed. Alan James (London, 1973), 85-115.

⁹⁹ H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Palgrave, 1977), 8.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰² H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Palgrave, 1977), 44.

In order to understand NATO and the role of strategic partnerships, it is essential to differentiate and relate between the three main spheres of the English School – international system, the international society and the world society.

According to Hedley Bull, *international system* is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them and have an impact on one another's decisions.¹⁰³ Hence, NATO and its partnership is part of the international system because it a set of different states forming a system, which have sufficient contact between each other and can influence each other's decision and behaviour by deploying soft power.

Adam Watson defines the *international society* as a group of individual states, united under a set of common rules, shared norms and values, who establish a dialogue or an institution, pursued by common interests and set of goals.¹⁰⁴ Tim Dunne portrays the international society as a relationship, where members accept their limited responsibilities towards one another and the society.¹⁰⁵ NATO's PfP program is a society of states, an institutional framework, joined by individual states sharing common set of norms and values, peacefully promoting democracy and preserving its own security of the state. NATO strategic partnerships are a dialogue, united by common economic, political and security interests and set of goals. Stanley Hoffman clarifies a major distinction between a "system" and "society" whereas system, is a "contract between states and the impact of one state on another"¹⁰⁶ and society is the "existence of certain common interests, values and set of rules between the states"¹⁰⁷. In sum, NATO and its partnership framework are part of both, the international system and society because both are an institutional construction and expression of common interests, values, norms and legal principles, accepting mutual responsibilities along with carrying out joint diplomatic, political and military actions.

¹⁰³ H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Palgrave, 1977), 9-10.

¹⁰⁴ Adam Watson, "Hedley Bull, states systems and international societies," *Review of International Studies* 13, no. 2 (1987): 147-153, [Doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500113701](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500113701).

¹⁰⁵ T. Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 3.

¹⁰⁶ H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Palgrave, 1977), vi.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

According to Hedley Bull, anarchy is always present therefore, the *world society* cannot emerge unless it is supported by the state system and efficient political framework.¹⁰⁸ NATO and its partners have access to hard and soft power. This means they utilise both therefore, the concept of power politics is embedded in the defence planning process of NATO, the implications of anarchy are observable during the high-level political meetings and agreements driven by insecurity, competitiveness of national interests under the protection of the norms of sovereignty.

To sum up the key theoretical thoughts of the English School; Realists argue that anarchy, hard power and war is a key approach in the international society.¹⁰⁹ Liberals claim that there must be a balance between “hard” and “soft” revolutions meaning, peace, constitutions and flexible democracies shape the international society.¹¹⁰ Constructivists stipulate, that an international society is formed through a balance of national interests, moral values and legitimate rules accepted by the society.¹¹¹ The three distinctive spheres of the English School, as analysed above, produce a complete image of the IR universe; mark a conceptual and methodological meaning of all the elements, examine all concepts through a three theoretical approach of the English School (i.e. Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism) and demonstrate a strong interlink among them.

The English School presents two distinctive visions of the international society - Pluralism and Solidarism. Hedley Bull assesses the Pluralist versus Solidarist debate and outlines their diverse conception of the English School based on the three traditional spheres analysed above. Pluralists defend the realist approach of the international society, arguing that diversity helps states form a society, where states are able to agree only for a certain minimum purposes due to political differences.¹¹² Solidarists support the liberal and constructivist approach of the international society, claiming that the society can develop through wide-ranging norms, values, principles and institutions, covering both coexistence

¹⁰⁸ H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Palgrave, 1977), 23.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1112-1113.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1112-1113.

¹¹² William Bain, "The Pluralist-Solidarist Debate in the English School," *Guide to the English School in International Studies*, 2014, 159-169, [Doi.org/10.1002/9781118624722.ch10](https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118624722.ch10).

and cooperation among actors with shared interests, goals and collective enforcement.¹¹³ The English School theory is a multi-conceptual and multi-dimensional theory of IR, which allows positioning currently NATO and its strategic partnerships in the multipolar security environment.

3.2. The Strategic Images of NATO and its Partnerships Through the English School

Currently, the Alliance is facing serious challenges for its capabilities to defend and secure its area and out-of-area operation, driven primarily by new and disruptive technology. NATO's new *raison d'être* captures not only defensive operations and peacekeeping outside its area of operation, but it also focuses on defence cooperation with its partners, regional collective defence and security thus, the promotion of political norms. The fundamental changes in the international system resulted in a new hardened security environment encompassing new security threats, security challenges, new vulnerabilities and risks that are perceived as destructive if not responded with a resilient global comprehensive approach applied by actors such as NATO. NATO's security adaption to the structural change of the current international system means:

- a) overcoming its *realpolitik* roots by applying hard and soft power through its partnership framework,¹¹⁴
- b) cooperating with its partners by developing a global comprehensive approach¹¹⁵ governed through enforced legal principles along with appropriate political and military tools to manage NATO's internal and external crises in the age of multipolarism.¹¹⁶

NATO in the light of the English School demonstrates how power is compromised through multifunctional cooperation between its members and partners governed by a strong rule of law, outlined in the Washington Treaty for NATO members, and bilateral agreements with its partners, outlined in the PfP program. NATO's power lies in its partnership framework, strong interplay among its members, deep cooperation between allies and its partners, legal

¹¹³ Nicholas J. Wheeler, and Timothy Dunne. "Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)* 72, no. 1 (1996): 93. Doi.org/10.2307/2624751.

¹¹⁴ R. B. J. Walker, Realism, Change, and International Political Theory, *International Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 1. (March 1987): 65–86. Doi.org/10.2307/2600660.

¹¹⁵ C.A. Cutler. "The 'Grotian Tradition' in International Relations." *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 1 (1991): 41–65. Doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500112318.

¹¹⁶ Ian Clark, "Traditions of Thought and Classical Theories of International Relations," *Classical Theories of International Relations*, (1996): 1-19. Doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27509-0_1.

principles governed by shared interests (i.e. achieving absolute security and defence), norms and values (i.e. promoting democracy to install and preserve peace).

The strategic images of NATO and its partnership are founded upon their politico-economic, strategic and military roles. The Alliance has transformed into a multifunctional security organization, combining the following roles, see appendix 1¹¹⁷.

NATO as a *collective defence organization*, where under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), parties agreed to “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”¹¹⁸. The Alliance is created for security and military cooperation in order to carry out crisis response operations and peacekeeping operations through collective security and joint forces.¹¹⁹ NATO as a *politico-economic organization*, promoting democratic values, economic prosperity and projecting security, stability and peace. This role is based on the Democratic Peace Theory, which emerged from the writings of Immanuel Kant and Bruce Russett that “allied democratic states do not go to war against each other”¹²⁰, in case of NATO and its partnerships they are united by common interests, identity and goals. NATO as a *community of values*, where democracy, human rights and rule of law are a pre-condition to all and “parties are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”¹²¹.

The following chapter analyses the evolution of NATO’s strategic partnerships. It briefly discusses Cold War and transitions into the post-1990s and post-9/11 setting, characterised by multipolarism, to demonstrate the change in NATO’s perception of security. It scrutinises the rise of “NATO Nouvelle” in the post-Cold War context and presents the Alliance’s new policy and strategy – partnerships. It aims to examine the PfP program along with the significance and role of NATO’s strategic partnerships.

¹¹⁷ See page 74.

¹¹⁸ NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty 1949: Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949”: 1, accessed December 20, 2019, <http://alturl.com/2dztz>.

¹¹⁹ Roy Jr. W. Stafford, “NATO Transformed (Book).” *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly* no. 22, (1999):

121. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed December 21, 2019).

¹²⁰ R. Bruce, and J. R. Oneal, “*Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*” (New York: Norton, 2001), 393.

¹²¹ NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty 1949: Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949”: 1, accessed December 20, 2019, <http://alturl.com/2dztz>.

CHAPTER 2: Theorising Partnerships in a Multipolar Setting

4. NATO's Perception of Security in Multipolarism

Security through partnerships is NATO's new vision of security in multipolarism. The Alliance's perception of security was dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War with the disintegration of the USSR; the shift towards multipolarity; the rise of new security threats; NATO-led military operations in the 1990s. NATO enhanced its collective security in the 1990s by launching its PfP program along with its strategic partnership framework in order to identify and counter complex security threats (i.e. cyber and hybrid threats), gain greater security and stability over its area of operation along with responding to the rising NATO's external and internal crises, dominated by the agenda related to Russia and Turkey in Europe.¹²² Multipolarism reflects to the strengthening of new centres of power and comes under the paradigm of "common and shared responsibility", which the Alliance with its partners is united under in order to achieve strategic stability in the 21st century.¹²³ The current global landscape is confronted with turbulent shifts in the world order and new global megatrends such as:

- i. Military and economic power shift to Asia,
- ii. Increased power to non- state actors governed by technology,
- iii. The change of global demographics and the rise of scarcities,
- iv. Energy revolution,
- v. Uncertain leadership of the (United States) US and the West to fight above mentioned struggles.¹²⁴

The transition to multipolarity and these new global megatrends signify potential strategic shocks and danger not only to the international environment but to NATO and its partners to carry out its core mission of collective defence and security.¹²⁵ The Alliance is entering an 'era of global competition and uncertainty' that rapidly changes, poses severe challenges and

¹²² Danish Institute for International Studies, *"Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World,"* last modified 2014, accessed January 28, 2020, <http://alturl.com/oig4q>.

¹²³ Graeme P. Herd, *Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century: Competing Visions of World Order* (London: Routledge, 2010).

¹²⁴ Barry Pavel and Magnus Nordenman, "Global Trends and the Future of NATO: Alliance Security in an Era of Global Competition," Atlantic Council, last modified August 16, 2019, accessed 26 January 2020, <http://alturl.com/78x3j>.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

offers different opportunities to NATO.¹²⁶ The development of strategic partnerships has played a key role in changing NATO's perception of security, altering the strategic environment of the Alliance and setting up a new collective defence posture in the post-Cold War context.¹²⁷ The power and effects of multipolarism are clearly visualised in the post 9/11 context with the rise of new powers and security threats and NATO's crisis management experience in the Balkan region and Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks. This required the Alliance to reassess and review its strategic posture by embedding its strategic partnerships as a policy and strategy into its Strategic Concept 2010. In order to theorise NATO partnerships in a multipolar setting, it is essential to analyse the idea of NATO and the preliminary construction of the partnership framework in the bipolar order during the Cold War. This leads to the creation of the PfP program, diverse NATO's strategic partnership framework along with the integration of strategic partnerships into NATO's cooperative approach to security, tied closely with the emergence of the concept of "NATO Nouvelle"¹²⁸ in multipolarism.

4.1. The Evolution of NATO's Partnership Framework

The evolution of NATO's partnership framework and the PfP program, can be dated back to the Cold War, dominated by the bipolar power struggle between the US and the USSR, classical alliances along with NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively. The preliminary construction of NATO's partnership framework under the PfP program is deeply rooted in the Cold War, when the greatest challenge for the US and its European allies was containing the USSR and preventing the spread of communism.¹²⁹ The USSR challenged the Cold War order with the creation of the Warsaw Pact while the US and Europe challenged the Cold War with the creation of NATO - a new type of multilateral defence agreement.¹³⁰ The prioritization of partnerships is based on an idea of extending classical alliances after the end of the Cold War.

¹²⁶ Barry Pavel and Magnus Nordenman, "Global Trends and the Future of NATO: Alliance Security in an Era of Global Competition," Atlantic Council, last modified August 16, 2019, accessed 26 January 2020, <http://alturl.com/78x3j>.

¹²⁷ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 193, accessed December 3, 2019, <http://alturl.com/82xgi>.

¹²⁸ Alexander G. Crowther, "NATO Nouvelle: Everything Old Is New Again", *Joint Force Quarterly* 83, no. 4 (2016): 91-98.

¹²⁹ Boyden C. Gray, "An Economic NATO: A New Alliance for New Global Order," Atlantic Council (2013): 1, accessed February 2, 2020, <http://alturl.com/9omch>.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.

Strategic partnerships became a new policy and strategy of preference for NATO in the post-1990s multipolar setting, characterized by elevated political and military cooperation along with collective security. The creation of the Washington Treaty is a crucial legal instrument in the evolution of the PfP and NATO strategic partnerships for understanding how strategic partnerships under the PfP are used by the Alliance as a policy and strategy.

The Washington Treaty established NATO to deter Soviet military attacks and to defend Europe through collective defence and military power.¹³¹ The principle of collective defence and military power was best defined through most prominently, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – Collective Security, the army, possession of various weaponries and most importantly, the concept of nuclear deterrence, which was the core notion of the Cold War period.¹³² NATO ever since its foundation has been set to function as a community of values, collective military defence alliance and a politico-economic organization, having a common and shared responsibility to defend and secure itself.¹³³ This underlines the fact that the PfP program and NATO strategic partnerships are a policy because they are built on the fundamental principles that define a democratic society. The central aim of the Washington Treaty was to create a military alliance, which would collectively secure its members from the communist ideology and the USSR aggressive behaviour.¹³⁴ In the post-Cold War context, *collective security* was used as the new defence posture, where strategic partnerships under the PfP are the centrepiece of NATO's cooperative approach to security.¹³⁵ This means that the PfP serves as a strategy for the Alliance because strategic goals of NATO are achieved through strategic commands and the Military Cooperation Division (MCD), out of which the PfP is a program. The PfP is a central and permanent feature of the trans-Atlantic security system and partners are at its centre because they share its resources and military capabilities with NATO.

¹³¹ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-57, doi.org/10.2307/2538981.

¹³² Charly S. Pasternak, "From Protecting Some to Security Many: NATO's Journey from A Military Alliance to a Security Manager." *The Finnish Institute of International Affairs* 17 (2007): 32.

¹³³ NATO Defense College, "NATO's organizational evolution: the case of a Civil Security Committee," (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2008): 2, accessed February 3, 2020, <http://alturl.com/7khsk>.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 5-57.

¹³⁵ David S. Yost *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington DC: United States Inst of Peace Press, 1998), 31.

During the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact, served as an important step for NATO's future important enlargement, where all non-Soviet satellite states within the Warsaw Pact framework joined the Alliance or the PfP program in the late 1990s, positioning strategic partnerships at the core of NATO's strategy in the post-Cold War context.¹³⁶

The end of the Cold War shifted NATO's military and political strategy, changing the Alliance's security perception by widening - expanding its territorial control into Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, gaining territorial range through its partnership framework deeper into the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean, the Gulf region and across the globe. In the post-Cold War era, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991, in which members and non-members discussed political and security issues of Europe, moving closer to the official establishment of the PfP program. The post-1990s and the multipolar setting allowed NATO to create one of its new powerful instruments - strategic partnerships. The launch of the PfP program in 1994 marks the beginning of the Alliance's new security posture, introducing multilateralism as the Alliance's main political practice, creating its strategic partnerships under the PfP as one of the main political and military practices to bond transatlantic relationships, and to enlarge the transatlantic community.¹³⁷

4.2. The Emergence of the PfP Program and "NATO Nouvelle" in Post-1990s

Multipolarity challenged NATO by its nature and compelled it to transform itself in order to position itself in the new security setting of the 21st century by extending its strategic concept of adaptation.¹³⁸ The transition to multipolarity brought three vital reordering of the world's geopolitical structures, expectations and attitudes towards IR.¹³⁹ First, the disintegration of the USSR left the US as a unipolar unit, until the September 11 attacks and the rise of new powers.¹⁴⁰ Second, a more limited turmoil and conflict in its scope and geostrategic

¹³⁶ David S. Yost *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington DC: United States Inst of Peace Press, 1998), 31.

¹³⁷ Charly S. Pasternak, "From Protecting Some to Security Many: NATO's Journey from A Military Alliance to a Security Manager." *The Finish Institute of International Affairs* 17 (2007): 46.

¹³⁸ Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War". *Cambridge University Press* 54, no. 4 (2003): 718, doi.org/10.1162/002081800551343.

¹³⁹ Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics of the World Systems* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003), 87.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 87.

implications.¹⁴¹ Third, more open borders allowing globalization¹⁴² and regionalization¹⁴³ to flourish with its positive and negative implications.¹⁴⁴ NATO became an important political alliance based on democratic values with primary military roles encompassing the idea of collective defence and expanding its military forces in various defence-positioning groups across Europe, using its strategic partnerships in joint force actions.¹⁴⁵ This means NATO in the thr age of multipolarism became not only an Alliance principally dedicated to safeguarding its members against military threats but as an institutional expression of the transatlantic community of states promoting and uniting western values, including various partnerships.¹⁴⁶ Since the end of the Cold War, the main changes in NATO's perception of security are governed by:

- a) introducing its New Strategic Concept over collective defence,
- b) solidifying its European pillar by offering Europe its military capacity to act together without the US participation,
- c) creating the PfP programme,
- d) undergoing through the process of widening.¹⁴⁷

This clearly expanded the Alliance's capabilities, in relation to power through its strategic partnerships, utilising it as a policy and strategy in the military sector. It acknowledged its relevance and restated its position in Europe as "NATO Nouvelle"¹⁴⁸ in the post-Cold War era and the age of multipolarism.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴¹ Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics of the World Systems* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003), 87.

¹⁴² An increasing interaction among, and integration of, the activities, especially economic activities, of human societies around the world. For detailed discussion see Mussa, Michael. "Meeting the Challenges of Globalisation." *Journal of African Economics* 12, no. 1 (February 2003), 14-34. doi:10.1093/jae/12.suppl_1.14.

¹⁴³ A fragmentation or segmentation of the integrated global world, forming regions on both sub-level (within states) and macro level (planetary) of the global political structure. For a detailed discussion see Grinin, Leonid E., Ilya V. Ilyin, Peter Herrmann, and Andrey V. Korotayev. "Global Regionalization as a Phenomenon of Globalization." In *Globalistics and globalization studies: Global Transformations and Global Future*, 271-276. Volgograd: Uchitel Publishing House, 2016.

¹⁴⁴ Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics of the World Systems* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003), 87.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 718.

¹⁴⁶ Ivo H. Daalder, *NATO in the 21st Century: What Purpose? What Missions?* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), chapter 1, accessed January 10, 2020, <http://alturl.com/krkd7>.

¹⁴⁷ Brian J. Collins, *NATO: A Guide to the Issues* (Oxford: PRAEGER, 2011), 94.

¹⁴⁸ Alexander G. Crowther, "NATO Nouvelle: Everything Old Is New Again", *Joint Force Quarterly* 83, no. 4 (2016): 91-98.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 94.

The beginning of the 21st century represents the beginning of “NATO Nouvelle”¹⁵⁰ as a politico-military Alliance of the post-1990s multipolar setting.¹⁵¹ One of the principal reason why NATO still endures is because it became an “*Alliance of Democracies*”, possessing hidden strengths that can overcome internal disputes and is ready to fight its rivals with a solid grounded strategic partnership framework.¹⁵² The emergence of “NATO Nouvelle”¹⁵³ is a breaking point in the evolution of NATO’s partnership framework.¹⁵⁴ NATO strategic partnerships were incorporated into the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security and used as the main diplomatic, political and military tool for NATO to manage stability around its allies in the post-1990s.¹⁵⁵ The concept of “NATO Nouvelle”¹⁵⁶ was introduced at the Washington 50th Anniversary Summit in 1999, where the Alliance presented its three purposes in the new century.¹⁵⁷ First, NATO is the “*Alliance of Collective Defence*” with military capacity to defend and secure its allies and partners.¹⁵⁸ Second, it is the “*Alliance of Collective Security*” with institutional force, promoting values and democratic principles of the Atlantic community throughout Europe in an effort to project stability and security.¹⁵⁹ Third, NATO is the “*Alliance of Collective Interests*”, whose purpose is to defend its security interests and politically and economically prevent any threats to attack Europe and the US.¹⁶⁰ The multipolar settings added NATO an institutional and political identity therefore, NATO enhanced its transformation through soft power in order to be able to comprehend new global trends brought by the multipolar setting, identify and counter unknown threats with its strategic partnerships.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁰ Alexander G. Crowther, “NATO Nouvelle: Everything Old Is New Again”, *Joint Force Quarterly* 83, no. 4 (2016): 91-98.

¹⁵¹ Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War”. *Cambridge University Press* 54, no. 4 (2003): 717, doi.org/10.1162/002081800551343.

¹⁵² Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 287.

¹⁵³ Alexander G. Crowther, “NATO Nouvelle: Everything Old Is New Again”, *Joint Force Quarterly* 83, no. 4 (2016): 91-98.

¹⁵⁴ Ivo H. Daalder, *NATO in the 21st Century: What Purpose? What Missions?* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), 8, accessed January 10, 2020, <http://alturl.com/krkd7>.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁵⁶ Alexander G. Crowther, “NATO Nouvelle: Everything Old Is New Again”, *Joint Force Quarterly* 83, no. 4 (2016): 91-98.

¹⁵⁷ Ivo H. Daalder, *NATO in the 21st Century: What Purpose? What Missions?* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), chapter 1, accessed January 10, 2020, <http://alturl.com/krkd7>.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁶¹ Joseph Lepgold, “NATO’s Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem.” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 81.

NATO's development in regard to its new military strategy embraced both political and military transformations in multipolarism. It is crucial to explain the difference between the concept of *strategy* and *stratagem* in terms of NATO's partnership development under multipolar settings. According to Sir Lawrence Freedman, military strategy is the art of creating power that embraces stratagem.¹⁶² This means NATO's enlargement and the creation of the PfP program with partners at its centre are different forms of stratagem of the Alliance to create power.¹⁶³ Since NATO is based on military capacity building, as Sun Tzu argued building of "capacity" and "strength" ultimately reaches a successfully exercised strategy.¹⁶⁴ This means, NATO needs to have enough strength, political and military capacity to succeed in its military operations as seen in the best-known missions in Kosovo, Libya, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan, with partners fighting in the front line, supporting NATO.¹⁶⁵ Arguably, NATO's adaptation concept in the current multipolar order is a strategy.¹⁶⁶ Firstly, it is an idea, offering series of possibilities of NATO to adapt to the new security environment through the use of soft power, by promoting institutional changes, expanding its partnership framework.¹⁶⁷ Secondly, it is practice, emphasizing the use of hard power by revealing its New Strategic Concept in the contemporary world, actively utilizing and incorporating its various partnerships under the PfP into its cooperative approach to security to have a solid defence posture.¹⁶⁸

The PfP program, launched in 1994, extended the stability and security throughout and beyond Europe and represents a permanent feature of the European security planning of NATO¹⁶⁹, where political and democratic values shared by allies and partners are essential part of the strategic partnership framework under the PfP.¹⁷⁰ The PfP is an open and transparent process, which brings together NATO allies and partners in a joint defence, and security

¹⁶² Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 6-17.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 6-17.

¹⁶⁴ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Lionel Giles (Norwalk: The Puppet Press, 1910), 38.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁶⁶ Pinar Bilgin, "Security studies: Theory/practice. "Cambridge Review of International Affairs 12, no. 2 (1999): 33-34. doi.org/10.1080/09557579908400239.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

¹⁶⁹ NATO Homepage, "Partnership for Peace – And Enhanced and More Operational Partnership", 1, accessed February 2, 2020, <http://alturl.com/tg4ht>.

¹⁷⁰ John Woodliffe, "The Evolution of a New NATO for a New Europe." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (1998): 177, accessed February 2, 2020, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/761487>.

related activities such as crisis management, civil emergency planning and armaments cooperation.¹⁷¹ The major objectives of the PfP since 1994 is:

1. Increasing transparency among countries in national defence planning and military budgeting,
2. Promoting democratic values,
3. Long-term development of operational forces between partner countries and NATO members.¹⁷²

Since the emergence of the PfP program, the idea to enlarge coexisted as an evolutionary process for NATO to grow in size and in political and security developments in Europe, serving as a pathway into NATO membership.^{173,174} NATO's perception of security through its partnerships has been considerably expanded in 1997, by giving the PfP an operational role.¹⁷⁵ This served as a linchpin of NATO's new approach in the age of multipolarism, when the Alliance practically incorporated partners into its, diplomatic, political and military planning for the first time, extending it non-member countries.¹⁷⁶

The PfP program and NATO strategic partnerships have become a political and military priority for NATO's New Strategic Concept in terms of collective security – Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.¹⁷⁷ International security in today's globalized multipolar world demands a responsive framework to interconnectedness, power struggle, shared vulnerabilities and rapid change.¹⁷⁸ In order to combat these diverse challenges presented by multipolarism, NATO uses its partnerships to provide an operative international security framework, meaning partners are a vital key for NATO to preserve a stable and well-secured international system, international society and world society.¹⁷⁹ NATO utilizes a four-system based strategy with its partners: interoperable military capabilities, actions in the global commons and on

¹⁷¹ NATO Homepage, "Partnership for Peace – And Enhanced and More Operational Partnership", 1, accessed February 2, 2020, <http://alturl.com/tg4ht>.

¹⁷² Ibid., 1.

¹⁷³ John Woodliffe, "The Evolution of a New NATO for a New Europe." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (1998): 180, accessed February 2, 2020, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/761487>.

¹⁷⁴ John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and beyond." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 71, no. 2 (1995): 239. doi:10.2307/2623432.

¹⁷⁵ NATO Homepage, "Partnership for Peace – And Enhanced and More Operational Partnership", 1, accessed February 2, 2020, <http://alturl.com/tg4ht>.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 1.

¹⁷⁷ Markus Kaim, "Reforming NATO's Partnerships." Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin, 2017): 5-23, accessed January 16, 2020, <http://alturl.com/fy3tc>.

¹⁷⁸ Atlantic Council, NATO Global Partnerships: Strategic Opportunities and Imperatives in a Globalized World (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2013), 2, accessed February 12, 2020, <http://alturl.com/mnrbz>.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 2.

transatlantic threats, military and security sector development along with strategic cooperation.¹⁸⁰

The significance of the PfP is that individual partners share their expertise and assistance to the Alliance during crises or defence processes, elevating NATO's soft and hard power capacities.¹⁸¹ It is based on practical collaboration and commitment to democratic principles that define NATO.¹⁸² The PfP program promotes reforms, increases stability, and diminishes threats to peace and security by establishing strong security relations between NATO allies and partners.¹⁸³ The core of the PfP is an individually formed partnership agreement with NATO tailored to individual needs, interests and capabilities.¹⁸⁴ The core ideas of the PfP are later transformed into action by providing a framework for both bilateral and multilateral actions by extending partner countries abilities to take part in NATO, engaging military and diplomatic programs.¹⁸⁵

4.2.1. NATO Strategic Partnerships

NATO actively engages with forty partners of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), MD, ICI and PATG¹⁸⁶, including Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, who hold the position of non-member countries, which offer substantial political and military capabilities and support for the Alliance missions.¹⁸⁷

Strategic partnerships are the centrepiece of NATO's new tactic of the 21st century and contribute to the Alliance's adaptation to new security challenges and broader vision of security.¹⁸⁸ Strategic partnerships, thus play a role of the 'new alliances', which allow NATO to

¹⁸⁰ Atlantic Council, NATO Global Partnerships: Strategic Opportunities and Imperatives in a Globalized World (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2013), 9-13, accessed February 12, 2020, <http://alturl.com/mnrbz>.

¹⁸¹ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 201, accessed December 3, 2019, <http://alturl.com/82xgi>.

¹⁸² Ibid., 197.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 197.

¹⁸⁴ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 197, accessed December 3, 2019, <http://alturl.com/82xgi>.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 198.

¹⁸⁶ Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Partners Across the Globe

¹⁸⁷ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security (Brussels: NATO, 2013), 2, accessed February 15, 2020, <http://alturl.com/wy5hv>.

¹⁸⁸ Tobias Bunde Antje Lein-Struck and Adrian Oroz, *Towards Mutual Security* (Göttingen: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek, 2014), 229.

widely operate, adapt and shape the increasingly contested world order, without necessarily expanding.¹⁸⁹ Stephen Walt defines the concept of *alliance*, as an “arrangement[s] for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states”¹⁹⁰, whereas Joseph Nye describes alliances as “arrangements that sovereign states enter into with each other in order to ensure their mutual security”¹⁹¹. This work follows George Liska’s and Edwin Fedder’s definition of an alliance in relation to NATO’s strategic partnership framework as “an explicit agreement among states in the realm of national security in which the partners promise mutual assistance in the form of substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency the arising of which is uncertain”¹⁹².

Different forms of NATO strategic partnerships helped the Alliance create a more stable and secure culture characterized by strong determination of its members and partners to apply international cooperation to the task of tackling dangerous security challenges inside or outside NATO’s zone of responsibility.¹⁹³ NATO strategic partnerships contribute to the reinforcement of the democratic transformation of the Alliance by constructing a more flexible, operative and democratically modern armed forces along with political forces.¹⁹⁴ In relation to NATO’s soft and hard power, strategic partners are highly valuable especially in the post-9/11 context because the Alliance utilises its partnerships worldwide to achieve maximised security and stability over its area in series of ways such as ensuring the balance of power in crises, implementing stabilization forces in conflicting regions, enforcing peace and promoting democratic values.¹⁹⁵

The post-9/11 setting has transformed NATO’s security perceptions by enhancing its partnership framework, reaching out to global partners. Before and after the September 11 attacks, the concept of partnership did not lose its significance, it underlined the importance

¹⁸⁹ Tobias Bunde Antje Lein-Struck and Adrian Oroz, *Towards Mutual Security* (Göttingen: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek, 2014), 229.

¹⁹⁰ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 12.

¹⁹¹ Joseph Jr Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 39.

¹⁹² Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner, *Small States and Alliances* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 36.

¹⁹³ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 193, accessed December 3, 2019, <http://alturl.com/82xgi>.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 193.

¹⁹⁵ Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and Stephen F. Larrabee, “NATO expansion: The next steps,” *Global Politics and Strategy* 37, (1995): 7-33, [Doi.org/10.1080/00396339508442774](https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339508442774).

of the EAPC under the PfP program. However, NATO's identity was redefined in the post 9/11 context.¹⁹⁶ The Alliance acquired a "new kind of enemy" entailing global terrorism as an internationally recognized security threat in the 21st century and raised broader global security questions.¹⁹⁷ Since 2001, NATO has begun to promote a deeper multilateral approach in global governance, collective efforts in responding to crises and enhanced partnerships within the PfP, which served as a gradual tool for potential future members and partner countries to adopt a new security and defence approach in multipolarism. Indisputably, the September 11 attacks best define the meaning of collective security because NATO evoked first time in history Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which strongly involved its partners. According to the NATO's Strategic Concept 2010, the cooperative approach to security is more efficient, when fighting against terrorism with an enhanced partnership framework, especially with global partners. This is why NATO is founded on the principle of collective defence security and partners are its centrepiece, because NATO allies and partners unify political and military forces to counter and safeguard an attacked ally in terms of crisis as demonstrated with the September 11 attacks.¹⁹⁸

All partnerships are based on mutual interests and benefits, meaning NATO profits from its partnership framework.¹⁹⁹ NATO helps strengthening its partners' military forces, training and educating them in military capacity building.²⁰⁰ Partner countries take advantage of NATO's support in promoting democratic values and establishing civilian control over military. Geopolitics is not the major guiding principle for NATO partnerships - it is the political commitment.²⁰¹ NATO is a community of values, where members are abided by the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.²⁰²

Currently, NATO strategic partnerships under the PfP program are facing great challenges within the European security environment due to NATO's rising external and

¹⁹⁶ Dzintars Kalnis, "9/11 and the Transformation of NATO's identity in the post-Cold War Context" (term paper, University of Bremen, 2010), 12.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 12.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 12.

¹⁹⁹ NATO Defense College, NATO's Partnerships After 2014: Go West!, no. 92 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2013): 5, accessed February 4, 2020, <http://alturl.com/u7y4t>.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 5.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 5.

²⁰² Ibid., 5.

internal challenges, the rapid evolution and increase of interdependence due to globalization among certain set of threats.²⁰³ NATO alone cannot and will not tackle various security challenges therefore, different partnerships serve as a strategy with major political and military role, which become indispensable during NATO-led operations in the fight against terrorism, to counter the proliferation of WMDs and to stop additional threats and challenges from occurring.²⁰⁴ The Alliance focuses on deepening relations with non-NATO countries and establishes relations to increase political and military partnership, cooperation and political dialogue as to achieve its key goals: increase of transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity of joint collective action.²⁰⁵ Since 2011, strategic partnerships became more functional for NATO on a global level due to; dialogue and cooperation, reform, operations and enlargement.²⁰⁶ The Alliance prepares political dialogue and practical cooperation with its partners in order to negotiate on issues related to security.²⁰⁷ It enhances its abilities to promote democratic values and foster democratic transformation across the Euro-Atlantic area by assisting its partners by political, and security related advices in terms of defence, institutional reforms and democratic control over the region.²⁰⁸ NATO continues to prepare interested partners for their participation in NATO-led operations and defence planning system by paying exclusive attention to its partner's individual interests and abilities in order to develop military interoperability and defence transformation.²⁰⁹ The Alliance supports its partners through the PfP program to join the Alliance with a consistent open policy to fight present and upcoming security threats.²¹⁰

Due to the rising NATO's external and internal challenges, the Alliance is for further stabilization of the transatlantic area rethinking its partnership with Ukraine and Georgia and expanding the non-European partnerships (in the case of Jordan, Finland and Sweden), which

²⁰³ Artur Kacprzyk, Kacper Rekawek, Witold Rodkiewicz and Andrej Wilk, "NATO and the Future of Peace in Europe: Towards a Tailored Approach." *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*, (Warsaw, 2016): 5, accessed February 10, 2020, <http://alturl.com/65j7w>.

²⁰⁴ NATO Defense College, *NATO's Partnerships After 2014: Go West!*, no. 92 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2013): 5, accessed February 4, 2020, <http://alturl.com/u7y4t>.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁰⁶ Danish Institute for International Studies, *"Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World,"* last modified 2014, accessed January 28, 2020, <http://alturl.com/oig4q>.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*


play a pivotal role in securing the Baltic Sea region and entire High North flank.²¹¹ In relation to NATO's external and internal crises, strategic partnerships help the Alliance by information sharing of evolving threats, stabilizing regions with collective force, offer new political and military expertise and support NATO during the phase of crises.

The following chapter contextualises the use of partnerships in connection to NATO's external crisis with Russia and an internal crisis with Turkey. The role of NATO's strategic partnership with Georgia and Ukraine is examined in case of Russia. Moreover, the next chapter reveals how a strategic partnership is employed as a strategy by Turkey and Russia in case of Syria.

²¹¹ Danish Institute for International Studies, *"Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World,"* last modified 2014, accessed January 28, 2020, <http://alturl.com/oig4q>.

Chapter 3: The Rising NATO's Challenges and the Use of Partnerships

NATO's partnership framework is an important policy making and a military strategy to combat new challenges of multipolarism. *Strategic partnerships are types of alliances that allow to reach operational and strategic goals without firm commitments that traditional alliances usually involve thus, provide flexibility in reaching strategic objectives.* Traditional alliances are not operative in a multipolar landscape. IR continually changes, this is one of the principal reasons why NATO's military missions in the post-1990s are supported by partnerships because the traditional model of NATO's operation is no longer applicable in the 21st century. This is the reason why partnerships are at the centre of NATO's cooperative approach to security in the post-1990s. Hence, NATO's unilateral military invasions do not work in the post-1990s context thus, partners are the Alliance's new vision of collective security. In both cases of Russia and Turkey, both states can challenge each other through effective partnerships, which provide for reduced risk compared to classical alliances, which have treaties. This allows both to engage in proxy warfare (i.e. through partnerships) in Syria, fight alongside its established partnerships and indirectly battle to pursue self-interest and maximise power through their partners. Strategic partnerships in this case allow for swift realignment between countries with a common strategic objective. Thus, partnerships as the new alliances give greater flexibility to states to engage in conflict, less security in a conflict scenario however, a higher chance in reaching its strategic objectives. Flexibility, security and probability is strongly interlinked with the use of partnership networks.



High flexibility does not require strong commitments of established partnerships (ad hoc agreements). Less security is provided due to a *voluntary* participation and decision of partners to intervene. High probabilities of succeeding are achieved due to the flexibility and the use of means provided by partnerships to realise strategic goals in a conflict scenario.

5. The Use of Strategic Partnerships

Partnerships are a key instrument to security and stability that shape behaviour and change attitudes of NATO.²¹² The partnership framework is a way for NATO to strengthen cooperation in different institutions, in building new bridges between a set of countries and also in being much more operative in operations at a domestic and international level during crises situations.²¹³ Partners assist NATO in sharing visions, advice and shape the Alliance's current position in relation to Russia and Turkey.²¹⁴ NATO partnerships improve communication with partnering nations, stimulate international reforms in these nations and lead the formation of a like-minded community of nations through programs such as PfP.²¹⁵ NATO strategic partners help promoting regional cooperation and stability, meaning partners are a tool for gradual democratization and holders of liberal norms that create regional socialization and improve conditions for peace.²¹⁶ NATO allies and strategic partners share common interests, which include community values, ideology and politico-economic benefits.²¹⁷ These common interests are the main drivers for partnership formation therefore; PfP partners are consciously cooperating with NATO for various reasons.²¹⁸ The major reasons are outlined by NATO's security dialogue and cooperation of the 21st century, meaning as the security environment evolves, partnerships are evolving too in order to detect, address and respond with collective action with NATO.²¹⁹

Partnerships play a critically important role in the present international system, where regular exchanges of views are needed within the Alliance and partners.²²⁰ Many security challenges of the 21st century are best addressed by working closely with partners who are

²¹² NATO Defense College and Guillaume Lasconjarias, "The Importance of Partnerships for NATO," *YouTube*, September 28, 2017, accessed February 13, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vFqCan5XO3c>.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ Ivan D. Ivanov, "The Effect of NATO Partnerships on Alliance's Smart Defense." American political Science Annual Meeting (Chicago: University of Cincinnati, 2013): 25, accessed February 15, 2020, <http://alturl.com/iq6xn>.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

²¹⁷ Bruce M. Russett, "Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 3 (1968): 285, accessed February 15, 2020, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/172667>.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 285.

²¹⁹ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *Security Through Partnership* (Brussels: NATO, 2005), 14, accessed February 16, 2020, <http://alturl.com/jh8uu>.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

familiar with specific regions or have established relations with neighbouring countries.²²¹ In this regard, EAPC and PfP are beneficial programs for both members and partners.²²² By strengthening and consolidating NATO's partnerships, the allies and partners benefit in three core fields: first, engaging partners in NATO's political and military sector, partners may be eligible to pursue membership to the Alliance.²²³ Second, partnerships are useful to provide institutional support for example in the Middle East and North Africa, where partner countries are experienced in the recent regime change and can help with their political knowledge.²²⁴ This means, their participation with NATO would facilitate military reforms towards democratization, enhanced efficiency and a higher level of contribution in international operations.²²⁵ Third, partners offer flexible cooperation to NATO and long-term military support as seen with the case of Afghanistan and September 11 attacks.²²⁶

The primary role of strategic partnerships for the Alliance in the 21st century is the provision of security with flexible means. Flexibility of strategic partnerships can be depicted with the example of Afghanistan in 1996-2001, when the Afghan Northern Alliance partnered with several countries²²⁷ including Russia and Turkey, by sharing its resources for the strategic purpose to defeat the Taliban, which partnered with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The strategic goal was to topple Taliban regime out of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the strategic partnership was based on state sponsorship, where partners financially supported the provision of resources such as supplying fighting factions with donkey, for example.²²⁸ This is an instance used to portray how a several states functions as a strategic partnership, which is based on collaboration between various sovereign strategic interests through the share of resources and financial instruments to reach mutual profits. Secondly, a strategic partnership can be also represented with the example of Afghanistan in 2003-2014 showing the operational use

²²¹ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *Security Through Partnership* (Brussels: NATO, 2005), 14, accessed February 16, 2020, <http://alturl.com/jh8uu>.

²²² *Ibid.*, 14.

²²³ Ivan D. Ivanov, "The Effect of NATO Partnerships on Alliance's Smart Defense." American political Science Annual Meeting (Chicago: University of Cincinnati, 2013): 25, accessed February 15, 2020, <http://alturl.com/iq6xn>.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

²²⁷ Iran, Turkey, Tajikistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, India, China, United States and the United Kingdom

²²⁸ Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington* (New York: Broadway Books, 2011), 94.

of partners in a complex NATO-led operation with a broader range of goals and a multicultural background. It merges individual interests of NATO allies and partners to form a collaborative structure through a partnership agreement, approving the share of various resources in order to reach desired long-term objectives – liberate and stabilise Afghanistan. In sum, a partnership is a policy in a form of a political agreement on the instrumental means of support. Second, partnership is a strategy, because countries have used their resources and means of military support to achieve the strategic objective – in this case overthrow of the Taliban regime.

5.1. NATO's External Crisis with Russia

In order to understand NATO's external crisis with Russia, it is necessary to examine and position 'resurgent Russia' as a powerful actor in the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical space characterized by political, economic and military rivalry to dominate the regional political system. Russia was a special partner to NATO in the international system, as well as Georgia and Ukraine is, due to its unique seat in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).²²⁹ It is crucial to comprehend, that Russia strategically wanted its special statute in NATO, which it officially gained in 2002 through formalization and the establishment of the NRC.²³⁰

Outlining the key historical involvement of NATO-Russia relations, helps to further contextualise the present conflict between NATO-Russia, in regard to the Georgia and Ukraine to practically demonstrate the existing Russian race in terms of regional and political autonomy. The arms race between Russia and the Alliance is best examined through the historical discourse focusing on the geopolitical, economic and political force but also from the partnership perspective, territorial expansion, military tactics and nuclear weapons. Arguably, the vital significance of 'resurgent Russia' should not be underestimated in the Euro-Atlantic region. Russia may threaten and makes NATO and its partners dependent since it has access to resources such as energy, oil, natural gas, coal and Internet data cables, which play a central role in the Russian economy. This means, Russia has a strategic advantages due to its natural resources, which generate a massive international reliance of countries on Russia

²²⁹ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO-Russia Relations: Background* (Brussels: NATO, 2017), 1- 2, accessed March 7, 2020, <http://alturl.com/jh8uu>.

²³⁰ Julianne Smith, *The NATO-Russia Relationship: Defining Moment or Déjà vu?* (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2008): 3, accessed March 7, 2020, <http://bit.ly/2DEKYyp>.

and pose severe implications on the Euro-Atlantic space including NATO and its partners due to mutual resource dependency.²³¹ In order to comprehend the NATO-Russia external crisis, one must outline briefly the NATO-Russia historical development.

The Cold War marked a political and military competition between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The beginning of NATO's relations with Russia were in 1994, when it joined the PfP program. The PfP allowed Russia to tighten its bonds with countries that had been under the USSR's occupation.²³² Arguably, Russia's participation in the PfP program was a highly controversial issue because of political tensions between Russia and other members of the PfP program, security of the Euro-Atlantic area and the Russian idea of 'new Europe'.²³³ As a partner, Russia contributed to peacekeeping forces as the largest non-NATO member in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The year 1997 marks an important year in history for NATO-Russia relations because the Alliance and Russia agreed on the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security". This gave Russia the ability to help NATO foster stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic region. Furthermore, from NATO's perspective, having Russia as a partner was not only beneficial for greater stability of its region of influence. It also implied having Moscow on board with the Alliance rather than an opponent, letting Russia be directly involved in strategic affairs of the Euro-Atlantic region due to its geopolitical posture in Europe. However, the first breaking point for the NATO-Russia relations began in 1997, when NATO celebrated a successful enlargement into the post-Soviet space with Eastern European nations. This enlargement added hard and soft power to NATO and it allowed for deeper reformation of the Alliance, which was a threat to Russia and its imaginary idea of 'new Europe'.²³⁴ After the election of Vladimir Putin in 2001, NATO and Russia came closer together in terms of similar strategic objectives and common identified security challenges of the 21st century such as terrorism, WMDs and instability in Central Asia. This led to the establishment of the NRC, a consultative mechanism, which made both parties equal, where decisions were taken based on consensus despite, Russia not being part of the EAPC and the PfP program any

²³¹ Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Security and Strategic Force Modernization", *National Institute for Public Policy*, no. 420 (June 2017): 2-5.

²³² Andrew Foxall, "A Fateful Summit: The Future of NATO's Relationship with Russia," *Russia Studies Centre*, no. 1, (September 2014): 3, accessed March 7, 2020, <http://alturl.com/e2fc7>.

²³³ Ihor Kharchenko, "Russia and the PfP," *Rozenberg Quarterly*, (September 1994): 209, accessed March 7, 2020, <http://alturl.com/kqgtm>.

²³⁴ Andrew Foxall, "A Fateful Summit: The Future of NATO's Relationship with Russia," *Russia Studies Centre*, no. 1, (September 2014): 3, accessed March 7, 2020, <http://alturl.com/e2fc7>.

longer, much due to its individual agreement with NATO. The main reason why the NRC is based on consensus-building cooperation is because both parties need to politically engage to consult Euro-Atlantic security issues, where the success of reaching a consensus highly depends on the political willingness of the nation states.²³⁵ This leads to the questioning of NATO-Russia partnership. The NRC allowed Russia to further participate in NATO-led operations such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan as a strategic and special partner, where it facilitated land transit of non-military equipment across the Russian territory.

Presently Russia's complicated relations with NATO, has led to an external crisis, triggering a conflict scenario due to the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The institutional relations between the Alliance and Russia have been suspended since 2008, when Russia's actions were considered to be 'disproportionate' and failed to promote democracy in the Caucasus.²³⁶ Hence, in relation to the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in eastern Ukraine, Russia has violated international law, NATO's principles, the commitment to the Founding Act and produced hazard in the Euro-Atlantic security environment. This was a 'game changer' for NATO, Russia's failure of proximity left NATO-Russia relations damaged and frozen.²³⁷

5.1.1. Contextualising Partnerships

It is significant to contextualise both cases due to present existing security challenges of the 21st century, determined by geographic size, regional and geopolitical force along with political and military capabilities. Presently, countries in a closer proximity to Russia are receiving the greatest missiles from the US to face Russia. This means, Ukraine and Georgia do not have to be a NATO member like Poland to receive the newest weaponry for the long-term strategic aim to build its long-term defence capacity to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also, both countries, Georgia and Ukraine, are special partners to the

²³⁵ NATO Rome Summit 2002, "NATO-Russia Council," (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2002), 5, accessed March 8, 2020, <http://alturl.com/jr5u3>.

²³⁶ Andrew Foxall, "A Fateful Summit: The Future of NATO's Relationship with Russia," *Russia Studies Centre*, no. 1, (September 2014): 3, accessed March 7, 2020, <http://alturl.com/e2fc7>.

²³⁷ Margarete Klein and Claudia Major, "Perspectives for NATO-Russia Relations," *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, (November 2015): 1, accessed March 8, 2020, <http://alturl.com/3cqhv>.

Alliance due to the establishment of the NATO-Georgia Council (NGC) and NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC), which is the primary decision-making forum, elevating both countries as NATO partners. Both councils signify practical cooperation and bridges Georgia and Ukraine closer to NATO than any other partner countries.²³⁸

5.1.1.1. The Case of Georgia

This section follows the sub question: *What is the role of Georgia for the Alliance in the context of NATO's rising external challenges with Russia in the 21st century?* Geopolitically, Georgia is a strategic partner due to its geographic location in Caucasus in relation to energy supply to Europe. Politically, it is a special partner because it is democratically committed and aspires to be a NATO member but faces obstacles from Russia's geopolitical perceptions. Strategically, Georgia engages in an extensive practical cooperation with the Alliance and increases its operational capacities and capabilities through NATO's partnership framework. Georgia is one of the biggest non-ally contributors in NATO's outside area operations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq.²³⁹ Thus, it helps Europe and NATO to widely operate outside the Euro-Atlantic area for political and strategic purposes. Georgia is a policy and strategy for NATO. Politically, it is highly committed to NATO's democratic values and sharing of norms. Strategically, it regularly assists NATO in military-led operations due to its military forces.

In order to contextualise the case of Georgia, it is vital to understand the strategic role of Georgia in the multipolar world, which drives its special and strategic partnership with NATO. Georgia has been identified as a key strategic and special partner to NATO due to its ambitious drive to join the EU and NATO by assisting the Alliance politically through the NGC and militarily in collective NATO actions. The cooperation between NATO and Georgia can essentially be defined as a case of resisting and balancing against Russia.²⁴⁰ For Georgia, Russia is a threatening power, which tries to deter it through an alignment with NATO but also the

²³⁸ "NATO's Cooperation with Third Countries," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, accessed March 19, 2020, <http://alturl.com/ivw86>.

²³⁹ House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Europe, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Bucharest Summit and the Way Forward for NATO: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session*, April 23, 2008, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 19, accessed March 20, 2020, <https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=DdGfULKsfNQc&hl=en&pg=GBS.PA1>.

²⁴⁰ Alberto Priego, "NATO cooperation towards South Caucasus," *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 2, no. 1 (2008): 4, <http://alturl.com/kg4zx>.

US.²⁴¹ The essential strategic point of NATO's interest in the Caucasus was the historic post-9/11 context, which changed NATO's strategy towards the Greater Middle East through an enhanced strategic partnership framework. Georgia's plays a crucial strategic role due to its geographic location in the South Caucasus area for NATO but also the US. For this reason, Georgia is a great asset for NATO in the PfP program due to its strategic importance as an energy corridor. It ensures energy delivery to Europe, bypassing Russia. This is a fundamental fact that shapes Georgia's role in NATO's perception of security. It lowers the dependency of Europe and NATO on Russia's natural resources, which is one of the motives for Russia to invade Georgia in 2008 and bombard the pipelines to cut off the energy supply to Europe and NATO.²⁴²

Georgia is an important security actor for NATO because it is working hard to enhance its defence sector through its partnership agreement to meet the Alliance's interoperability levels. As NATO's special and strategic partner, it assists the Alliance in military-led operations. In Afghanistan, during the ISAF mission, Georgia was the largest non-NATO contributor, being the fifth largest contributor overall. Hence, during the Resolute Support Mission, Georgia pledged financial support to NATO for the future development of the Afghan National Security Force and also provided land force.²⁴³

Due to Georgia's long aspiration of becoming a future NATO member, it politically contributes to the Alliance due to its valuable democratic commitment within the NGC and the partnership framework. In this way, Georgia serves as NATO's political tool, which frequently joins NATO negotiations and helps the Alliance spread democracy in the 21st century among other partners. Georgia's high potential of becoming a NATO member has

²⁴¹ Alberto Priego, "NATO cooperation towards South Caucasus," *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 2, no. 1 (2008): 4, <http://alturl.com/kg4zx>.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁴³ NATO, "Georgia: Now the Top Non-NATO Troop Contributor in Afghanistan," NATO, last modified March 3, 2020, accessed March 19, 2020, <http://alturl.com/z73k7>.

triggered a security dilemma²⁴⁴ for Russia and the secessionist regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), thus Russian objective is to block Georgian's accession into NATO.²⁴⁵

The partnership between NATO-Georgia was enhanced from 2008 onwards. Georgia shares common political interests, values and norms; hence, it truly supports NATO during the external crisis with Russia. Russia intervenes with NATO strategic partnerships in its strategic dispute over Georgia. NATO is interested in a politically and strategically strong Georgia by engaging it in diplomatic negotiations, training the Georgian army.²⁴⁶

5.1.1.2. The Case of Ukraine

This section follows the sub question: *What is the role of Ukraine for the Alliance in the context of NATO's rising external challenges with Russia in the 21st century?* Geopolitically, Ukraine is a buffer state between Russia and NATO's area of operation. Politically, Ukraine is a close strategic partner to NATO in terms of sharing democratic values. Strategically, NATO enforces Ukraine's operational capability in order to use Ukraine as a strategic partner. Ukraine is a close partner committed and united with shared democratic norms and values with the Alliance, strategically securing NATO's territorial borders.

The Ukraine crisis is the crystallisation of series longer-term problems that have been increasingly visible such as the strategic dissonance between Russia and the West. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 has become a turning point in Euro-Atlantic security. Russia was perceived as an aggressor, being a threat to NATO.²⁴⁷ Currently, NATO is supporting and training the Ukrainian army to raise its operational capability.

²⁴⁴ A situation in which one state increases its means of defence in order to achieve a higher degree of security, which, however, is interpreted by another state as an act of aggression and thus countered with security measures on its side, thus possibly leading to an armament spiral. For a more extensive discussion see Diez, Thomas, Ingvild Bode and Aleksandra F. Da Costa. "Security Dilemma." In *Key Concepts in International Relations*, 205-208, SAGE Key Concepts. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011. Doi.org/10.4135/9781446288344.n37.

²⁴⁵ Alberto Priego, "NATO cooperation towards South Caucasus," *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 2, no. 1 (2008): 5, <http://alturl.com/kg4zx>.

²⁴⁶ Zofia Studzińska, "How Russia, Step by Step, Wants to Regain an Imperial Role in the Global and European Security System," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 14, no. 4 (2015): 21-41, doi.org/10.11610/connections.14.4.03.

²⁴⁷ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Richard Sakwa, *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives* (Bristol: E-international Relations, 2015), 221-222, <http://alturl.com/mgfno>.

NATO and Russia have a strategic dispute over Russia's annexation of Crimea for tactical motives due to the fact that Russia feels deeply threatened by the NATO as stipulated in its National Security Strategy:

*The build-up of the military potential of NATO and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of international law, the galvanization of the bloc countries' military activity, the further expansion of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russia borders are creating a threat to national security.*²⁴⁸

NATO's enlargement or military activities held in the proximity to the Russian borders, is perceived as a direct threat to Russia. NATO is challenged by responding to the Russian non-conventional threat including aggressive nuclear signalling and hybrid warfare.²⁴⁹ In this scenario, partners balances the ability to reinforce large combat forces and contribute with a sufficient military structure in the region during NATO's response to Russia.²⁵⁰

In order to contextualise the case of Ukraine, it is necessary to understand that NATO-Ukraine strategic partnership is more extensive than with any other partner country in specifically the area of defence and security sector reform. The NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine (NIDC) plays a key role in a better understanding of Ukraine geostrategically.²⁵¹ The NIDC also contributes to facilitating and enhancing Ukraine's participation in cooperation activities with the Alliance.²⁵² Russia steadily challenges NATO's understanding of collective security through strategic partnerships, by annexing eastern Ukraine.²⁵³

²⁴⁸ The Russian Federation Presidential Edict, "Russian National Security Strategy," December (2015): 4, accessed March 22, 2020, <http://alturl.com/ui38z>.

²⁴⁹ Artur Kacprzyk, Kacper Rekawek, Witold Rodkiewicz and Andrej Wilk, "NATO and the Future of Peace in Europe: Towards a Tailored Approach." *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*, (Warsaw, 2016): 5, accessed February 10, 2020, <http://alturl.com/65j7w>.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 5.

²⁵¹ NATO, "NATO Information and Documentation Centre (NIDC) in Kyiv, Ukraine," NATO, last modified April 12, 2018, accessed March 19, 2020, from, <http://alturl.com/k3349>.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ "Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act," Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe | OSCE, last modified 1975, accessed March 19, 2020, from <http://alturl.com/27qun>.

Russia's actions in Ukraine have implications for NATO's security – challenges NATO's concept of partnership and its partners' choice of foreign policy. Since 2014, there has been a substantial increase in Russian activities around NATO borders, with ships, planes and submarines, venturing close to and occasionally across NATO borders to conduct exercises and cyber attacks. Furthermore, Russia is also engaged in an ongoing propaganda campaign, stirring up inter-ethnic tensions. It funds populist and extremist parties across Europe, in an attempt to split the Alliance.²⁵⁴ Hence, Russia is deeply involved in series of conflicts, being a trigger for NATO's internal crisis with Turkey over Syria.

5.2. NATO's Inter-Alliance Crisis with Turkey

The internal relations between NATO and Turkey deteriorated over the past few years due to hindered ties between Turkey and the US, Ankara's oil and gas dispute in Cyprus, purchase of Russian S-400 air-defence missile system, conflict in Syria - where Kurdish-led militias partnered with the US against ISIS over Turkey's strong objections - and Turkey's hampered accession negotiations to the EU.²⁵⁵ Another essential source of this internal crisis is Turkey's 'insecurity complex', where it perceives different security threats in comparison to NATO. For Turkey, "security reigns supreme in societal and political development."²⁵⁶ It is vital to position Turkey as a powerful actor in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian geopolitical space since the Cold War, when it has become a strong NATO ally.²⁵⁷ Thus, due to its geo-strategic location with borders in Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, Turkey plays a key role in regional politics.²⁵⁸ Arguably, in the post-Cold War context, Turkey is more of a nationalist power seeking to reassert its political and military power in the region.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ Geir H. Karlsen, "Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe," *Palgrave Communications* 5, no. 1 (2019), doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0227-8.

²⁵⁵ Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief," Federation of American Scientists, last modified April 7, 2020, accessed April 15, 2020, <http://alturl.com/bwhqq>.

²⁵⁶ Mustafa Aydin, "Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 3, no. 2 (2003): 164, doi.org/10.1080/713999347.

²⁵⁷ Yaprak Gürsoy and Ilke Toygür, "Turkey in and out of NATO? An instance of a turbulent alliance with Western institutions," The Elcano Royal Institute, last modified June 11, 2018, accessed March 21, 2020, <http://alturl.com/ixson>.

²⁵⁸ Mustafa Aydin, "Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 3, no. 2 (2003): 170, doi.org/10.1080/713999347.

²⁵⁹ Marc Pierini How Far Can Turkey Challenge NATO and the EU in 2020?, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020), <http://alturl.com/parh3>.

Outlining the key historical developments of NATO-Turkey relations, helps to further contextualise the present conflict in Syria to practically demonstrate the Turkish ambition to regionally lead. It visualises the concept of strategic partnership and its use as a strategy and policy by individual states – Turkey and Russia. The troubled relationship between Turkey and NATO is best examined through the historical discourse focusing mainly on Turkey's accession in 1952, the Arab Spring, failed coup in Turkey and tense relations with the US in regard to the S-400s and F-35s purchase.²⁶⁰ Arguably, the vital significance of Turkey as a NATO member should not be underestimated in the Euro-Atlantic area and Eurasia. It strategically and tactically moves NATO closer to the Middle East and in relation to its defence capabilities, it is the second largest standing military force in NATO after the US therefore, enjoys a qualitative or quantitative superiority over its neighbouring countries.²⁶¹ Turkey challenges and intensifies relations with NATO and the US because of its presence in current conflict scenarios in Syria with Russia and the US. This means, Turkey is a strategic asset to NATO therefore, for the Alliance it is important to maintain and develop better relations with Turkey to avoid a geopolitical cataclysm. In order to comprehend NATO's inter-alliance crisis with Turkey and Turkey's perception of security, one must outline briefly the major historical developments in order to further contextualise the case of Syria and NATO's perception of security.²⁶²

During the Cold War Turkey played a major role in containing the USSR in accordance with the US policy, having a strategic location on the European periphery. Hence, following the US support, Turkey became a NATO member in 1952 – as one of its earliest allies. However, relations between NATO-Turkey and the US were intensified firstly in connection to Greece, a strategic dispute over Turkey's annexation of Cyprus in 1974. In the post-Cold War context, during the Balkan crises, NATO-Turkey and EU-Turkey relations were troubling due to Turkey's different security perceptions and strive for influence in the region in cases of Yugoslavia and Kosovo, when Ankara blocked the EU-NATO cooperation due to its 'insecurity complex'. Moreover, NATO-Turkey faced conflicting relations due to various military coups in Turkey. First, due to Turkey's powerful regional aspirations, the Arab uprisings have crushed

²⁶⁰ Yegin Mehmet, "Turkey between NATO and Russia: The Failed Balance, Turkey's S-400 Purchase and Implications for Turkish Relations with NATO." *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* 30 (June 2019): 1-4, accessed March 21, 2020, <http://alturl.com/vbhcy>.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 175.

²⁶² Mustafa Aydin, "Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 3, no. 2 (2003): 163, doi.org/10.1080/713999347.

this idea by forcing Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to make public declarations against the coup in Egypt, which was a failure for the Turkish foreign policy. Second, the 2016 coup attempt arguably harmed NATO-Turkey relations that aimed to topple the Erdoğan's government^{263,264} Third, Ankara's closer cooperation with Moscow in relation to the purchase of S-400 air-defence missile system has triggered problematic relations with NATO. As a consequence, Turkey communicated to NATO and the US that it intends to purchase S-400 from Russia. In response, NATO argued that the Russian missile system would not integrate into NATO's system; the US exerted pressure on Turkey to reverse its plans in buying S-400, in addition freezing delivery of a number of F-35 jets to Ankara.²⁶⁵ Turkey is engaged in the Syrian conflict with Russia and the US because it strategically occupies northern Syria to create a buffer zone in order to secure the Turkish state from Kurds and potential Kurdistan state, which are perceived as a security threat by Turkey.²⁶⁶

5.2.1. Strategic Partnership

Following the case in Syria, a strategic partnership is formed between Turkey - Syrian rebels and Russia - Assad regime. Both countries are involved in a proxy warfare, fighting through a strategic partnership, meaning that Turkey and Russia are indirectly engaging with each other on the Syrian soil. The case of Syria depicts a form of a strategic partnership to show the pursue of Turkey's and Russia's strategic objectives and security policy in Syria, arguably generating an inter-alliance crisis within NATO.

5.2.1.1. The Case of Syria

This section follows a sub question: *What is the role of a strategic partnership in the Syrian conflict for Turkey in the context of NATO's rising internal challenges in the 21st century?* Geopolitically, Turkey aims to prevent a powerful Kurdish group in Syria. Therefore, it

²⁶³ AK Parti known as the Justice and Development Party.

²⁶⁴ Yaprak Gürsoy and Ilke Toygür, "Turkey in and out of NATO? An instance of a turbulent alliance with Western institutions," The Elcano Royal Institute, last modified June 11, 2018, accessed March 21, 2020, <http://alturl.com/ixson>.

²⁶⁵ Yegin Mehmet, "Turkey between NATO and Russia: The Failed Balance, Turkey's S-400 Purchase and Implications for Turkish Relations with NATO." *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* 30 (June 2019): 1-4, accessed March 21, 2020, <http://alturl.com/vbhcy>.

²⁶⁶ Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief," *Federation of American Scientists*, last modified April 7, 2020, accessed April 15, 2020, <http://alturl.com/bwhqq>.

strategically occupies Northern Syria to preclude the rise on an independent Kurdish state in Syria. Politically, Turkey's goal is to have a decision-making power in case of Syria due to the Kurdish group, which is a significant security threat to Turkey. Moreover, it reaches out to the EU and NATO for political and military assistance, to support Turkey's actions in Syria.

The Syrian conflict is characterized by regional state actors attempting to impose their strategies in order to maximise their power in the Middle East region and by ethnic groups such as Kurds seeking for an independent state - Kurdistan. From a systemic perspective, actors such as Turkey, Russia and the US are deeply involved in the ongoing Syrian crisis due to their significant strategic interests. In relation to NATO, Erdoğan's Turkey, being an important NATO ally and a regional power in the Middle East, is indirectly fighting Russia via proxy warfare, forming a strategic partnership with the Syrian rebels to advance its interests in the region. The Syrian conflict questions current geopolitical stance of Erdoğan's Turkey, which is arguably oriented towards a *realpolitik* approach implying conflicts of interests with its traditional NATO allies, steaming an inter-alliance crisis within the Alliance.²⁶⁷

Strategically, NATO's and Turkey's security objectives of Syria are diverging, meaning Turkey's concerns in Syria are incompatible to the ones of NATO, regarding the Kurdish group.²⁶⁸ As a consequence, a strategic partnership was constructed, one being Turkey with the Syrian rebels and second being Russia with the Assad regime. Both countries have formed a strategic partnership through which Russia and Turkey partnered with non-state actors in order to pursue their individual interests to achieve their strategic goals – have control over Syria. This is a case depicting a strategic partnership merged by individual interests of state and non-state actors for mutual advantage with a wider range of goals.²⁶⁹

One can point that NATO is only externally involved in the Syrian conflict, because the Kurdistan Workers' Party is a Turkish domestic issue, connected to Syria, not a NATO conflict.

²⁶⁷ Elettra Pelino, *The 2018 Turkish Military Operation in Northern Syria: Turkey's Ambiguous Realpolitik Between the USA and Russia*, (Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie, 2018), accessed March 25, 2020, <http://alturl.com/m4mcy>.

²⁶⁸ Karol Wasilewski, *Turkey's New Anti-PKK Strategy: Consequences and Feasibility*, (Zürich: Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich:Center for Security Studies, 2016), accessed March 23, 2020, <http://alturl.com/gfx7u>.

²⁶⁹ Jen Kirby, "Turkey and Russia Reached a Ceasefire in Syria. Will It Hold?," Vox, last modified March 6, 2020, accessed March 22, 2020, <http://alturl.com/sp5u9>.

This explains why article 4 and not article 5 was invoked, as Turkey demands and pressures its international allies (NATO) and strategic partners (EU) to extend their actions in Syria. Consequently, to raise pressure on NATO and the EU, Turkey released refugees, generating a crisis at the Turkish-Greek border.²⁷⁰ Turkey and its NATO allies are therefore, diverging in practical matters, strategically being allies and identifying for example Russia as a common threat in cases of Ukraine and Georgia.²⁷¹

²⁷⁰ "Erdogan Demands 'concrete Support' from EU, NATO over Syria," Al Jazeera, last modified March 9, 2020, accessed March 22, 2020, <http://alturl.com/mei6m>.

²⁷¹ Asya Akca and Gregory Sanders, "The Great Unwinding: The U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Dispute," Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified March 17, 2020, accessed March 22, 2020, <http://alturl.com/yi4r5>.

Conclusion

The nature of NATO has changed in the 21st century. Multipolarism had stimulated the process of its transformation from a classical collective defence organization into also an excessively political organization along with a community of values. This work emphasized that NATO's strategic partnerships constitute the Alliance's de facto new operational model in Europe due to partnership's key role in altering the strategic environment becoming essential in helping the Alliance fulfilling its core responsibilities. Consequently, NATO's partnerships are based on mutual interests, benefits and reciprocity. The concept of partnership is embedded in NATO's cooperative security approach, which is founded on the basis of collective commitment of both Allies and partners. The fundamental advantages of strategic partnerships can be summarized as regional security awareness encompassing political and intelligence sharing, enduring participation of partners in military trainings and collective security. The contextualization and use of NATO's strategic partnerships as the new alliances is best illustrated through the case study of Russia with examples of Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey with the example of Syria.

NATO cooperates with its partners in order to successfully counter terrorism, enhance cyber warfare capabilities, enforce energy security and minimize the proliferation of WMDs. Strategic partnerships ensure access to a worldwide range of resources and offer a comprehensive set of capabilities and expertise in the field of security and defence in order to build a stronger partnership network based on the cooperative security approach. Currently, the Alliance is confronted with strategic shocks, which generate a raging landscape in the new era of global competition and uncertainty. This triggers NATO's transformation, adaptation and institutional adjustment for the purpose to counter new security threats through strengthening its wide range of partnerships. Partners enhance NATO's capacities in promoting political dialogue, democratic values, engaging in diplomatic programs, undergoing military trainings and lastly, assisting during NATO-led missions, crises or defence processes. Partnerships help NATO establish a more stable and secure strategic culture through strong determination and participation of partners during international operations outside the NATO territory along with the Alliance members.

This work analysed the concept of partnership in the light of the English School theory in three different spheres: the international society, international system and the world society. This theoretical model helped to reach the conclusion that strategic partnerships are the centrepiece of NATO's new tactic of the 21st century, serve as a political and military instrument and contribute to the Alliance's adaptation process and broader vision of security. The empirical part demonstrated how NATO utilizes its strategic partnerships geopolitically, politically and strategically. Through the application of the case study methodology of Russia and Turkey it can be concluded that the success of NATO's cooperative approach to security is not only dependent on the Allies but substantially and extensively so on the partners. This means, partner countries need NATO and the Alliance relies on its partners more and more in order to fight the new security threats through an efficient and extended collective security approach. This work has identified that there are various types of partnerships. Institutionalized partnerships such as with Georgia and Ukraine, as discussed in the case study of Russia, represents the primary level of NATO's cooperation through partnerships. On the other hand, informal partnerships, such as NATO member states with their counterparts, as discussed in the case study with Turkey, represents a separate level of security cooperation. Altogether, both case studies confirm enhanced importance of partnerships strategy for NATO.

This work proves that partnerships play a key role for the Alliance to enhance stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Furthermore, NATO cannot solely safeguard its strategic regions of interest beyond Europe without including its partners in its cooperative approach to security. This was demonstrated with the emergence of NATO's strategic partnership network in the post-1990s, where cooperation is based on mutual interests, benefits, reciprocity and goals. In conclusion, collective security of Europe is based on the mutual commitment of both the Allies and partners in order to achieve regional and international security and stability. Due to the present unstable multipolar security setting, NATO needs its partners more than ever to identify and respond collectively to emerging unknown threats of the 21st century. This idea was best underlined before and after September 11 attacks, where NATO redefined its identity, recognized a new international threat such as global terrorism, and collectively responded to an attack using its partnerships.

NATO militarily and politically benefits from its interaction with different partners in responding to crises in the area of security and defence through its partnership network. The strategic partnerships, underpinned by the EAPC and the PfP program, is crucial due to NATO's objectives to safeguard its area of interest against external security threats such as Russia. Russia is defined as a powerful agent in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important actor for NATO due to its common strategic and political interests to tackle rising security threats. This underlines the idea that the Alliance secures and defends the Euro-Atlantic region through its established partnerships by promoting and extending democratic control, regional cooperation, collective security and defence restructuring between NATO and the Euro-Atlantic partnership.

NATO has embraced the concept of 'multipolarism' - being the core element of a multipolar cosmopolitan world. Allies and partners are dependent on the political determination to overcome political challenges, to foster their sovereignty and to enhance cohesion in the new cosmopolitan world. This is the reason why NATO extends its adaptation process and institutional reform to respond to the new security threats (i.e. hybrid and cyber threats), which are increasing in their level of danger, both to NATO members and partners.

For further research, this work recommends the study of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. The Sino-Russian relations are considered to be the world's most important rising alignment. Since, both are currently challenging international affairs by its revisionist approach, the author finds it relevant to conduct a study on NATO's and its partners' future strategy and global policy to defend the interests of the liberal democracies in order to avoid a global cataclysm.

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
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Appendices

1. Strategic images of NATO. ²⁷²



2. NATO Strategic Partnerships. ²⁷³

EAPC				
Armenia				
Azerbaijan				
Belarus				
Bosnia and Herzegovina				
Finland				
Ireland				
Kazakhstan				
Kyrgyz Republic				
Malta				
The Republic of Moldova				
Serbia				
Sweden				
Switzerland				
Tajikistan				
Turkmenistan				
Uzbekistan				
MD		PAtG		
Algeria		Afghanistan		
Egypt		Australia		
Israel		Colombia		
Jordan		Iraq		
Mauritania		Japan		
Morocco		Republic of Korea		
Tunisia		Mongolia		
		New Zealand		
		Pakistan		
ICI		Special Partners		
Bahrain		Georgia		
Kuwait		Russia		
Qatar		Ukraine		
United Arab Emirates				

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²⁷³ NATO Homepage, "Partners". Accessed February 2, 2020, <http://alturl.com/7mxw2>.