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Auteur : Hanson, Melissa

Promoteur(s) : Matagne, Geoffroy

Faculté : Faculté de Droit, de Science Politique et de Criminologie

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FACULTÉ DE DROIT, DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE ET DE
CRIMINOLOGIE

DÉPARTEMENT DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE

**Paternalism and Bilateral Aid Assistance:
The Case of France and its Former Colonies in the Sahel Region of Africa
in Hollande and Macron's Mandates**

Melissa Hanson

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Supervisor:
Geoffroy Matagne

Readers:
Antonios Vlassis
Marc Poncelet

Paternalism is well established as a concept, however, research regarding its contribution to the development rhetoric is limited. This study adds to the contemporary development literature by focusing on donor-recipient relationships through bilateral aid assistance and addressing the factors which are central to them. The results conclude that a paternalistic attitude to development influences the dynamic of France's donor-recipient relationship with its former colonies in the Sahel region of Africa. Through a qualitative analysis of speeches, Hollande and Macron's mandates exhibit paternalistic characteristics which are indicative of French bilateral policy towards the Sahel.

List of Acronyms

AFD – Agence Française de Développement

ECB – European Central Bank

GNI – Gross National Income

HDI – Human Development Index

LEDC – Less Economically Developed Country

OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

ODA – Official Development Assistance

WAMU – West African Monetary Union

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Introduction

This research hypothesises paternalism as a key motivation for France's bilateral aid policy towards its former colonies in the Sahel region of Africa.¹ The donor-recipient relationship of France and countries in the Sahel will be analysed to show how France's aid rhetoric is motivated by paternalism. Such a finding could help to explain why France's bilateral aid policy has not evolved in reaction to the slow development of some of the poorest nations in the Sahel which, despite receiving a constant influx of French aid assistance, make up one of the poorest regions in the world today. When aid is allocated out of any motivation other than the intention to eradicate poverty and encourage economic growth it can have devastating implications for the recipient. Paternalism is a motivation which sees aid being allocated according to the will of the donor rather than the needs of the recipient and for France, this echoes colonial Franco-African relations.

Foreign aid plays a key role in development studies today where it has been hailed as the most effective way to end poverty by prominent economists like Jeffrey Sachs (2005). However, with the slow increase in economic prosperity, and in many cases the perpetuation of poverty on the African continent, development scholars are starting to question the true impact of bilateral aid.² Despite having received almost \$1 trillion USD in development aid in the past 50 years (Moyo, 2009), Sub-Saharan Africa is still widely viewed as a destitute continent increasingly in need of Western aid assistance (Moyo 2009). It is evident that foreign aid is failing to increase economic prosperity in Africa, as many states which remain dependent on Western assistance still lack adequate healthcare, sanitation, housing and schooling, all of which contribute to a low ranking on the Human Development Index (HDI) in terms of quality of human development (HDI 2019). Moreover, of the 47 countries listed as 'least developed countries' by the United Nations Committee for Development Policy (UN CDP) 33 are in Sub-Saharan Africa (UN 2018). Development economists (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Easterly 2006; Abuzeid 2009; Moyo 2009) have called for a change in approach if the Western post-colonial development framework is to be more effective for African states and many are exploring new approaches to development. This research will not aim to add to the discourse in this way, but instead ask why such heavily criticised approaches are still

¹ Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal

² Aid given directly from the donor government to the recipient government

prominent today in the foreign aid policies of Western states such as France by looking towards their donor motivations.

The donor-recipient relationship is relevant when trying to evaluate motivations for bilateral aid. France stands out as a state that generates the most controversy regarding its political relations with recipient states in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is because of France's tumultuous history with Africa as one of the continent's largest colonisers which, in contrast to other Western powers today, continues to exercise a tight rein on its former colonies. This exercise of control gives substance to the neologism "Françafrique," a term coined by French economist, François-Xavier Verschave to denote continuous subjugation of supposedly sovereign African states (Diop 2018) by France. Today, France is heavily economically invested in the development of its former colonies in the Sahel region where it maintains substantial political influence. The donor-recipient relationship between France and Côte d'Ivoire is particularly indicative of Western donors' tendency to overlook the inefficacy of aid for development in Sub-Saharan Africa. France is Côte d'Ivoire's leading bilateral donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Côte d'Ivoire ranks as France's fourth highest recipient of gross ODA (OECD 2018) – the highest in the Sahel region. Yet, Côte d'Ivoire still remains one of the lowest ranked regions in the world on the UN HDI of least developed nations in the world, with a ranking of 165 from a total of 189 countries (Human Development Report Office 2019). The HDI will be used in this research as a measure of effective human development as it denotes specific indicators such as life expectancy, education and standard of living which help to measure a country's level of poverty and economic growth.

This research endeavours to evaluate France's relationship with former colonies in the Sahel through the lens of paternalism. The current literature acknowledges that some of the biggest Western bilateral aid donors to Africa, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany (not including international organisations) determine their recipients based on historical and strategic factors (Alesina and Dollar 2000) which tends to see them favouring former colonies out of both guilt and investment potential. In contrast, the paternalistic lens offers an alternative view of the donor-recipient relationship especially with regards to former African colonies. The relevance of the recipient being an African country addresses issues of race relations and this will be expanded on further in the literature review.

Paternalism is commonly referenced in a philosophical context, or occasionally in a medical

context regarding the patient-doctor relationship. Although many conclusions regarding donor motivations, in terms of bilateral aid, can be understood in relation to paternalism, this theory has not been widely debated in the aid rhetoric.

Paternalism stands out in this research as a motivator of France's bilateral aid policy towards its former colonies in the Sahel region of Africa. The paternalistic attitudes that exist within France's donor-recipient relationship elucidates its reasoning for donating so consistently and generously to former colonies. Furthermore, a link can be drawn directly from paternalism as a motivating factor, to the lack of effective development in the Sahel region. This link between paternalism and the development of former French colonies in Africa could be ground-breaking for international development. Recognising paternalism as a key driver of France's bilateral aid policy towards former colonies in the Sahel could pave the way for establishing a link between some of the largest bilateral aid donors and the underdevelopment of their former African colonies. Hence, this research may be indicative of the contemporary Western attitude towards bilateral aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Part I

1. France in the Sahel

1.1 Aid

France has an incredibly volatile colonial past and its tumultuous relations with former African colonies has earned itself a reputation in the development discourse as a contemporary neo-colonial power. France claimed sovereignty in 20 states on the African continent as a colonial power, with a majority in West Africa and the Sahel region where it continues to have a significant influence today. France continues to have strong economic and political relations with its former colonies which have allowed it to maintain a sphere of influence in post-colonial Africa. According to OECD regional data (2018), Sub-Saharan Africa received the highest amount French ODA at a percentage of 27.5% of France's gross bilateral ODA. This made France Sub-Saharan Africa's second highest donor after the United States. Of the \$2.4 billion USD of French ODA channelled into Sub-Saharan Africa, \$990 million was concentrated in the Sahel region alone. Côte d'Ivoire, which sits in the South of the Sahel region, is France's 4th highest recipient overall (1st in the south of Sahara region) receiving \$341 million USD in 2018. Further to this, Côte d'Ivoire has consistently been within the top ten recipients of French bilateral ODA since 2000 (OECD 2018) which makes their donor-recipient relationship noteworthy. Moyo believes that aid like is destroying Africa, and that the only answer is to curb excessive over spending in order to encourage better governance (Moyo 2009). For France however, generosity in the Sahel region is integral to its development policy and its identity as a donor: to reduce aid spending would be to once again abandon the former colonies that were left impoverished after a chaotic decolonisation process. It is clear from the data that France has strong ties to the Sahel through bilateral aid, and of the many ways in which France maintains a sphere of influence in Sub-Saharan Africa today, aid is arguably the most debated.

1.2 Military

France is heavily involved in the Sahel through military support and anti-terrorism is main focus of France's security agenda. France has had a strong military presence in the Sahel region since the launch of Operation Serval in 2013 to push back terrorists in Mali. Operation Serval was replaced in 2014 with the ongoing anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane under which 4,500 French military personnel have been deployed in the Sahel (Ministry for Europe

and Foreign Affairs, 2020). The G5 Sahel was created to coordinate its five member states: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger on security matters in West Africa, and they are supported by France through the training of African soldiers, deployment of French soldiers, donation of military equipment and combat operations (ibid). In 2017 along with Germany, the UK and the EU, France also created the Sahel Alliance to improve development assistance in the region (ibid). It is within France's interest to pursue terrorist threats to countries in the Sahel as further fragility within these states could also damage France's economy. Not to mention that terrorism presents an international threat to peace and security. Although France is able to justify military intervention in the Sahel in keeping with the policy of security and defence cooperation, (Moroney et al 2011) a heavy French military presence since the 1960s has created a sense of "Francophobia" amongst African citizens who accuse France of neo-colonialism.

1.3 Franc zone

A key way in which France maintains a strong influence over Western Africa today is through the CFA franc zone, a French monetary zone originally abbreviated from *Colonies françaises d'Afrique* meaning "French colonies of Africa." The zone is comprised of 14 countries in West and Central Africa which each have their own currencies: The Western CFA franc (XOF) and the Central African Franc (XAF). Both currencies have the same exchange rate, but they cannot be used interchangeably. The Western CFA franc is official currency in Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The CFA franc's exchange rate is fixed to the Euro which allows for the users' monetary policies to be dictated by the European Central Bank (ECB). The franc has been denounced as a neo-colonial device which is destroying the prospect of economic development for its users where it acts as a barrier to industrialisation. It also inhibits user states in from having their own monetary sovereignty. To add to this, the nations which use the CFA franc have been obliged to keep half of their foreign exchange reserves in the French Central Bank in Paris. Leaders of the nations of the West African CFA Union have criticised this as a form of neo-colonial tax which insults the sovereignty of its member states and inhibits economic growth in Africa (Hundeyin 2019). Membership of the franc zone has become synonymous with economic decline as a majority of its users are Lower Economically Developed Countries (LEDCs) and this has led to its nations calling for a withdrawal of their cash reserves from France. President of Chad, Idris Deby described the CFA franc zone as an "injustice" (Tih et al 2019) and President of Benin, Patrice Talon

released a statement in November 2019 announcing that all eight member states would be withdrawing from the zone (ibid). A plan to introduce a new currency called the ECO for the entire region of West Africa by 2020³ was announced in 2003 which would see states in the West African Monetary Union having a common currency which could diversify their economies and see them gain more control over their currency reserves by moving away from the franc.

1.4 Trade

France's relationship with former colonies in Africa has allowed it to benefit from long-standing trade partnerships which have strengthened Franco-African economic relations. Of its former colonies in Africa, France is one of the top five highest importers of goods to ten states (OECD 2020), seven of which are in the Sahel region.⁴ France's trade relationship with Côte d'Ivoire is particularly significant: France is the second largest exporter of goods to Côte d'Ivoire and France is also the third highest importer of goods from Côte d'Ivoire. As its largest European trade partner, West Africa has long acted as a trading hub for France and many French businesses have subsidiaries rooted in African countries and relying African consumers, such as Bolloré and Total Gas and Power. Yet despite such long-standing trade relations, France faces competition as one of the highest exporters of goods to Africa from China. China-African trade has skyrocketed in the last decade and China is now the largest importer to the African continent, overtaking France as the highest importer to the Sahel. This competition comes as no surprise as China has surpassed the United States in being the world's largest exporter today.

³ The launch date has already been postponed 3 times from 2005 to 2010 to 2014, but it is expected to come into use in July 2020

⁴ Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal

2. Literature Review

2.1 Approaches to development in post-colonial Africa

The development discourse is expansive and it is necessary to focus on more contemporary literature when trying to analyse the current debate on the motivations of Western bilateral aid donors in post-colonial Africa. The literature has evolved over time along with development itself and the changing nature of the Western aid rhetoric has allowed scholars to draw conclusions which reflect growth in Sub-Saharan Africa post-colonisation. This state of the art will focus on the more recent approaches to development since the turn of the 21st century because it is data from this period onwards that will be analysed in the research.

The inefficacy of foreign aid has been tumultuously debated in the literature, but scholars who choose to address this problem offer broad resolutions that are often viewed as controversial. Dambisa Moyo for example, boldly suggests cutting off aid to Africa as a way of reducing poverty and increasing growth in her book “Dead Aid: why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa” (Moyo 2009). The renowned economist, William Easterly suggests a more nuanced approach to development when explaining the difference between the approaches of *thinkers* and *planners* in his book “The White Man’s Burden” (Easterly 2006). He ultimately suggests that development must be tackled with a bottom-up approach instead of from the top-down, but even Easterly offers little in the way of suggesting how this change in approach to development can be effectively implemented and sustained in practise, not just in theory. Aside from offering new approaches to development, much of the literature explores donor motivations as a way of contextualising current approaches. Selfish motivations such as wealth creation, political control and maintaining a sphere of influence are debated throughout the literature, all of which echo the sentiments of colonial Africa. Taking the existing literature into account, this research aims to turn away from suggestions of *how* the West should change its current approach to the development of Sub-Saharan Africa (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Easterly 2006; Bwanya 2017) - such speculations in the past, although ground-breaking in the literature, have achieved little for development itself. Instead of asking why the traditional top-down approaches to foreign aid is failing for African development, or what it can be replaced with in order to achieve growth

⁵ The top-down approach to development is comprised of decisions or policies made at the highest level e.g. by government or multilateral institutions, which affect people at the local level who generally do not have a say in the policy, but are the most influenced by it.

and reduce poverty, it is more important to focus on *why* this model is still being employed by governments, despite the growing endorsement of the bottom-up approach⁶ (Easterly 2006; Panda 2007) and the need to increase capabilities at the citizen level (Sen 1999). By approaching the debate from this alternative angle, this research will be contributing to what is a very limited area of the development aid literature. Questioning why Western countries continue to give large amounts of bilateral aid to former African colonies calls for the need to explore donor motivations first and foremost. The idea that aid is failing suggests that donor states exhibit selfish motivations which lie outside of simply wanting to eradicate poverty and promote growth within the countries they support. There must exist a factor which motivates France to continue supporting an aid framework in Africa which has been unsuccessful in lifting former colonies out of poverty, and this research suggests it to be paternalism.

2.2 Corruption

A huge problem associated with aid and with African states in particular is corruption. Some donors have issued guidelines on how to prevent corruption in aid projects indicating that it is a known risk (Aguilar et al 2000). Corruption is appendage of bilateral aid in Africa whereby it harms governance and delays reform (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Svensson 2003; Abuzeid 2009; Moyo 2009). In the past, France has been criticised for not doing enough to stop corruption (Transparency International 2011) and even former French president Jacques Chirac was accused of accepting election bribes from Omar Bongo, the former president of Gabon. Abuzeid (2009) argues that aid strengthens existing corruption by increasing the volume of money available to already corrupt governments and as a result, corruption has become a lucrative tool for government officials. Moyo (2009) argues however, that aid creates corruption where it otherwise may not have flourished. She argues that bilateral aid causes conflict because direct cash transfers from government to government increase competition for power. This leads to a vicious cycle as aggressive competition for power erodes good quality governance which is necessary for reducing corruption (Abuzeid 2009). Aid also breeds corruption by reducing incentive for taxation. Taxing citizens in order to generate income increases government accountability (Paler 2013), but when governments receive non-taxed money such as aid, this makes leaders less accountable to their citizens

⁶ Bottom-up development involves projects planned by local authorities for local communities. They are generally smaller than projects implemented via the top-down approach, but they tend to be better targeted and more efficient.

(Ahmed 2012). Moreover, reduced incentive for taxation means that governments become reliant on external sources of income where they cannot create or sustain wealth domestically: this leads to aid dependency. With a lack of accountability to their citizens, governments are more likely to adopt pro-incumbency policies rather than pro-growth policies. Such a case of incumbency came to fruition in Côte d'Ivoire's 2010 post-election crisis after president Gbagbo refused to concede defeat to the now current president Alassane Ouattara (Piccolino 2016). Money received for development has also been used to maintain power and exert repression over citizens (Ahmed 2012) and in more extreme cases, money has been used to directly buy votes (Jablonski 2014). Collier and Hoeffler (2007) found that 40% of African military spending is indirectly financed by OECD, which gives governments more opportunity for using aid money for personal gain rather than the development of their country.

2.3 Motivations

When trying to establish paternalism as France's key motivation for a bilateral aid policy concentrated in the Sahel region of Africa, it is important to first consider other motivations for giving. This will help to frame paternalism as a motivation in the wider rhetoric. These motivations will be considered in a more general setting in order to highlight key theories in the literature, for explaining the context in which their donor-recipient relationship is situated.

Wealth creation

The literature suggests that France's jurisdiction over monetary systems in former African colonies is a form of neo-colonialism (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Easterly 2006; Whitfield 2008; Pacquement 2010). There is an obvious bias towards former colonies in France's aid policy: this comes from the donor's tendency to value their own political interests over the needs of recipients (Hoeffler 2008; Abuzeid 2009; Pacquement 2010). It is known that the colonisation of West Africa provided an immense source of wealth for France through the depletion of natural resources, military support and labour, which could help to explain why post-colonisation, France remains invested in the 'Françeafrique' that it created. In this regard, wealth creation is a motivating factor for France's bilateral aid policies towards Francophone Africa. Although the AFD concentrates over 50% of its aid commitments to Africa, which equated to €5.6bn in 2018 alone (AFD 2020), France continues to exploit former colonies in the West African and Monetary Union which use the CFA franc; a

currency denounced for being the last colonial currency in activity (Sylla 2019). There are distinct arguments both for and against French controlled currency in the Sahel region, however the point to be noted here is that France directly benefits from the CFA franc. For example, countries which use the CFA Franc must deposit at least 50% of their foreign exchange reserves in the French Treasury (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères 2020) thus giving France significant power over the wealth of countries in the WAMU. Moreover, France is also the only state which has continued to preserve its colonial currency post-independence.

Political control

France's donor-recipient relationship with its former colonies allows it to indirectly maintain a similar amount of political control as colonial rule. This need to maintain close ties sees aid being used as a tool for control rather than a tool for development as it should be intended in a decolonisation framework. Maintaining political control or influence is a selfish donor motivation which can actually make aid ineffective (Bearce and Tirone 2010) as it leads to inefficient allocation (Alesina and Dollar 2000) which overlooks the developmental needs of the recipient. Easterly (2006) addresses this kind of poor allocation when using the example of mosquito nets in Malawi: he describes how aid agencies assume the needs of people in Malawi by donating mosquito nets which often end up on the black market, or are used as nets for fishing. When using this example, Easterly shows that the real problems which require tailored solutions are overlooked in the aid framework in place of a one-size-fits-all approach to development. This example can be related back to France and its former African colonies where France overlooks the recipient's needs indicated by its HDI ranking in favour of poorly allocated sums of cash to satisfy quotas.⁷ This inadequate allocation allows France to maintain political control whilst poor African countries remain in a state of aid dependency. France's rich history with former African colonies also acts as a basis for establishing such powerful Franco-African presence on the international stage, which has allowed France to maintain a sphere of influence over independent states in West Africa.

⁷ See 3.4: Former French Colonies in the Sahel by Human Development Index Ranking 2019

3. Paternalism

Scholars (Alesina Weder 1999; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009; Whitfield 2009) agree that donors are more generous towards former colonies, but the reason for this owing to selfish motivations- such as wealth creation or political control- or the fostering of paternalistic attitudes amongst donors is disputed (Hoeffler 2008; Pacquement 2010). Paternalism can be viewed as a motivation for the unsystematic allocation of aid exhibited by France towards its former African colonies. In order to develop this research with regards to France and the Sahel, the concept of paternalism must first be defined, before it can be explained relative to the donor-recipient context, as it is too complex to simply be categorised as a selfish motivation for bilateral aid.

3.1 Paternalism defined

Immanuel Kant described paternalism as the greatest despotism imaginable (Kant in Berlin 1958). Isaiah Berlin echoed this sentiment explaining paternalism to be the treatment of men as if they were not free, but “human material” for the “benevolent reformer to mould in accordance with [his] own...freely adopted purpose” (Berlin 1958 p.22). The research will focus on this oppressive characteristic of paternalism, interpreting it as interference by one state upon another state or group of people, regardless of their will, motivated by the idea that the person or state interfered with will be benefit from such interference (Dworkin 2002). This comes from the presumption that particular states, and the people within them, are incapable of governing themselves so are therefore deemed as incompetent. Furthermore, this idea of incapability is based solely upon the myopic standards of the interfering states regardless of the different needs and values of their dependents.

Paternalism can be dated back to slavery when maternal figures, such as wives of slave-owners, believed themselves to be protectors of their slaves, able to provide them with benefits that they otherwise would not have had access to (Mulligan 2012). These maternal figures prided themselves on their ability to save black slaves from their white masters, whilst at the same time actively participating in their enslavement. This false assumption that inferior black Africans need saving continues to live on in the 21st century (Cammarota 2011) and it is apparent today through paternalistic attitudes exhibited by developed Western states such as France. Such a supremacist attitude has become an institutionalised component of

international development, reflecting the long-lasting effects of colonialism in Africa. Paternalism perpetuates the Western vision of African people as needy (Ruge 2016) and continues to inhibit prosperity on the continent today. In both the aforementioned eras throughout history, Africans needed protecting from the destructive Western practices of slavery and colonialism. Today, Western elites are portrayed as the saviours who protect Africans from economic backwardness which ironically exists only as a result of Western interference. Smith says that such a “lack of attention to race and white supremacy” (2012 p.66) in the current development rhetoric hinders the evolution of a decolonisation framework and therefore impedes effective development. This is clear to see among the Western elite who overlook the severity of structural inequality and prejudice for inhibiting development. This results in its misrepresentation of underdevelopment as something that can be solved simply by injecting copious amounts of aid into the poorest countries that have suffered only as a result of colonialism’s economic exploitation.

Colonial guilt is important to discuss as it contributes to France’s paternalistic relationship with former African colonies. Colonial guilt is exhibited by France today in its favouring of the Sahel region through its bilateral aid policy; this guilt causes donors to favour their former colonies (Allpress et al 2010) which negates strategic aid allocation, therefore inhibiting the process of effective development. Moreover, the idea of colonial guilt is not just exclusive to France. Allpress et al found that there is ‘growing international recognition of the lasting effects of colonial violence and discrimination’ (2010 p. 76) which has led to an increased willingness to address these issues. Nobles found that some of the ways former colonisers address their violent past is through reparations (2008), and such reparations can be seen today in the form of bilateral aid assistance. Aid motivated by colonial guilt is paternalistic as it satisfies the guilt felt by the donor, whilst not necessarily meeting the needs of the recipient. There is evidence to show that poor countries can develop successfully without extreme Western intervention in the form of reparative aid. This was displayed with the Gang of Four: Hong Kong; Korea; Singapore and Taiwan (Easterly 1995), but the difference between these “Asian miracles” (Easterly 1995 pg.267) and former French colonies in Africa lies in the West’s perception of them. In the Western media and political dialogue, Asia is often portrayed as prosperous where it is growing economically and militarily. Africa however, is viewed through a distorted lens as being an entirely backward and poverty stricken continent. The continent is generalised as a single state of grief and poverty as opposed to the 54 separate sovereign states that it is comprised of. This Western

vision of Africa exacerbates the guilt within the French psyche surrounding former African colonies, whilst encouraging the idea that the best way to compensate for the lasting effects of colonialism is through a constant influx of aid.

3. 2 White saviour rhetoric

The white saviour rhetoric has gained recognition as a subset of paternalism within the foreign aid dialogue today. This phenomenon shows how paternalism influences Western attitudes as it is also demonstrated by normal people, not just elites and policymakers. As explained, paternalism has become an issue of race which perpetuates the myth that Africans are less competent than non-Africans or Westerners, and are unable to help themselves (Baker 2015). This creates the idea that African states are in need of external forces to “come in and save the day” (Aronson 2017, p.37) with Western development policy. This has created a paradigm which sees paternalistic donor states not just as economically superior to their recipients, but ethnically superior too. It is here that paternalism can be linked to the white saviour narrative, a psychological complex which encapsulates structural racism amongst white Westerners in the belief that white intervention is necessary in Africa in order to save less fortunate black Africans (Aronson 2017). The white saviour narrative cannot exist exclusively of paternalism however it differs from it in how it exists today. It has become a cultural phenomenon institutionalised within the general public and manifested by elites, and more commonly it is recognised in the film industry and the media. This ideology is ingrained into society (ibid) and it presents itself as a significant obstacle in the way of effective development for Sub-Saharan Africa. Paternalistic donor attitudes perpetuate the white saviour rhetoric and build upon the sentiment that the global south is economically and culturally inferior to the West, making it necessarily dependant on ODA administered by superior Western powers. These paternalistic sentiments are continually vocalised by elites in public addresses which will be analysed in the research to show how prevalent paternalism is amongst French policymakers.

3.3 Paternalism in Africa

The French colonial empire was established in Africa towards the end of the 19th century which saw France claim sovereignty over 11 states in West Africa alone⁸ until the decades-long process of decolonisation began in the late 1950s. France's mission⁹ in Africa was to bring civilisation to benighted peoples (Betts 2005) which began the policy of Franco-Europeanisation in French colonies- most notably in West Africa. The lasting impact of France's mission is apparent today as Africa is home to 21 of the 29 francophone countries in the world. The French policy of civilisation assumed African people to be primitive and in need of European influence and moreover, colonisers believed that carrying out the *mission civilisatrice* was their duty. Rights were even extended to those who adopted the French language and began practicing Christianity, showing how committed the French were to imposing their culture (Rhodes 2019). The idea that bringing European civilisation to West Africa was a rationale for the colonisation sets the precedence for paternalism as a motivation in France's contemporary relationship with former colonies. The French colonial empire in Africa was built on the paternalistic sentiment that the less capable African people were in need of French intervention and this ideology continues to exhibit itself today in France's attitude towards sovereign African states which a neo-colonial sentiment.

3.4 Causal relationship between paternalism and former colonies in the Sahel










The Human Development Index was created by the United Nations to emphasise that “people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country” (Human Development Report Office 2019). It is commonly used in development studies to rank countries into four tiers of human development using very specific economic indicators which can be grouped into three dimensions: long and healthy life; knowledge and decent standard of living. These dimensions correspond to three indexes: life expectancy; education and GNI, all of which are scored to create a ranking on the Human Development Index. In this way, the HDI simplifies human development so that it can be quantified and evaluated.

⁸ Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo

⁹ '*mission civilisatrice*' in French

Measuring development is important for establishing a causal link between paternalism and the donor-recipient relationship of France and former colonies in the Sahel as it helps to stress the significance of donor motivations to a state's foreign aid policy. It is important to understand that there is a link between countries in a constant state of underdevelopment and the ideology of their donors. This is relevant not only in the case of France, but to other former colonial powers such as the United Kingdom and Belgium. The causal link between former French colonies in the Sahel region and France's paternalistic motivations as a donor, is their level of development – or lack thereof. All former French colonies in the Sahel region of Africa are in the 4th tier of human development under 'Low Human Development' according to the most recently published figures from 2019. It can be said from looking at these rankings (see table), that French aid assistance is therefore ineffective for the development of its former colonies in the Sahel in terms of growth on the on the HDI. Each of these countries has remained in the Low Human Development bracket since 1990 which id as far as back as the data can be retrieved (Human Development Report Office 2019). This correlation between French bilateral aid and the low development of former colonies begs the question as to why France continues to implement a top-down approach to bilateral aid in West Africa even though it appears to be failing recipients.

Former French Colonies in the Sahel by Human Development Index Ranking 2019

	Rank	Country	Human Development Index (value)	Life expectancy at birth (years) SDG 3	Expected years of schooling (years) SDG 4.3	Mean years of schooling (years) SDG 4.6	Gross national income (GNI) per capita (PPP \$) SDG 8.5
	161	Mauritania	0.527	64.7	8.5	4.6	3,746
	163	Benin	0.520	61.5	12.6	3.8	2,135
	165	Côte d'Ivoire	0.516	57.4	9.6	5.2	3,589
	166	Senegal	0.514	67.7	9.0	3.1	3,256
	174	Guinea	0.466	61.2	9.0	2.7	2,211
	182	Burkina Faso	0.434	61.2	8.9	1.6	1,705
	184	Mali	0.427	58.9	7.6	2.4	1,965
	187	Chad	0.401	54.0	7.5	2.4	1,716
	189	Niger	0.377	62.0	6.5	2.0	912

(Human Development Report Office 2019)

The answer to this lies in the donor motivations which take precedence over achieving sustainable human development in former colonies. Paternalistically motivated aid can explain why there has been no significant remodelling of France's bilateral aid policy since the AFD was established in 1998. This was arguably the most recent progression in the French development to move towards more effective development initiatives which attempt to implement the bottom-up approach. Yet, even with creation of the AFD, France's bilateral aid is still not effectively implemented for the successful development of former African colonies and this is due to it being paternalistically motivated. The paternalistic approach to aid is suited to the will of the donor over the needs of the recipient. Paternalism differs from other selfish motivations for foreign aid in terms of the gains for the donor country. For example, implementing a foreign aid strategy for political control allows a donor state to exert power over the recipient and similarly, the motivation of wealth creation sees a donor state becoming richer. Paternalism as a motivation however, has no direct political or monetary gains for the donor, yet it is just as prevalent as a selfish donor motivation. It is an ideology embedded within the Western aid rhetoric that is synonymous with race and power relations, rather than with the potential to gain power itself. Paternalism is institutionalised within Western states with regards to African states and the people within them. This ideology existed before the colonisation of African with slavery, it drove the Scramble for Africa, and it is still exhibited today through France and its relations with former African colonies.

3.5 Role of Elites

This research will identify political elites as endorsers of Western paternalism in the Franco-African aid rhetoric. French elites have adopted the white saviour narrative by portraying former French colonies in West Africa to be in need of Western assistance and this makes the paternalistic nature of the donor-recipient relationship admissible without the need to criticise current approaches or search for a more pragmatic solution for developing of African countries. Easterly describes these political figures, who he says fixate on failed models of the past instead of approaching aid pragmatically, as “planners” (Easterly 2006, p.3). The literature criticises this planner mentality as a key feature of paternalism where the will of the donor takes precedence over recipient needs. Sachs (2005) endorses this kind of approach by prescribing huge bilateral aid transfers as a way of tackling poverty. He was a promoter of the big push model which aimed to increase aid to Africa to end the poverty trap, but this concept has since been debunked as a myth by development economists such as Easterly, Abuzeid (2009) and Moyo (2009). They use the example of the growth of the Gang of Four from third world to first world countries over a 40-year period to disprove the concept of a poverty trap that can only be escaped through a big push financed by Western aid donors. African scholars have also expressed their feelings about aid and elites who advocate it. Jean-Claude Shanda Tonme described the paternalistic Western mindset as patronising, saying they “believe [Africans] to be like children they must save” (Tomne 2005 cited in Easterly 2006 p.23) by haphazardly proposing solutions from the top down with little accountability for their failure. At the Mandela Washington Fellowship Summit in August 2017, Sharon Bwanya of Arizona State University criticised former colonial powers for following a rhetoric which assumes that African people cannot champion their own causes (Bwanya 2017). Paternalism which motivates the unsolicited liberation of non-whites today through bilateral aid, typifies the belief that Africans cannot escape poverty without the help of superior Western states, therefore assuming their incompetence. Like Easterly, Bwanya (2017) believes that African problems must be met with African solutions, but this cannot happen so long as the donor-recipient relationship remains a paternalistic one.

So, the literature agrees that paternalism may be a factor which motivates Western assistance to Africa and to former colonies in particular. It is clear that motivations for bilateral aid and explanations for the inefficacy of development are widely debated, and that the literature on this is expansive. However, the literature is still evolving with regards to paternalism and the dynamic of the donor-recipient relationship.

Part II

4. Methodology

One way of establishing France motivations for its bilateral aid policy towards the Sahel region is to focus on the institutions which endorse it. France, being a democracy, is very transparent with regards to its foreign policy and political decisions made at the highest levels are subject to both government and public accountability. The French Development Agency¹⁰ was first considered as a key source in the data collection for this research, as it is responsible for promoting sustainable development by implementing the policy defined by the French government. The AFD, although a key institution for French development, it does not create the policy which it implements. Therefore, it would be difficult to establish France's motivations for aid policy by focusing on the AFD alone. Moreover, the AFD does not act exclusively in implementing France's bilateral policies; the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs is responsible for France's foreign relations. So, to understand the motivations behind France's bilateral aid policy, it is necessary to analyse correspondence from the head of state. This is because the president is ultimately responsible for guiding government policy, thus reflecting the position of France on all political matters and at the highest level. It is the president who must establish and maintain relationships with recipients and he who must position France on the international stage. So in this way, official statements made by the president himself are the most relevant for establishing the extent to which paternalism motivates France's bilateral aid policy.

4.1 Data collection

The following research will use secondary data in the form of official statements and speeches given by the current president of the Republic of France, Emmanuel Macron and former president, François Hollande for establishing the extent to which paternalism is a key motivation in France's bilateral aid rhetoric. This data has been accessed using the official website of the Élysee Palace which keeps an archive of official transcripts and videos of government speeches, press conferences and statements. The database is reliable as it is available in the public domain and within a democratic society. There is also no risk of the

¹⁰ Agence française de développement (AFD)

data being biased as it simply consists of transcribed speeches rather than reports or commentary which may be opinionated.

Sampling

Using the Élysee database, every speech made by president Macron between May 2017 and January 2020, and by president Hollande between May 2012 and May 2017, which referred directly to a former colony¹¹ in the Sahel region of Africa in its title was selected. January 2020 was the most recent date under which a speech made by Macron was relevant for the study.¹² Other key announcements or speeches addressing France's relations with Africa were also selected, for example those made at summits or the United Nations General Assembly; however, Franco-African relations are not always discussed at such meetings so only relevant transcripts were selected for the data. This was done by reading transcripts of the speeches or statements given directly by the presidents in the meetings, as well as transcripts of joint press conferences given prior to and after the meetings, which included direct reference to Africa as a continent or the Sahel by the president. This was necessary so that relevant contributions to the data were not overlooked, especially as such high profile events are key in establishing where a state stands with its bilateral policies. The criterion was purposefully adhered to so that all of the speeches in the sample are relevant to the research question in order to create a high yield of specific, detailed information (Patton 2002) for observing the attitudes represented amongst the French government. A purposive sampling strategy was necessary as it helps to produce a sample for the analysis which is logically representative of the population (Lavrakas 2008) This is important for this thesis as the study will analyse a relatively small number of speeches.

Macron and Hollande's speeches were logged separately for analysis. Of the statements available according to the criteria, 57 were selected from Macron's database, and 66 from Hollande's. These included statements on the subject of a country in the Sahel region of Africa, or the Sahel itself, as well as statements made by the presidents at international summits which addressed Franco-Africa relations. Some statements, although they fit within the criteria, were deemed irrelevant for the research so they were removed from the sample.

¹¹ Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal

¹² There is a lack of relevant data surrounding bilateral aid policy after this date. This comes as domestic issues are being prioritised owing to the coronavirus pandemic.

This included statements made by the presidents which addressed the deaths of French soldiers in Mali for example. Such statements, although directly related to a country in the Sahel region, are irrelevant for the study due to their context; they are not focused on the donor-recipient relationship, rather; intended simply to honour French soldiers. Keeping these statements in the sample for analysis would therefore impact the results as the context is unrelated to the research question, so therefore not relevant to the study. Every other statement analysed from the sample is relevant to the Franco-African bilateral relationship from the standpoint of the French president at the time, meaning that the language can be representative of the nature of France's attitude towards recipients.

4.2 Paternalistic language

Each speech in the sample has been analysed against a systematic criteria of specific language that can be interpreted as evidence of a paternalistic attitude demonstrated by the person using it. There are of course limitations to carrying out a qualitative analysis such as this, as language interpreted by different researchers can lead to different results owing to its ambiguity. For this reason, the criteria have been specifically created based on the literature that frames paternalism within this study. The criteria are as follows:

	Criteria
A	Interference under the notion of saving or duty to save/ protect
B	Generalisations of African culture or people
C	Reference to or assumption of weakness or incapability of African states or people
D	Bilateral assistance to African countries as part of the French identity
E	Emphasis on France as a leader for development
F	Stressing relevance of France's colonial past for contemporary relations with recipients
G	Highlighting the importance of la Francophonie for Africa

These criteria were selected based on the definition of paternalism as interference by one state upon another state or group of people, regardless of their will, motivated by the idea that the person or state interfered with will benefit from such interference (Dworkin 2002).

Paternalism also differs here to other motivations where it sees bilateral assistance being tailored primarily towards the will of the donor rather than the needs of the recipient. Criteria A considers Cammarota's argument (2011) that Western states assume black Africans need saving. This also links into Aronson's (2017) idea that Western states feel it their duty to interfere with recipient states in this way. Criteria B and C consider that paternalism sees

states assuming the capabilities of recipient states and the people within them. This comes from the presumption that particular states are incapable of governing themselves so are therefore deemed as incompetent (Baker 2015). This can be extended to generalisations of African people by donor states showing a lack of understanding on a human level, further emphasising the idea those who are motivated by paternalism make assumptions about the groups of people which they feel it their duty to save. Presenting bilateral assistance as part of the French identity is an example of paternalism as described under criterion D where it undermines the needs of the recipient by trivialising development and shifting the focus from the recipient to the donor. Criterion E comes from a similar line of argument where a donor stressing itself as a leader emphasises itself as integral for the development of the recipient. This links back to Dworkin's definition of paternalism as the donor state believing its interference with recipients is indispensable, prompting the need to establish itself in the rhetoric as a leader for Africa. Criterion E and G are both substantial for establishing paternalism where they reflect France's *mission civilisatrice* as a coloniser. Continuing to value the importance of being a leader in the development of Africa reflects the sentiment of expanding European influence from colonial times. It is for the same reason that criteria G is relevant as France continues to encourage the adoption of French language and culture by former colonies (Rhodes 2019), something which was a key feature of the paternalistic civilisation mission in the past. Finally, criterion F shows paternalism through colonial guilt which sees the donor state emphasising the importance of bilateral assistance as something which it owes to recipients.

5. Paternalistically Motivated Mandates

Each speech in the sample collected from the Élysee website was analysed against the paternalistic language criteria so that conclusions could be drawn in comparison to the research question. Hollande and Macron's speeches were analysed separately to give two different data sets, one from each mandate, which will be compared against each other to show any change in attitude between presidencies.

5.1. Hollande 2012-17

Security was at the top of François Hollande's agenda regarding development in Africa. His foreign policy towards Africa between 2012 and 2017 was characterised by military operations to combat of Islamist extremism in the Sahel, such as Operation Serval in Mali, and its subsequent expansion under Operation Barkhane. As president of France, he maintained strong bilateral relationships with former colonies in the Sahel and he was a successful military leader in the protection of West Africa, and thus the protection of France, against terrorist campaigns. He saw growing potential in African economies and often referred to the damage caused by the colonisation of Africa as a debt that France needed to repay. It must be said however, that Africa was not central to Hollande's foreign policy. Amongst his priorities were trade with the USA and developing Franco-German relations. His mandate was also concerned with domestic political issues. France suffered a string of terror attacks during Hollande's term, including the Charlie Hebdo shooting and the Paris attacks in 2015. The refugee crisis also began in 2015, which Hollande had to turn his attention to. This meant that in terms of collecting data for analysis, there were only a limited number of speeches relating directly to France's former colonies in the Sahel or Franco-African relations, considering the five-year time frame. A majority of the relevant speeches were relating to military interventions, such as in Mali or the Central African Republic, however, the military context does not make these speeches any less pertinent for investigating the existence of paternalism within the development rhetoric at the time.

Results

Of the 66 speeches made by Hollande between May 2017 and April 2017 which were analysed, 37 (56%) indicated a paternalistic attitude as demonstrated in accordance with the criteria and 29 (43%) did not.¹³ Of the 37 speeches which matched the criteria, most matched more than one of the criterion (as shown below) and the most commonly occurring was criterion A – interference under the notion of saving or the duty to protect. The speeches which demonstrated paternalistic language have been analysed in accordance with the criteria, and key statements from the speeches will be referred to in order to support the analysis. It is not possible to present an analysis of each of the 66 individual speeches within the scope of this thesis, hence why the table below shows how many speeches corresponded to each criterion in the analysis.¹⁴

	Criteria	No. of speeches which matched criterion
A	Interference under the notion of saving or duty to save/ protect	20
B	Generalisations of African culture or people	0
C	Reference to or assumption of weakness or incapability of African states or people	8
D	Bilateral assistance to African countries as part of the French identity	3
E	Emphasis on France as a leader for development	12
F	Stressing relevance of France's colonial past for contemporary relations with recipients	16
G	Highlighting the importance of La Francophonie for Africa	7

¹³ See appendix for full table of speeches matched to criteria: 'Y' for match to 1 or more criteria, 'N' for no match

¹⁴ The table in the appendix provides specific detail as to which speeches matched which criteria in the column 'Criteria'

5.1.2 Paternalistic Approach to Development

Duty to protect

Criteria A shows that bilateral assistance is motivated by paternalism according to Dworkin's (2002) definition of paternalism being the interference of one state upon another, i.e. a donor state and a recipient, based on the assumption that the recipient will be better off or benefit from such interference. This notion manifests itself through Hollande's language as a duty to save African nations or to support them through interference deemed necessary by French policymakers. Aronson (2017) also highlighted the importance of Western states feeling duty-bound to intervene with recipient states as a feature of paternalism. 20 speeches matched this criterion making it the most prevalent for which paternalism can be identified in the French development rhetoric. In a statement on Franco-African relations in Senegal on 12 October 2012, Hollande said in regard to France's partnership with Senegal:

“These principles translate into France's desire to always be by your side. This is the reason why last July I granted your country exceptional budgetary aid of 130 million euros, to respond to the emergencies that I knew and which obliged France.”

(Hollande 2012)¹⁵

Here, Hollande says that France has a desire to assist Senegal through development aid and the use of the word 'obliged' makes it seem as though France feels duty-bound to do so. This combination of desire and obligation is an example of France acting out of its own will to be at the forefront of African development. Hollande also directly implied on several occasions that France feels duty-bound to assist Africa:

On women's rights in Central African Republic: “France will do its duty for Africa.”

(Hollande 2013)¹⁶

On economic relations between France and Africa: “France must lend its support to Africa.”

(Hollande 2013)¹⁷

¹⁵ see appendix 1 no. 8

¹⁶ see appendix 1 no. 28

¹⁷ see appendix 1 no. 29

On the religious conflict in Central African Republic in 2013: “France will support this operation. It is her duty: duty of assistance and solidarity.”

(Hollande 2013)¹⁸

“I made the decision to intervene...as it was the duty of France.”

(Hollande 2013)¹⁹

On the Ebola crisis in Guinea: “We have a duty to support you.”

(Hollande 2014)²⁰

On French foreign policy challenges: “We have a moral duty to Africa.”

(Hollande 2016)²¹

It is clear from Hollande’s language that France feels compelled to assist African countries because of a belief that this is her duty. The notion of duty with regards to contemporary development policy resonates with France’s civilising mission of the 19th and 20th centuries when France felt it a duty to intervene in Africa. Such an undeniably paternalistic attitude which characterised colonisation is visible in Hollande’s development rhetoric where it is clear that France justifies intervening in Africa as a ‘duty’. In addition to this, Hollande shows that France benefits from assisting underdeveloped African nations in terms of its moral standing on the international stage. In a statement responding to France’s intervention in Central African Republic in 2013, Hollande said:

“It is courageous to take responsibility for a country which is in chaos.”

(Hollande 2014)²²

Here, Hollande presents French military assistance to a former colony, Central African Republic, as France courageously taking responsibility for a recipient instead of assisting them. Admitting to taking responsibility shows that Hollande sees it France’s duty to take

¹⁸ See appendix 1 no. 30

¹⁹ See appendix 1 no.31

²⁰ See appendix 1 no. 41

²¹ See appendix 1 no. 62

²² See appendix 1 no. 34

control and make decisions on behalf of Central African Republic. This is paternalistic whereby France praises itself for interfering with a ‘country which is in chaos’ that it believes is better off under French control.

France’s identity as a donor

Criteria D leads on from A when analysing Hollande’s language. It is apparent that he sees France as having a duty to protect its former African colonies in the Sahel, a duty which could otherwise be seen as unwarranted interference. To expand on this, Hollande goes further to portray this duty to assist African countries as part of the French identity, by making the development of Africa appear synonymous with France’s identity as a donor. For example, in a speech on Franco-Cameroonian relations in 2015, Hollande said:

“I considered that my duty, my role, my place was to be here, in this part of Africa with you, so that France can respond to the hope it creates, because it is what makes France.”

(Hollande 2015)²³

Hollande insists that responding to the ‘hope’(ibid) that France creates for African countries is integral to France’s identity as it is ‘what makes France’ (ibid). Similarly, when France first intervened in Mali, Hollande affirmed that France identifies itself as integral to the saviour of African countries when saying:

“Our country, because it is France, must come to the aid of a friendly country.”

(Hollande 2013)²⁴

Hollande showed here that he is aware that France is known for being the first to respond to African crises, and he responded to this in an interview on the intervention in Central African Republic:

²³ See appendix 1 no. 50

²⁴ See appendix 1 no. 13

“I know the questions that are always asked in these circumstances. Why are we the first, we France, to come to support a country in distress. We are the first because we are France.”

(Hollande 2013)²⁵

It is clear from this statement, that Hollande sees France’s assistance to Africa as integral to its standing in the development rhetoric as a donor. These statements show that a paternalistic attitude motivates French development where policymakers see development assistance as synonymous with their own identity. This allows France to boost its legitimacy as a donor both internationally, as well as in the Sahel. Development under this circumstance can be suited to the will of the donor rather than the needs of the recipient, making it paternalistic. Although this sentiment is clear from the statements which matched criterion D, it must be noted that only three out of the 66 speeches showed France’s bilateral assistance to African countries to be part of the French identity. So, it is not appropriate to conclude that this attitude applies to Hollande’s entire mandate regarding African development policy.

France as a leader

As Hollande had heavy military involvement in Africa during his mandate, it was important for him to show France as being at the forefront of military development and assistance to the countries concerned. 16 of the 66 speeches indicate this sentiment by emphasising France as a leader for development. This is paternalistic as it frames France’s development assistance as bolstering France’s image in the development rhetoric, which sees aid being distributed according to suit the donor’s will over recipient needs. When discussing the military intervention in Central African Republic, Hollande said:

“Why this extra effort? Because we need presence everywhere on the Central African territory. Because we must lead by example, this is France. She must always be ahead of others. Set an example, first vis à vis the Africans.”

(Hollande 2014)²⁶

²⁵ See appendix 1 no. 31

²⁶ See appendix 1 no. 32

Similarly, in a conference on Guinea relations, he said:

“But France must set an example. A financial example first: we have made 100 million euros available.”

(Hollande 2014)²⁷

It seems that being a leader in Africa, whether that be financially or militarily, was something which Hollande wanted to emphasise and make clear, especially to Africans. This shows France’s undeniable desire to continue being both a leader for African development, and a name associated with African success in a post-colonial framework which no longer allows France control by force. This desire for influence is indeed paternalistic where it manifests the same sentiment which was fundamental to *Françafrique*. Hollande consolidated France’s desire to be recognised as a leader for Africa in a statement on the development of Mali:

“Today the OECD invites us to commit again to Mali and I am very proud that once again, it is to France that you are turning. France will remain on the front line.”

(Hollande 2015)²⁸

Hollande clearly valued France’s image as a military leader, and it was necessary at this time to uphold a strong reputation in the Sahel given the context surrounding anti-terrorism campaigns in Mali and terror attacks in France. However, the sense of pride that France felt in being a military leader for Mali is where this need to assist could be interpreted as paternalistically motivated, as it is clear that France is not only intervening based on the needs of Mali alone.

Assuming capabilities

Eight speeches matched criteria C for Hollande assuming African capabilities. This is paternalistic by Baker’s definition as: a donor state assuming that recipient states are incapable of governing themselves (2015). In a speech made in Senegal in October 2012, on discussing new economic opportunities for Africa, Hollande said:

²⁷ See appendix 1 no. 41

²⁸ See appendix 1 no. 54

“You don’t have to be afraid of this new interest. You must be aware that your institutions, your practices, your capacities will allow you to guide, to direct this capital in your own interest.”

(Hollande 2012)²⁹

Hollande implied when making this statement that the Senegalese are incapable of handling their own investments. He speaks as though they are unaware of their own capacities, assuming that they need assistance or advice from France, a trusted ally, when it comes to economic development. He insists that:

“The future of Africa will be built by strengthening the capacity of Africans to manage [for] themselves the crises that the continent is going through.”

(Hollande 2012)³⁰

This statement reiterates the paternalistic sentiment of French policymakers that Africans are less capable than Westerners, and that their future is dependent on Western development assistance. This overlooks the historical factors that are directly responsible for West Africa being less developed than Western countries, and implies that such underdevelopment is a result of African people’s incapacities, rather than structural inequalities. This paternalistic attitude can be detrimental to the development narrative because it creates inequality within the donor-recipient relationship. This is because ineffective development within recipient states becomes characterised by the people within them, rather than the institutions which govern them. France’s donor attitude towards development as evidently motivated by the assumption of recipient incapability also reflects the white saviour rhetoric. This is because it perpetuates the myth that Africans are less competent, so are therefore in need of saving through Western development (Aronson 2017). On discussing France’s intervention in Mali, Hollande encapsulated this Western notion of white saviourism when he said:

“I would like Europeans to be proud of what Europe is doing for Africa.”

(Hollande 2013)³¹

²⁹ See appendix 1 no. 8

³⁰ See appendix 1 no. 8

³¹ See appendix 1 no. 19

By encouraging Europeans to take pride in assisting former French colony, Mali, Hollande places importance on European people as necessary contributors to military success in Mali, a country which French people are arguably only linked to through their army and colonial history. He portrays Europeans as integral to African success, thus undermining the real threat that terrorism and underdevelopment in West African poses to African people. This is an example of a paternalistic attitude towards development where it makes Africa appear needy and trivialises complex problems as readily solvable, that all Europeans should feel proud.

Colonial relations

Sixteen of Hollande's speeches referred to France's colonial past in relation to former colonies in the Sahel under criterion F. This shows that bilateral assistance to these countries could be paternalistically motivated where French policymakers insist that the colonial donor-recipient relationship is relevant for the contemporary one. This leads to inefficient aid allocation because these former colonies are favoured out of colonial guilt (Allpress et al 2010). Aid based on this sentiment is paternalistically determined by the will of the donor who wants to rehabilitate post-colonial African relations through development, thus overlooking the needs of the recipient which are not relative to their status as a former colony. In a press conference in Benin, Hollande emphasised France's historical relationship with Africa as pertinent for bilateral future relations:

“...we will write it together so that the relationship between France and Africa, strong in its history, can be prolonged in the coming years.”

(Hollande 2012)³²

He appears to focus on the positives of a history of colonisation for strengthening Franco-African relations, instead of undermining them:

“The story we have in common- it is beautiful, it is rebellious, it is cruel. A story that leaves us a shared language, but also a common political culture: democracy.”

(Hollande 2012)³³

³² See appendix 1 no. 2

³³ See appendix 1 no. 8

Hollande rather insultingly described France and Africa's 'story' as 'beautiful' (ibid) in an interview on Franco-African relations, whilst praising a brutal history of imperialism for creating democracy in Africa today. This was also quite a sweeping statement to make at the time seeing as Africa was not a continent associated with democratic rule, but with dictatorships and corruption, something which many African nations continue to fight against today. Hollande implied once more that Africa and France should both be grateful for their history when saying:

“France and Africa have historic relations, we both have a recognition for what it has brought us, and also faults which must be remembered: ...colonisation and before, which was the slave trade.”

(Hollande 2012)³⁴

He implies here that colonisation has brought positives for Africa when saying 'we both have a recognition for what it has brought us' (ibid), but of course it is known that colonisation brought many benefits to France at the expense of Africans. It was not a mutually beneficial process. However, he does go on in this statement to recognise colonisation as a fault, and this is something which Hollande expressed several times in his speeches regarding France's colonial past. Hollande often referred to a debt that France owes Africa, and sees bilateral assistance, in particular military interventions, as France's way of paying that debt. In the same speech as previously mentioned, Hollande said:

“France remembers that in 1914 and 1940 it was able to count on the assistance of many Senegalese enlisted willingly or by force under the tricolour flag and whose courage enabled our country to be what it is today. Twice in the last century, African blood has been shed for the freedom of the world.”

(Hollande 2012)³⁵

There is a minor attempt to sugar coat the forced enlisting of African soldiers to fight on behalf of France in European wars by saying 'enlisted willingly' (ibid), however in the above statement, Hollande address the injustices of colonialism under France for African people.

³⁴ See appendix 1 no. 7

³⁵ See appendix 1 no. 8

In a statement on relations with Mali, Hollande depicts military intervention as an act in payment of colonial debt, rather than for the security of Mali and the Sahel region:

“France also came to honour a debt which had been contracted during the two world conflicts of the 20th century. France has not forgotten that Malian soldiers, that African soldiers had paid the price of their blood to liberate France!”

(Hollande 2013)³⁶

He reiterated this over a year later:

“France, also by intervening in Mali, with the Africans, paid its debt, the debt that we had contracted with regard to the Senegalese skirmishers who had come during the First World War then, under other conditions, during the Second World War to liberate France.”

(Hollande 2014)³⁷

Here, Hollande suggests that the military intervention in Mali, initially justified in a speech in January 2013 as ‘the safeguard of a friendly country’ with ‘no other goal than the fight against terrorism’ (Hollande 2013), was in fact a debt owed to Senegalese fighters. Hollande shows that his need to assist Western Africa is motivated by colonial guilt as he constantly refers back to actions committed in the past which lead to the death of Africans under French rule. Although, he is careful to portray this assistance as paying a debt instead of repenting for injustices. In a statement on Benin relations in 2015, Hollande said:

“France had to honour its debt. We give back to West Africa, when we are present in Mali, part of what it gave us during the last two world wars, where so many African soldiers lost their lives for the freedom of France.” “You must always have this memory- what we French owe to Africa.”

(Hollande 2015)³⁸

Hollande’s statement regarding colonial relations with West Africa reflects the colonial guilt present in French development policy which motivates bilateral assistance to former colonies

³⁶ See appendix 1 no. 25

³⁷ See appendix 1 no. 43

³⁸ See appendix 1 no. 47

in the Sahel. He refers to the two world wars as being key events in Africa's history during which blood was shed for France, and during both these wars, African people were made to fight on behalf of their imperialist rulers. French policymakers see this part of France and Africa's combined history as having created a debt that France now owes to Africa, which can be paid off with development assistance. Of course, this colonial debt can also be interpreted as France's colonial guilt, which encourages paternalistically motivated development that is suited to the donor's will.

La Francophonie

Seven of Hollande's speeches highlighted the importance of La Francophonie for Africa, under criterion G. La Francophonie is the world's French-speaking community which represents one of the largest linguistic zones in the world. This community is incredibly important for France as it increases French influence around the globe, and it forms a basis for many of France's bilateral relationships with French-speaking countries in Africa. Hollande emphasises the importance of La Francophonie for Franco-African relations and many French development projects undertaken in African countries are supported through this community. Bilateral assistance motivated by the need to invigorate Francophonie culture in Africa can be seen as paternalistic because of its relation to France's colonial civilising mission, which demanded that Africans under French rule speak the French language. At the time, this came from the paternalistic sentiment that African people needed to adopt Western culture to be economically successful. This sentiment also resonates with the spread of the French language today, as the history surrounding its succession into African cultures is overlooked. In a statement on Franco-African relations, Hollande said:

“speaking the French language is...speaking the language of freedom, it is to speak the language of dignity, to speak the language of cultural diversity. It's your language, it's our language, we have it in common. Let's broadcast it. “

(Hollande 2012)³⁹

He describes the French language as a language of freedom, despite it being used as an oppressive tool for influence in colonial Africa. He also describes it as a language of dignity

³⁹ See appendix 1 no. 8

which is quite an outlandish statement given the reason that it exists on the African continent today. Hollande reiterated this statement when discussing relations with Senegal, saying:

“Speaking French is not enough, it is speaking the values not of France, but of human rights, the dignity of women, equality for all, the fight against poverty and misery. This is what it means to be francophone.”

(Hollande 2014)⁴⁰

This statement also reflects France’s desperation for French to be recognised not just as a language, but as a tool for human development and economic success when saying ‘speaking French is not enough’ (ibid). He similarly described La Francophonie as: “a tool of diversity and cultural exception” (Hollande 2013). Hollande shows that France tries to frame the French language as something which belongs to Africans, and doing this could be an attempt to remove the stigma surrounding it as a colonial tool for development. Hollande said in regard to the French language in a statement on strengthening Franco-African relations:

“I want to say to the Africans who speak French, that we are extremely grateful to them. The French language is an African language. Today, Africans are the most likely to speak French. I want to express my gratitude to them.”

(Hollande 2012)⁴¹

He describes French as an African language and clearly values Africans who speak it, perhaps suggesting that Francophone countries are more favourable in the French development rhetoric because of the sphere of influence that they have allowed France to maintain on the continent. Hollande also shows that France values la Francophonie in Africa for the future of the continent, and therefore the future of Franco-African relations. He acknowledged this in a statement on La Francophonie when saying:

⁴⁰ See appendix 1 no.46

⁴¹ See appendix 1 no. 7

“In 2050...the youth of the world will be largely French-speaking; this youth will be African. It is up to us, to all of us gathered here, to allow these young people, not just to speak French, to be supported and to be trained in French.”

(Hollande 2014)⁴²

It is clear from this statement that the French language being spoken in former colonies is integral to French development policy, and that encouraging the growth of the language by offering support and training in French can help it to flourish. Hollande says that it is up to French and African policymakers to ‘allow’ young people to speak French, implying that France has a vital role in preserving the language in Africa, and therefore justifying this paternalistic tool for maintaining influence as a tool for development.

The analysis of Hollande’s language shows that paternalism was exhibited in his mandate according to the criteria based on the literature. A paternalistic attitude underpins some of the speeches as shown. However, it cannot be said that paternalism was therefore the main motivator of France’s bilateral policy to former colonies in the Sahel at the time.

⁴² See appendix 1 no. 8

5.2 Macron 2017-20

The French administration inherited by Macron had bilateral relations with Africa primarily focused on security, as demonstrated by the launch of Operation Barkhane in Mali which is still ongoing today. Hollande left a strong military legacy after committing his presidential term to an anti-terrorist military campaign in West Africa. Macron has upheld this legacy by continuing to pursue France's military interests in the Sahel. When elected into power, Macron became the youngest French president since Napoleon. He has tried to create a new narrative for Africa, making promises of more effective development in African countries and renewed relationships that would no longer implement the post-colonial models that his predecessors had followed. Macron has tried to focus French development policy for Africa on education and female empowerment, and he recognises the importance of Africa's young demographic the future. Africa is certainly a continent of interest in Macron's foreign policy, perhaps more so than any of his predecessors, and he has made significant attempts to move away from the paternalistic narrative that the Franco-Africa donor-recipient relationship encapsulates. He encourages plans to move away from the use of the CFA franc in 2020 and began introducing a policy to get African artefacts held in French museums returned to Africa.

Results

Out of the 57 speeches made by Macron between May 2017 and January 2020 which were used in the analysis, 31 (54%) indicated a paternalistic attitude as demonstrated in accordance with the criteria and 26 (45%) did not.⁴³ Of the 31 speeches which matched the criteria, most matched more than one of the criterion (as shown below) and the most commonly occurring was criterion F – highlighting the importance of la Francophonie for Africa.

	Criteria	No. of speeches which matched criterion
A	Interference under the notion of saving or duty to save/ protect	13
B	Generalisations of African culture or people	3
C	Reference to or assumption of weakness or incapability of African states or people	10
D	Bilateral assistance to African countries as part of the French identity	4
E	Emphasis on France as a leader for development	12
F	Stressing relevance of France’s colonial past for contemporary relations with recipients	12
G	Highlighting the importance of La Francophonie for Africa	8

The speeches demonstrating paternalistic language will be analysed in accordance with the criteria they matched. Some speeches also clearly indicated Macron’s intention to create a new narrative for Africa through a development paradigm based on donor needs which contrasts with the idea of paternalism being a key motivation. This will be discussed later on in the evaluation.

⁴³ See appendix for full table of speeches matched to criteria: ‘Y’ for match to 1 or more criteria, ‘N’ for no match

5.2.1 Paternalistic Approach to Development

Generalisations

Although criteria B – generalisations of African people and culture - was the least occurring criterion in the analysis, it is pertinent to the research; the sentiment expressed within these 3 speeches gained controversy in the media for being paternalistic. Criteria B assumes that the speaker is reflecting a paternalistic attitude towards African countries by showing a lack of understanding about their recipients on a human level, which would motivate the claim that they do not understand recipient needs. This therefore sees bilateral assistance being based upon the will of the donor, rather than the needs of the recipient. In his speech at the G20 summit on 8th July 2017, two months after becoming president, Macron stated that a lack of economic development in African countries is because of civilizational problems. Arguably, this was his first statement which publicly caused offence, and certainly mirrored the paternalistic attitude of the Franco-African relationship that he claimed he wanted to leave in the past. When introducing the economic challenges that Africa faces, Macron stated that:

“The challenge Africa faces today is completely different, its much deeper, its civilizational.”
“...It is by more rigorous governance, a fight against corruption, a fight for good governance [and] a successful demographic transition when countries today have seven or eight children per woman spending billions of euros outright would stabilize nothing.”

(Macron 2017)⁴⁴

Here, Macron generalises African women by suggesting that they have an excessive number of children, and further implying that this is damaging for the Western view of ‘successful’ demography. Ultimately, he is suggesting that multiple children per woman is unmanageable within African societies should they want to become economically successful, something which can be achieved by westernising their culture. It is also worth noting that only two West African leaders were invited as guests to the summit: The President of Guinea, who chaired the African Union that year and the President of Senegal, who has a leading role in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Macron’s comments were met with criticisms and compared to the French *mission civilisatrice* in how they imposed Western cultural expectations as a prerequisite for economic success. Suggesting that African problems are civilizational is paternalistic where it assumes that Western societies do not face

⁴⁴ See appendix 2 no. 9

the same economic struggles because of their culture, and that African societies could also benefit if they follow suit. Macron reiterated the comments he made at the G20 in a speech he made to students at the University of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso on 28th November 2017 and directly compared African and French women in terms of their decision to have children. He said:

“It must be a choice, particularly for young girls and women, and you must ask the question, if you have had seven, eight or nine children per woman, is it that each time, in each family...it is the choice of that woman? In my country there are families who have made this choice. In France there are families [with] seven, eight or nine children per woman. It is their choice, it is very good, I do not judge them, I never speak about them. And I don’t judge African families and African women, but I want to be sure that everywhere in Africa it is the choice of this young girl or woman.”

(Macron 2017)⁴⁵

The paternalistic sentiment behind the comparison between French and African women cannot be ignored here. Macron is still addressing African women’s tendency to have several children as a problem for the successful development of their economies, and he directly undermines these African women by suggesting that they, compared to French women, are incapable of making their own reproductive choices. It is true that developmental factors such as poor healthcare or a lack of education may contribute to a higher number of children per woman in African countries, however, this is not something that can be assumed for every African woman, as Macron suggests. This speech appears to have been an attempt by Macron to mask over the offence he caused at the G20 summit, where he showed himself to be more aware of other factors that contribute to birth rates, by suggesting that African women are not to blame for having many children. However, it is obvious that the French government still considers ‘civilizational’ issues such as this to be a hindrance for economic development. Macron later moved away from the idea that having many children might not be the choice of African women in a speech he made to Chadian women on 23rd December 2018. When discussing the countries increasing birth rate, Macron said:

⁴⁵ See appendix 2 no. 15

“And what is behind this rate? We can say it in truth: a dropout of young girls, forced marriages and basically there is a chosen fertility. There are life choices that are made by women.”

(Macron 2018)⁴⁶

In contrast to his talk at the University of Ouagadougou, Macron clearly states that African women do in fact make the choice to have ‘seven or eight’ children referring to their ‘chosen fertility.’ This gives weight to his comments at the G20 in 2017 by suggesting that women are to blame for the number of children they have; this ignorantly overlooks cultural and structural factors that influence why the birth rate in many African countries is higher than in the West. Suggesting that economic development is lacking in African countries because of civilizational problems is not only paternalistic, but it follows the colonial dynamic that Western practices produce a preferable society and that African countries should adopt them if they also want to succeed.

“I don't have to tell a young Chadian girl what she should do, but I will do everything I can to make sure that a young Chadian girl can go to school to choose her life and know what's good for her.”

(Macron 2018)⁴⁷

Here, Macron addresses the issue of education as a contributing factor to what the West would deem as poor family planning in Africa. However, he takes this further by suggesting that a lack of education equates to a lack of capability, referenced under criterion C. It is suggested that by not attending school, Chadian women do not know what is best for themselves, therefore, assuming their capabilities. This also shows France to have adopted the paternalistic assumption that French policymakers know what is best for these African women.

⁴⁶ See appendix 2 no. 38

⁴⁷ *ibid*

Assuming capabilities

Macron's approach towards French bilateral assistance for former African colonies exhibits a paternalistic attitude where he assumes African people and policymakers to be less competent than the French. He directly expresses this sentiment in 10 out of the 57 speeches used in the analysis by implying that a donor-recipient relationship with France is necessary for the success of African countries. A month after his inauguration in June 2017, Macron said in a joint statement with the President of Senegal that: "it is a balanced partnership [with France] that allows Senegal to succeed," (Macron 2017) implying that Senegal needs France to prosper. He further implied in his speech for the Ambassador's Week in August 2017, that Africa as a continent cannot cope without Western assistance when saying:

"Africa...is a continent of the future. For this reason, ...we cannot leave it to face its demographic, climatic and political challenges alone."

(Macron 2017)⁴⁸

The following month, when discussing the future of the African continent at the UN General Assembly, Macron stated:

"Whatever means we use, we will not succeed in our collective mission if the countries most concerned are not able to assume their own responsibilities."

(Macron 2017)⁴⁹

When using this language, Macron reveals France's assumption that African countries and their leaders are incompetent. He speaks with a paternalistic view towards Africa as being in need of France's help if it is to be successful. Moreover, Macron is not specific about which countries he is referring to, instead making a sweeping statement about the African continent as a whole. This undermines the successful economic development of some of the richest countries on the continent such as Nigeria or South Africa, middle-income countries, which have very different developmental needs to the less developed former French colonies in the Sahel. Macron is frank in his implication of African countries as weak states which are in

⁴⁸ See appendix 2 no. 9

⁴⁹ See appendix 2 no. 13

need of Western intervention for their own survival. In a statement made in Ghana on 30th November 2017 he said:

“I do not think at all that a country like Ghana can succeed without a stronger Africa and a stronger partnership between Africa and Europe.”

(Macron 2017)⁵⁰

This is the same paternalistic sentiment that he expressed towards Senegal needing France in order to ‘succeed.’ Although it may be true that Western African countries like Ghana and Senegal need a stronger Africa to benefit their own economies, it remains a paternalistic sentiment by implying that these states would not be successful without the assistance of Europe and France. Macron himself admits that France’s donor-recipient relationship with its former African colonies is paternalistically motivated when saying:

“I admit that we have adopted a strategy of peer pressure and not of direct expression or lecturing on what should be done.”

(Macron 2019)⁵¹

This statement, which was made more recently in Macron’s term, shows him admitting to pressuring African states to follow French bilateral policy. Although this is perhaps a better strategy for effective development than ‘lecturing on what should be done,’ admitting to peer pressure supports the argument that France is motivated by paternalism. By pressuring African states, policymakers assume they know what is best. They are therefore following an approach towards bilateral policy which is in accordance with their own will rather than the needs of the donor. Macron continued in this speech to say that:

“We ourselves must take action and work in a different way with Africans for themselves, to think out their actions with them...”

(Macron 2019)⁵²

⁵⁰ See appendix 2 no. 16

⁵¹ See appendix 2 no. 48

⁵² *ibid*

Here, he exhibits the paternalistic sentiment that African people need European assistance for their own benefit. This agrees with Dworkin's argument that paternalism is interference by one state upon another state or group of people, motivated by the idea that the person or state interfered with will be better off (2002).

Duty to protect

Another way in which paternalism is shown to be a motivation for France's bilateral policy towards former African colonies in the Sahel, is through the notion of policymakers acting to save African people simply because they feel it is their duty to do so. Macron exhibited this language, as described by criterion A, in 13 speeches. On four occasions Macron honoured France's decision to commence Operation Barkhane as a 'courageous decision to intervene' and a 'credit to [France]' (Macron 2017). Macron presents the military operation as a French intervention on behalf of Mali in order to 'defend the entire region,' admitting it to be a French decision imposed upon an African country which the French felt needed protecting. The ongoing mission has arguably been successful for stabilizing the region against Islamic extremism, however, the point here is that Macron emphasizes it as coming from France's self-proclaimed duty to protect, rather than Mali's need to be assisted. When explaining the reason for the launch of Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, Macron said:

“We did it because France has always been at the side of Africa when its stability, when its life, was at stake.”

(Macron 2017)⁵³

Here he confirms that France feels duty bound to intervene with Africa when its stability is at risk. Such a duty, to protect former colonies when their security is compromised, echoes imperialist sentiments of colonial France and continues the *Françafrique* narrative. In the 72nd UN General Assembly, Macron said:

“I know that France's duty is to speak for those we do not hear...It is our will to act, it is our will to influence the course of history.”

(Macron 2017)⁵⁴

⁵³ See appendix 2 no. 15

⁵⁴ See appendix 2 no. 13

A year later, he followed the same sentiment when speaking on the topic of Africa at the UN General Assembly, saying:

“Are we going to give them the means to be the actors of their own lives? If we don’t what world are we preparing for?”

(Macron 2018)⁵⁵

Macron implies that it is not just the duty of France, but of all developed nations to intervene in a helpless Africa. He admits in the first statement that France’s bilateral policy towards Africa is motivated by its own will, and the second statement implies that it would be backward to not to assist African people on the paternalistic assumption that they are not in control of their own lives. Macron has made it apparent that his narrative for the development of Africa will focus on the youth and the ‘demographic challenge’ that Africa will be facing in years to come. He has dedicated many speeches to the younger generations by talking at schools and universities since he became president. In December during a Christmas visit to Côte d’Ivoire, he said that:

“[France] has only to help her brothers and sisters to succeed and this African youth to conquer their future.”

(Macron 2019)⁵⁶

Thus, making it clear that France itself is playing a leading and necessary role in the development of Africa. On the same day in a speech to the French community in Côte d’Ivoire, he said:

“France has an essential role to play in helping the emancipation of African youth and building a new relationship.”

(Macron 2019)⁵⁷

⁵⁵ See appendix 2 no. 33

⁵⁶ See appendix 2 no. 56

⁵⁷ See appendix 2 no. 54

Emancipating African youth suggests there is something oppressive which they need to be emancipated from. This choice of language shows that France continues to view Africa through a colonial lens as an oppressed continent. France fails to separate Africa's developmental needs from its inequalities, and further to this, fails to recognize that the development of sovereign African countries is not homogenous.

France as a leader

Through his language, Macron presents France as a leader for the development of former African colonies in the Sahel, as well as a leader for the African continent. This is something that is already known when looking at the substantial donor-recipient relationships that France maintains in West Africa, and the amount of bilateral aid that it donates to supporting these countries. Yet, despite the quantitative data, Macron's language shows that France considers it necessary to be a leader for Africa, helping to frame France's motivations for aid in the Sahel as paternalistic. In the analysis, 12 speeches matched criteria E for presenting France as a leader. Macron ensures France is highlighted as a bilateral leader for West African countries, and one area in which he emphasises France's commitment is to the security of the Sahel. The creation of the G5 Sahel in particular was a movement which France takes pride in, with Macron saying:

“It is a profound movement that France is proud of – to accompany the G5 Sahel.”

(Macron 2017)⁵⁸

Macron made it clear with regards to the security of the Sahel region, that France wants “to lead the fight...at the level of the African Union in the Libyan zone and within the G5 Sahel” (ibid). This reflects France's paternalistic motivation for aiding former colonies where it wants French policy to be in the forefront of development and security of the Sahel region. France is certainly proud of its military interventions in West Africa which Macron showed when stating in Burkina Faso:

⁵⁸ See appendix 2 no. 5

“France is indeed, certainly in the region, the most committed non-African country, because we have stuck to our commitments from both a military point of view and from a budgetary point of view.”

(Macron 2017)⁵⁹

Such a statement shows how much France values being a leader for Africa, to the extent that its involvement with recipients has to be reiterated back to the recipients themselves. In the same year, Macron said in regards its student exchange programmes:

“France is very often the first destination. I want it to be the first destination, not out of habit, but by choice, by desire.”

(Macron 2017)⁶⁰

Clearly, France values its influence over its former colonies in the Sahel, and aims to continue being a leader in all aspects of the development of West Africa. The language here suggests there is a need for France to be the dominant country for its former colonies to rely on, indicating France’s inability to let go of the *Françafrique* that it used to command. Macron also stressed the importance of aid to Africa for France as a donor, saying in his speech at the UN General Assembly:

“Yes, I want France to be at the rendezvous of official development aid.”

(Macron 2017)⁶¹

Here, he implies that France should be recognized as a state synonymous with development aid thanks to its commitments as a donor. This could be extended to France seeing the development of former colonies in the Sahel as part of its own narrative and part of the French identity, which has also been demonstrated through Macron’s use of language. He also repeated this in his speech at the World Economic Forum.⁶²

⁵⁹ See appendix 2 no. 35

⁶⁰ See appendix 2 no.15

⁶¹ See appendix 2 no.13

⁶² See appendix 2 no.21

France's identity as a donor

Paternalism is seen as a motivation for France's bilateral aid assistance towards former colonies in the Sahel where France sees development aid as a key component of its identity as a sovereign state. France views the development of former African colonies as an element of its bilateral policy which upholds the donor-recipient relationship. Associating the French narrative with the development of the Sahel is paternalistic; it sees Aronson's definition of the white saviour rhetoric - a phenomenon fabricating the need to save less fortunate black Africans - becoming ingrained into Western society (Aronson 2017). Evidence of France seeing bilateral aid to former colonies as part of its identity is difficult to extract from qualitative data. This is because this sentiment is internalized, so therefore difficult to interpret without very direct language. However, it is still a relevant criterion for establishing the extent to which paternalism motivates France's donor-recipient relationship with these African countries. The analysis found that 3/57 speeches matched criterion D. In December 2019 at a Christmas reception in Côte d'Ivoire, Macron said:

“Barkhane is an essential mission for France.”

(Macron 2019)⁶³

He emphasises that security in the Sahel is not just important for the countries in that region who are under immediate threat, but that it is essential for France too. Having a military presence in Africa increases France's military presence worldwide. This therefore consolidates its identity not only as a military power, but as a state integral to the survival and development of Africa. This is paternalistic as France is using its relationship with Africa to increase its own power as a sovereign state on the international stage. France is therefore investing in the development of the Sahel primarily according to its own will as a donor.

In 2017 in a speech in Burkina Faso, Macron said:

⁶³ See appendix 2 no. 52

“Africa is etched in French memory, in culture, in history, in the identity of France, and this is a force and a pride that I want to cultivate, that I want to carry as an asset for France and for Africa in our relationship to the world.”

(Macron 2017)⁶⁴

Macron states very clearly here that Africa is etched in the identity of France, and that he wants their relationship to be recognised on the international stage. Referring to Africa as part of France’s identity is paternalistic as it trivialises aid as a tool for increasing France’s legitimacy in the development rhetoric, instead of increasing the efficacy of existing development approaches. Macron echoed the same sentiment a year later at his second ambassadors conference in August 2018 when saying:

“Africa is important to France not only because it is our closest neighbour but also because it is part of our identity through our common history.”

(Macron 2018)⁶⁵

Macron shows that France identifies itself with Africa through a post-colonial dynamic by referencing their shared history. He goes further than saying that France simply works with Africa to say that Africa is indeed part of France’s identity. This undermines African nations, especially as Macron says ‘Africa’ without referencing specifically to any of the 54 independent countries that make up the continent. He speaks of the African continent as though it is a concept which Western countries can use to expand their own narratives in accordance with their own will, rather than a continent existing of separate sovereign states made up of African people. This is paternalistic as it undermines the needs of the recipient where it is more beneficial for the donor to maintain close ties for their own narrative and foreign policy goals. It is also habitual of France to refer its ‘common history’ with Africa as a reason for keeping such close ties today.

⁶⁴ See appendix 2 no. 15

⁶⁵ See appendix 2 no. 32

Colonial relations

12 speeches were matched to criterion F where Macron referred directly to France's past as a colonial power in Africa. As the youngest president of the Republic, Macron uses his age to disassociate personally from the horrors of France's relations with its African colonies. He understandably wants to break away from the *Françafrique* that was created under imperialism. However, France's colonial guilt is still a relevant factor in motivating its bilateral assistance to countries in the Sahel and this can be seen in the way Macron addresses the sovereign African states which were French colonies in recent history. Macron references to a 'common history' (Macron 2019) with former colonies, describing Franco-African bilateral relationships as 'old and strong' despite 'difficult episodes' (Macron 2017) and 'dark chapters and suffering' (Macron 2019). He frequently describes the powerful bilateral relationships that exist today as 'friendships' which undermines the history which precedes them. This colonial guilt is paternalistic where it is responsible for bilateral assistance being distributed to the will of the donor rather than the needs of the recipient, this undermines effective allocation (Alesina and Dollar 2000) by creating bias. Despite using this paternalistic language, Macron has made attempts to show that France does not consider past colonial relations as relevant to the contemporary donor-recipient relationship. In 2017 at a speech to students of the University of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, Macron told the students:

"I am like you, of a generation that has never known Africa as a colonized continent...I come from a generation where we do not tell Africa what to do."

(Macron 2017)⁶⁶

Macron speaks as though whitewashing France's history with Africa is something which becomes less significant as time passes- but of course this is not the case. He ignores the structural issues that exist as a result of the colonisation of African countries, and undermines the fact that these students might be just one generation away from those who did know Africa as a colonized continent. Not living in a time where Burkina Faso was a French colony does not make its colonial history irrelevant today as Macron tries to suggest. Macron values his lack of experience of colonialism with regards to his bilateral policy with Africa as it is

⁶⁶ See appendix 2 no. 15

something which he has mentioned several times. On discussing France's 'very complicated history with Africa' in Lagos, Nigeria in July 2018, Macron said:

"I am sorry but the new generation never experienced colonialism. My generation never experienced colonialism."

(Macron 2018)⁶⁷

Further to this, when discussing the criticisms of the West African Economic and Monetary Union as being a postcolonial mechanism, he again says:

"So I do not belong to a generation which knew colonialism...So let's break the moorings and have the courage to move forward and build an uninhibited partnership together."

(Macron 2019)⁶⁸

Addressing that he himself does not come from a generation which knew African states as colonies does not deter from the fact that Macron is the leader of a nation which did colonise the African countries which it maintains such strong relations with today, and that this history as a colonial power is ultimately what created those relations. In a speech on 10th May 2019 on the National Day of Remembrance of the Slave Trade, Macron acknowledged that the repercussions of colonialism are in fact relevant to Franco-African relations today by saying:

"It connects us to Africa...The consequences of this past are there, still there, because its heritage today is the geography of contemporary France."

(Macron 2019)⁶⁹

So, although Macron is trying to move away from the post-colonial development framework that France exhibits towards former colonies; it is clear to see that colonial guilt still manifests itself amongst French policy when looking at Macron's delivery. Colonial guilt, being a feature of paternalism where it sees assistance allocated according to the will of the donor, therefore motivates France's bilateral aid policy towards former colonies in the Sahel.

⁶⁷ See appendix 2 no. 31

⁶⁸ See appendix 2 no. 56

⁶⁹ See appendix 2 no. 43

La Francophonie

France has been criticised for maintaining colonial power relations with its former colonies in the Sahel and a key feature of such relations most prominent today is La Francophonie.

French is spoke in 29 African countries and it is an official language in 21 of these. This allows France to maintain a sphere of influence in Africa in a post-colonial framework. The *mission civilisatrice* which epitomized France's paternalistic attitude towards Africa as a colonial power, showed how France viewed these African countries as states in desperate need of Western intervention. The French language was imposed upon African states in the name of the French imperialism, hence why so many have French as an official language today. Yet this practice, although not denied as being created as paternalistic tool for development, is still encouraged by the French today and this is evident from Macron's speeches. Eight speeches matched criteria G for highlighting the importance of La Francophonie for Africa, and this shows that the French language, which was created from a paternalistic attitude, is still pertinent to France's bilateral aid policy in the Sahel today. In his first ambassador's conference in August 2017, Macron said:

“La Francophonie and its community are...central to the fight to meet our development objectives.”

(Macron 2017)⁷⁰

He admitted here to French ambassadors that encouraging participation within La Francophonie and continuing to hail the French language as a necessary tool for development. In this way, the paternalistic sphere of the French language which began under colonial rule, can be seen to continue to influence France's donor-recipient relationships with former colonies today. In the same ambassador's conference, Macron described French as:

“a tool for achieving attractiveness and influence” due to it being “present on all continents with France at the helm.”

(Macron 2017)⁷¹

⁷⁰ See appendix 2 no. 10

⁷¹ *ibid*

France views the French language as integral to its identity in international politics and this is one colonial tool for development that French policymakers continue to use despite the negative connotations that come with its history. Macron has tried to implement this initiative of the rejuvenating la Francophonie by encouraging youth to admire the French language. In his speech at the University of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, Macron told students that:

“The French language of Burkina-Faso, the French language of Senegal, it is no longer just French, it is already yours, so wear it with pride!”

(Macron 2017)⁷²

Macron’s initiative to rejuvenate la Francophonie was met with criticism from African scholar Alain Mabanckou; insisted in an open letter to the president that the French language is a colonial tool which props up autocratic regimes in Africa today (Mabanckou 2018). He is not the first president to take pride in La Francophonie and to insist on its growth and continuation, however, using such a paternalistic tool for consolidating France’s influence contradicts Macron’s plan to leave the Françafrique narrative behind. It shows that a paternalistic attitude is still maintained by French policymakers who want to contribute to the development of Africa, but insist on using imperialistic tools of development for keeping a strong donor-recipient relationship. Macron admits that La Francophonie is a tool for maintaining bilateral relations when saying to the French community in Senegal in February 2018:

“This Francophonie...I would like you to bring it to life...it is important for you, it is important for the bilateral relationship, I am convinced it is important for Senegal and its ability to succeed in the region and far beyond.” “Make this relationship live, be proud of it and be proud of this part of the language that you have inherited.”

(Macron 2018)⁷³

Macron speaks as though the French language is a gift to people in Senegal and that they, the people who the language was forced upon, need it in order to be successful. He presents La Francophonie as equally as important for Senegal as it is for France, when in fact the spread

⁷² See appendix 2 no. 15

⁷³ See appendix 2 no. 22

of La Francophonie increases France's power and influence whilst stripping former colonies of their integrity as sovereign nations. Macron acknowledges that the French language is rooted in the paternalistic ideology which led to the colonization of Africa, yet he chooses not to condemn this:

“By making the language of the colonists their language, by affirming that social and political submission could find an outlet in the language of the dominant...the former colonized brought to our language that experience of suffering that enriches our gaze.”

(Macron 2018)⁷⁴

What Macron said here, in a speech in March 2018, on La Francophonie was incredibly obtuse; he acknowledged the suffering that led to the creation of La Francophonie, yet describes this suffering as something which simply ‘enriches’ France's economic outlook with regards to the development of Africa. It is clear to see that despite the backlash it has received since decolonization, France continues to value la Francophonie as a key foreign policy tool.

“The whole European strategy in terms of official development assistance and cooperation revolves around this Francophonie, and French is what gives access to a good part of the African continent to economic opportunities.”

(Macron 2018)⁷⁵

Macron makes the link here between La Francophonie and ODA, showing that a paternalistic mechanism directly motivates France's bilateral assistance to former colonies, particularly as French is spoken in every former French colony in the Sahel. He hails the French language for creating economic opportunities in Africa which France can take advantage of when explaining the significance of La Francophonie to French people in this speech. This is contrasted in speeches given in African countries where he tries to present French as equally as valuable to African people as it is for France, when in fact it is simply a tool for expanding Europe's economic opportunities in Africa, something which France can take credit for.

⁷⁴ *ibid*

⁷⁵ See appendix 2 no. 25

6. A New Direction for Development

Of the speeches from Hollande and Macron's mandates, 56% and 54% matched the criteria for paternalism respectively. This shows that paternalism does motivate French bilateral assistance to former colonies in the Sahel according to the criteria created from the literature. However, the margins are very slim so it is arguable that the research is not conclusive enough to assert paternalism as the main motivation for France's bilateral assistance to the Sahel region, or that it is more prevalent than other motivations such as wealth creation or political control.

Although the percentage of speeches which matched at least one of the criteria was slightly lower in the analysis of Macron's speeches at 54% than Hollande's at 56%, the analysis of Macron's speeches proved far more interesting. Unlike Hollande, Macron has chosen to make the development of the Sahel a main focus of his mandate, so even though the time frame used in the data was shorter, there were only nine fewer speeches relevant for the analysis of Macron's term than Hollande's. Moreover, Hollande's involvement in Africa was occupied predominantly by security, so many of the speeches in the analysis were relating to the same topic, which resulted in very uniformed language. Moreover, Hollande's speeches were more focussed on fewer countries, most notably Mali and the Central African Republic. So, Hollande and Macron's agendas regarding the development of Africa had more differences than similarities. Their few similarities lied in seeing Africa as a continent with much economic potential, and both were equally as keen to protect France's interests by reiterating the strong friendships that France has maintained with countries in the Sahel post-colonisation. They both stress the importance of la Francophonie for Franco-African relations and for France's global influence, and they both address the relevance of France's colonial linkages with Africa. However, Hollande blamed this colonial past for creating an ongoing French debt to West Africa, whereas, Macron reflects on this historical relationship as a basis from which to strengthen existing ties today. He especially values the youth and sees France's colonial past as something which should not be relevant for them or for the future of Africa, which he believes African youth must be more engaged with. Macron is focused on what he calls Africa's demographic challenge, something which Hollande also saw potential in but was arguably less enthusiastic about, perhaps because military engagement in the Sahel was more pressing during his term. Macron does maintain a security in the Sahel, in

particularly with his involvement in the G5 Sahel, however in comparison to Hollande, his legacy for Franco-African relations will not be categorised by military achievements as he is simply expanding on his predecessor's work. Hollande's stabilisation of the Sahel potentially allowed Macron to pursue a more diplomatic approach to West Africa, in particular with his new narrative for the Franco-African relationship which is attempting to depart from historical association with *Françafrique*. Of the speeches analysed, Hollande only made one reference to *Françafrique* when saying "The time of what used to be called *Françafrique* is over" (Hollande 2012). This was in his first statement on Franco-African relations, however, unlike Macron, he made little attempt to pursue this sentiment throughout the rest of his term. If Macron is to successfully pursue this new narrative, this could mark a turning point in the French aid rhetoric marking the transition away from paternalistically motivated bilateral assistance.

6.1 Macron's Africa

The analysis showed that underlying paternalistic sentiments do exist in the French development rhetoric. So paternalism, can be suggested as a motivation for France's bilateral aid policy with former colonies in the Sahel, to an extent. Through the language he uses in speeches, it is obvious that Macron represents a government indentifying itself as necessary for the prosperity of African nations and a saviour of African people from backward cultural practices and an economic framework that is detrimental to the Western idea of success. French policy still exhibits characteristics of the *Françafrique* that Macron aims to forget through repressive tools such as language, and ideologies suggesting African people to be less capable than Europeans, and therefore better off with Western influence. Yet despite the obvious paternalistic features of bilateral policy towards former colonies in the Sahel under Macron, there were key examples in the analysis that showed Macron's government to be setting a new and unprecedented agenda for France's relationship with former colonies. This could indicate a new direction for France's development rhetoric: one that is in fact moving away from the outdated concept of *Françafrique* that engulfed the post-colonial political framework of his predecessors.

6.1.1 A new narrative

Macron has attempted to establish a new development narrative for France with regards to former French colonies aiming to move away from colonial donor-recipient power structures. This is evident within his speeches and such examples contradict the hypothesis where Macron shows French policy to be consciously diverging from the paternalistic attitude that motivated his predecessors. In an interview in Nigeria in May 2018, on the topic of the economic future of Africa, Macron said:

“What we need is to have African people speaking about Africa. When I say we need a new narrative, we need new people to make this narrative. We need people coming from Africa to speak about Europe.”

(Macron 2018)

By recognising that a new narrative needs African people speaking about Africa, Macron is addressing the same flaw in the Western approach to development that key scholars have highlighted. Sharon Bwanya for example, argued that African problems must be met with African solutions (2017), and this is what Easterly envisioned as the more effective ‘planner mentality’ (2006 p.3). Macron shows that French policymakers recognise that African people are key to their own development, implying that the classic top-down approach may not be so prominent in his ‘new narrative.’ Macron reiterated this sentiment over a year later at the ambassador’s conference in August 2019, and this makes his aspiration for a new narrative appear more genuine when considering he is addressing French ambassadors on French soil. When describing the need to “continue a mutual shift in outlook,” Macron said:

“We no longer want to have a relationship with Africa that is based on the sentiment of asymmetry.” “The most advanced actions must be carried out with Africans in Africa...ultimately the continent’s future must be prepared in Africa, with the people in Africa.”

(Macron 2019)

Macron wants to change the French development narrative into one that is recipient focused, and less paternalistic. However simply expressing the need for a new narrative does not consequently change the narrative, or indeed what motivates it. France’s donor-recipient relationship with former colonies in the Sahel is still characterised by the Western need to

assist Africans, and moreover, a post-colonial framework continues to fortify this relationship. So, the narrative can only be denied as a paternalistically motivated one if paternalistic tools for development are removed from it.

6.1.2 Implementing the new narrative

The analysis of speeches revealed Macron to be moving away from a bilateral aid policy that is motivated by paternalism where he has made efforts to implement a new narrative. This involved attempts to remodel or remove parts of the existing narrative underpinning a French post-colonial framework towards the Sahel. Within three months of his inauguration, Macron had created the Presidential Council for Africa (CPA)⁷⁶, an independent council made up of members of both French and African society, to provide advice on Franco-African relations. Macron introduced the CPA as:

“an unprecedented structure focusing on the expectations of our young people” saying that it “will transform the way we conduct our Africa policy by surrounding [Macron] with a group of dedicated people from the civil society sector.”

(Macron 2017)

Creating the CPA presented Macron’s commitment to the new narrative that his presidency is becoming consistent with as it created a direct channel between Macron and African people. In this instance, it shows that Macron has not made the paternalistic assumption that it is only French policymakers who know what is best for the Franco-African relationship.

Since becoming president of the French Republic, Macron has made the return of African artefacts a key mission of his. A report published on the restitution of African heritage in 2018 stated that:

“within five years the conditions will be met for temporary or permanent restitution of African heritage in Africa.”

(Sarr and Savoy 2018)

⁷⁶ Conseil Présidentiel pour l’Afrique

Macron argues that the return of African artefacts stolen under colonial rule will signify a return of cultural heritage to Africa, and lead to a change in the way France and Africa see each other. Macron is confident that, as a result:

“France will be able to see Africa differently, but also Africa will be able to express itself differently, to tell its own history to the world and to build a new intellectual connection between Africa and France.”

(Macron 2018)

This mission shows France to be recognising colonial mistakes which is key for moving away from the paternalistic sentiments which motivate bilateral aid policy. However, Macron is not explicit in how exactly returning artefacts can improve the development of Africa, other than further strengthening Franco-African relations. This new policy admits colonial guilt and attempts to rectify it, but it does not necessarily contribute to a new narrative for France’s donor-recipient relationship with former colonies.

A key structure which receives criticism as one of France’s post-colonial tools for development is the Western African Monetary Union for its use of the CFA franc. Former presidents have faced questioning over the continued use of this currency and, despite little action being taken to address its inequalities, the currency is continuously denied by France as an oppressive tool for development. One way in which the issue of the CFA franc has been addressed by France is through the support for the proposed launch of a new currency called the Eco. Although planning for its launch began long before Macron became president, he has openly shown his support for a currency which has reduced links to France. With regards to the currency, Macron said:

“I welcome it, it will be the tool for this integration... There will of course be new opportunities for France and the WAEMU to continue exchanging with the different member states of the Union, but these will be more informal, less institutionalized, based on a new, free, chosen dynamic.”

(Macron 2019)

It must be noted however, that the introduction of the Eco has been postponed three times, and it is not due to be implemented until July 2020. Moreover, this new currency remains pegged to the Euro and it is the Bank of France which will guarantee the convertibility between the Eco and the Euro.

6.1.3 An attitude shift?

Despite Macron's intention to create a new narrative for French development, there is little evidence to show that this narrative is being implemented. It therefore cannot be denied that France's bilateral policy towards former colonies in the Sahel is motivated by paternalism. However, Macron does acknowledge some of the paternalistic characteristics of France's current narrative and he condemns them to an extent, showing that he may be paving the way for this new narrative by showing a shift in current attitudes amongst policymakers. When announcing the establishment of the Presidential Council for Africa at the 2017 Ambassadors conference, Macron explained its necessity by saying that:

“France must not be some post-colonial country vacillating between weakened political leadership and unhealthy repentance.”

(Macron 2017)

He admits here that colonial guilt has played a part in creating a paternalistically lead donor-recipient relationship when referring to unhealthy repentance, assuming that this could be a reason for weak leadership as a bilateral donor. A few months later in his talk at the University of Ouagadougou, Macron showed that he is representative of a more progressive government attitude towards development in contrast to a paternalistic way of viewing Africa. He said:

“It is never easy given our shared history for a French president to come and talk about Africa, and I would not pretend to express the complexity and diversity of a continent [made up of] 54 countries...there is something terribly arrogant in trying to explain [that there is] complete homogeneity [between] 54 countries with so much history...with relations that are not the same with regard to France...”

(Macron 2017)

He shows that he is not prepared to generalise Africa and that he wants to recognise African countries based on their individual needs, rather than as a homogenous continent. This is indicative of a bottom-up approach to development which is more recipient focused, as opposed to a paternalistic approach which overlooks recipient needs. Macron goes further in this speech to admit to mistakes in French development, and call for a recipient-based approach:

“[French] development assistance does not meet the needs. It pleases French or African governments. It must be evaluated. If it is effective, it should be continued. If it is not, it must be redirected towards projects carried out in the field.” “France will no longer invest solely in carrying out government-to-government operations where there is no impact on the local population.”

(Macron 2017)

Conclusion

It is clear when comparing Hollande and Macron's mandates, that Macron is far more engaged with Africa and with changing the current dynamic of France's donor-recipient relationship with former colonies. It is undeniable however, that despite his efforts, Macron still exhibits a paternalistic attitude towards African nations, as evident from the language used in his speeches. Moreover, it can be said that Macron, despite making a more conscious effort to change the narrative, has actually caused more harm to it than Hollande, as his attitude reflects characteristics of the Françafrique narrative which he wants to divert from. As mentioned in the analysis, Macron has been reprimanded for his comments on African civilizational problems, and had to deal with criticism from African scholars for his ardour of La Francophonie, and his whitewashing of France's colonial past. Perhaps he is more exposed to this kind of criticism as he is trying to change the narrative more vehemently in comparison to Hollande, whose mandate was focused on security and stability of the Sahel.

So in terms of the hypothesis, the analysis does show, to an extent, that a paternalistic attitude is exhibited by France regarding its bilateral policy towards former colonies in the Sahel. There is evidence of paternalistic language which can be related back to the paternalism literature. There was an overarching sentiment of the unsolicited will to intervene in African countries in both mandates, on the notion that they will be better off. It is difficult to ignore the similarities between contemporary France's need to assist former colonies, and the civilising mission of colonial France which was constructed from a paternalistic ideology. The colonial tools for maintaining power, such as the CFA franc zone and La Francophonie, also give weight to the idea that France's development policy in Africa is paternalistically motivated.

Limitations

It is important to discuss limitations to this research. It is possible to draw a conclusion from the analysis which directly address the hypothesis to argue that paternalism does exist in France's contemporary aid rhetoric. However, this can only be argued to an extent, and it cannot be said that paternalism is a main motivation. This is because the analysis did not consider other motivations as discussed in the state of the art. The analysis focused on the most recent French presidencies to keep up with expanding aid literature, and to provide a picture of the French narrative as close as possible to the present day. This caused problems

for the clarity of the analysis as Macron's mandate is still ongoing, so the study cannot draw conclusions about paternalism throughout his term in its entirety. This also meant that the analysis of Hollande and Macron covered different time frames. This could have created an imbalance in the analysis, however it emerged that both mandates had a similar amount of relative information for the analysis as Macron's, although shorter than Hollande's, was more focused on development policy.

A qualitative speech analysis can have many limitations as language is ambiguous, so different researchers may have drawn different conclusions from the same data set used in the study. This is why common criteria for paternalism was created from the most current and well established paternalism literature. Yet despite this, the paternalism literature itself is still maturing, so the findings of this research might need adjusting in due course according to the evolving literature. The study combined a qualitative and quantitative method by producing qualitative data from a qualitative analysis of language. This was necessary to measure the prevalence of each criterion within each mandate, and it gave the reader more tangible and coherent information going into the analysis. The data itself was not overwhelming for the hypothesis however, and this could be due to the ambiguity of the criteria which the speeches were analysed according to. There were many factors to compare the speeches against, and some were more suggestive of paternalism than others, which made it difficult to apply a fair quantitative analysis to each mandate. However, a qualitative analysis alone would have created more room for bias, something which presented a high risk to this research.

Suggestions for Further Research

This study could have been more effective if it compared two mandates from presidencies that were not adjacent to one another. Macron's mandate proved very interesting as Africa was central to his foreign policy. Determining paternalism as a motivator of France's policy may have been more effective if Macron's mandate was compared with another French president who had a similar enthusiasm for African development, to show if attitudes have changed over time. Although Hollande and Macron both represent the centre-left in terms of their political ideology, their foreign policy goals and personalities are very different. This made comparing their mandates in terms of paternalistic characteristics difficult, as there were many other factors which impacted what motivated their goals, and therefore their speeches.

An analysis of one president in more depth, rather than two presidents covering a longer time frame, could be more effective in producing more pertinent research for the hypothesis. An analysis as such could also integrate other motivations for bilateral assistance to Africa as discussed in the literature, such as wealth creation and political control, into the study.

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Appendices

Appendix 1	Date	Title	Link	Paternalism Y/N	Criteria
1	19 May 2012	Press Point: African aid	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/05/19/point-de-presse-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-notamment-sur-la-croissance-economique-le-nucleaire-iranien-la-situation-en-syrie-laide-a-lafrique-et-sur-la-zone-euro-a-camp-round-meadow-etats-unis-le-19-mai-2012	N	
2	29 May 2012	Press conference with President of Benin	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/05/29/conference-de-presse-conjointe-de-mm-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-thomas-boni-yayi-president-de-la-republique-du-benin-et-president-de-lunion-africaine-sur-les-relations-franco-africaines-et-sur-la-situation-au-mali-et-en-syrie	Y	F G
3	11 June 2012	Press conference with President of Niger	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/06/11/conference-de-presse-conjointe-de-mm-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-mahamadou-issoufou-president-de-la-republique-du-niger-sur-les-relations-franco-nigeriennes-laide-au-developpement-et-sur-la-situation-au-mali-a-paris-le-11-juin	Y	A
4	26 September 2012	Statement on the situation in Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/09/26/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-situation-au-mali-a-new-york-le-26-septembre-2012	Y	A C
5	26 September 2012	Conference on political situation in Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/09/26/conference-de-presse-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-situation-politique-au-mali-a-new-york-le-26-septembre-2012	N	
6	5 October 2012	Press briefing on situation in Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/10/05/point-de-presse-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-les-deux-rives-de-la-mediterranee-la-zone-euro-et-sur-la-situation-au-mali-a-la-valette-malte-le-5-octobre-2012	N	
7	11 October 2012	Interview on Franco-African relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/10/11/interview-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-par-france-4tv5monde-et-rfi-le-11-octobre-2012-sur-la-vie-politique-en-republique-democratique-du-congo-les-relations-franco-africaines-le-terrorisme-au-mali-la-presence-economique-du-q	Y	G F
8	12 October 2012	Statement on French relations with Senegal	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/10/12/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-lafrique-a-dakar-le-12-octobre-2012	Y	F C E A G
9	14 November 2012	Challenges on the African continent	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/11/14/declaration-conjointe-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-mme-dlamini-zuma-presidente-de-la-commission-de-lunion-africaine-sur-les-defis-et-priorites-du-continent-africain-a-paris-le-14-novembre-2012	N	
10	11 January 2013	Statement on Mali intervention	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2012/11/14/declaration-conjointe-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-mme-dlamini-zuma-presidente-de-la-commission-de-lunion-africaine-sur-les-defis-et-priorites-du-continent-africain-a-paris-le-14-novembre-2012	Y	A

11	12 January 2013	Statement on intervention in Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/01/12/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-l'intervention-militaire-francaise-au-mali-a-paris-le-12-janvier-2013	N	
12	16 January 2013	Statement on intervention in Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/01/16/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-politique-gouvernementale-et-sur-l'intervention-militaire-francaise-au-mali-a-paris-le-16-janvier-2013	Y	E
13	19 January 2013	France now engaged in Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/01/19/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-l'intervention-militaire-francaise-au-mali-a-tulle-le-19-janvier-2013	Y	D
14	1 March 2013	Statement on development policy	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/03/01/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-politique-de-developpement-a-paris-le-1er-mars-2013	N	
15	19 April 2013	Joint statement with president of AU	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/04/19/declaration-conjointe-de-mm-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-hailemariam-desalegn-premier-ministre-ethiopien-et-president-de-l'union-africaine-sur-les-relations-franco-ethiopiennes-et-sur-la-liberation-des-otages-francais-enlevés-au-c	N	
16	25 April 2013	Statement on UN adoption of Resolution on Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/04/25/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-l'adoption-par-le-conseil-de-securite-des-nations-unies-de-la-resolution-2100-sur-le-mali-a-paris-le-25-avril-2013	N	
17	10 May 2013	Joint press conference with president of Niger	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/05/10/point-de-presse-conjoint-de-mm-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-mahamadou-issoufou-president-de-la-republique-du-niger-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-le-niger-et-sur-la-situation-au-mali-a-paris-le-10-mai-2013	Y	A
18	15 May 2013	On financing aid to Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/05/15/conference-de-presse-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-laide-financiere-et-militaire-apportee-au-mali-a-bruxelles-le-15-mai-2013	N	
19	15 May 2013	On military aid to Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/05/15/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-laide-militaire-et-financiere-de-la-france-de-l'union-europeenne-de-l'afrique-et-de-la-communaute-internationale-apportee-au-mali-a-bruxelles-le-15-mai-2013	Y	C
20	25 May 2013	Statement on Future relations between France and Africa	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/05/25/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-l'avenir-des-relations-entre-la-france-leurope-et-l'afrique-a-addis-abeba-le-25-mai-2013	Y	F E A G
21	25 May 2013	Press conference on future relations of France and Africa	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/05/25/conference-de-presse-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-l'afrique-a-addis-abeba-le-25-mai-2013	Y	C F
22	5 June 2013	Statement on intervention in Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/06/05/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-l'intervention-militaire-francaise-au-mali-a-paris-le-5-juin-2013	Y	A E
23	15 July 2013	Statement on Mali intervention	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/07/15/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-l'intervention-militaire-francaise-au-mali-a-paris-le-15-juillet-2013	Y	A

24	19 September 2013	Press conference on Mali intervention	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/09/19/conference-de-presse-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-lintervention-militaire-francaise-au-mali-et-sur-la-situation-en-syrie-et-en-centrafrique-a-bamako-le-19-septembre-2013	Y	A E
25	19 September 2013	Statement on Mali- French relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/09/19/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-lintervention-militaire-francaise-au-mali-et-sur-les-relations-franco-maliennes-a-bamako-le-19-septembre-2013	Y	C F
26	19 September 2013	Statement on Mali intervention	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/09/19/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-lintervention-militaire-francaise-au-mali-a-bamako-le-19-septembre-2013	N	
27	8 November 2013	Statement on aid to Africa and Sahel	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/11/08/declarations-de-mm-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-jim-yong-kim-president-de-la-banque-mondiale-sur-laide-a-lafrique-notamment-aux-pays-du-sahel-a-paris-le-8-novembre-2013	Y	A E
28	21 November 2013	Statement on rights of women in CAR	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/11/21/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-prevention-des-conflits-le-droit-des-femmes-la-situation-en-republique-democratique-du-congo-et-en-centrafrique-et-sur-la-lutte-contre-le-rechauffement-climatique-a-paris-le-21-no	Y	A C
29	4 December 2013	Statement on economic relations between France and Africa	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/12/04/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-economiques-entre-la-france-et-lafrique-a-paris-le-4-decembre-2013	Y	A E F
30	5 December 2013	On the situation in CAR	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/12/05/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-situation-en-centrafrique-a-paris-le-5-decembre-2013	Y	A
31	10 December 2013	On military intervention in CAR	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2013/12/10/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-lintervention-militaire-francaise-en-centrafrique-a-bangui-le-10-decembre-2013	Y	A E
32	28 February 2014	Statement on intervention in CAR	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/02/28/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-lintervention-militaire-francaise-en-centrafrique-a-bangui-le-28-fevrier-2014	Y	E
33	20 March 2014	On Euro-African relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/03/20/conference-de-presse-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-situation-en-ukraine-la-question-climatique-et-sur-les-relations-euro-africaines	N	
34	1 April 2014	Joint statement on situation in CAR	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/04/01/declaration-conjointe-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-mme-catherine-samba-panza-chef-de-letat-de-la-transition-en-republique-centrafricaine-sur-la-france-et-lunion-europeenne-face-a-la-situation-en-centrafrique-a-paris-le-1er	N	
35	17 July 2014	Joint statement on	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/07/17/declaration-conjointe-de-mm-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-alassane-ouattara-president-de-la-republique-de-cote-divoire-sur-les-relations-franco-ivoiriennes-a-abidjan-le-17-juillet-2014	N	

		Franco-Ivorian relations			
36	17 July 2014	Statement on Franco-Ivorian relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/07/17/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-la-cote-divoire-a-abidjan-le-17-juillet-2014	N	
37	18 July 2014	Joint conference on France-Niger relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/07/18/conference-de-presse-conjointe-de-mm-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-m-mahamadou-issoufou-president-de-la-republique-du-niger-sur-les-relations-franco-nigeriennes-le-crash-du-vol-malaysian-airlines-sur-le-sol-ukrainien-et-sur-la-si	Y	F
38	18 July 2014	Statement on France-Niger relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/07/18/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-le-niger-et-sur-la-presence-militaire-francaise-en-afrique-a-niamey-le-18-juillet-2014	N	
39	19 July 2014	Joint press conference on Franco-Chadian relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/07/19/conference-de-presse-conjointe-de-mm-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-et-idriss-deby-itno-president-de-la-republique-du-tchad-sur-les-relations-franco-tchadiennes-le-crash-du-vol-malaysian-airlines-sur-le-sol-ukrainien-et-sur-la-situati	Y	C
40	19 July 2014	Statement on military interventions in Africa	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/07/19/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-interventions-militaires-francaises-en-afrique-a-njamena-le-19-juillet-2014	Y	A
41	28 November 2014	Statement to French community in Guinea	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/11/28/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-lutte-contre-lepide-mie-debola-et-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-la-guinee-a-conakry-le-28-novembre-2014	N	
42	28 November 2014	Statement on Ebola in Guinea	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/11/28/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-laction-de-la-france-dans-la-lutte-contre-lepide-mie-debola-en-guinee-a-conakry-le-28-novembre-2014	Y	F A E
43	29 November 2014	Statement on la Francophonie	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/11/29/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-francophonie-a-dakar-le-29-novembre-2014	Y	G F C
45	29 November 2014	Francophonie in Senegal	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/11/29/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-leopold-sedar-senghor-et-la-francophonie-a-dakar-le-29-novembre-2014	Y	G
46	29 November 2014	Statement on Franco-Senegalese relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2014/11/29/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-franco-senegalaises-et-sur-la-francophonie-a-dakar-le-29-novembre-2014	Y	F G
47	2 July 2015	Statement on Benin relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/07/02/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-franco-beninoises-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-laide-au-developpement-et-sur-la-question-climatique-a-cotonou-le-2-juillet-2015	Y	A F
48	2 July 2015	Franco-Benin relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/07/02/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-franco-beninoises-la-question-climatique-et-sur-la-cooperation-avec-lafrique-a-cotonou-le-2-juillet-2015	Y	F

49	3 July 2015	Interview on Franco-African relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/07/03/interview-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-franco-africaines-a-luanda-le-3-juillet-2015	N	
50	3 July 2015	Franco-Cameroonian relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/07/03/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-franco-camerounaises-et-sur-la-cooperation-avec-lafrique-a-yaounde-le-3-juillet-2015	Y	F A D
51	8 September 2015	On sustainable development and refugees	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/09/08/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-le-developpement-durable-et-sur-la-question-des-refugies-a-paris-le-8-septembre-2015	N	
52	21 October 2015	Statement on French-Mali relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/10/21/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-le-mali-a-paris-le-21-octobre-2015	Y	F
53	21 October 2015	On Mali relations and terrorism	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/10/21/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-le-mali-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-la-crise-des-refugies-et-sur-la-conference-de-paris-sur-le-climat-a-paris-le-21-octobre-2015	N	
54	22 October 2015	Statement on aid for development of Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/10/22/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-laide-en-faveur-du-developpement-du-mali-a-paris-le-22-octobre-2015	Y	E
55	20 November 2015	On terror attack in Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/11/20/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-lattaque-terroriste-a-bamako-au-mali-et-sur-la-lutte-contre-le-dereglement-climatique-a-paris-le-20-novembre-2015	N	
56	5 April 2016	Relations with Burkina Faso	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2016/04/05/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-le-burkina-faso-a-paris-le-5-avril-2016	N	
57	20 April 2016	Statement on situation in CAR	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2016/04/20/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-situation-en-republique-centrafricaine-a-paris-le-20-avril-2016	N	
58	26 April 2016	Statement on Benin relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2016/04/26/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-le-benin-a-paris-le-26-avril-2016	N	
59	13 May 2016	On military intervention in CAR	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2016/05/13/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-lintervention-militaire-francaise-en-republique-centrafricaine-a-bangui-le-13-mai-2016	N	
60	14 May 2016	On Franco-Nigerian relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2016/05/14/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-franco-nigeriennes-et-sur-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-a-abuja-le-14-mai-2016	N	
61	14 June 2016	Franco-Niger relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2016/06/14/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-et-les-relations-franco-nigeriennes-a-paris-le-14-juin-2016	Y	F
62	30 August 2016	French foreign policy challenges	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2016/08/30/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-defis-et-priorites-de-la-politique-etrangere-de-la-france-a-paris-le-30-aout-2016	Y	E A
63	16 November 2016	Statement on aid for	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2016/11/16/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-laide-en-faveur-du-developpement-de-lafrique-a-marrakech-le-16-novembre-2016	N	

		development of Africa			
64	14 January 2017	On France-Africa relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2017/01/14/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-lafrique-a-bamako-le-14-janvier-2017-1	N	
65	31 March 2017	On Franco-Nigerian relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2017/03/31/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-franco-nigeriennes-et-sur-la-situation-en-libye-au-mali-et-en-afrique-de-louest-a-paris-le-31-mars-2017	Y	A
66	11 April 2017	On Franco-Guinea relations	https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2017/04/11/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-relations-entre-la-france-et-la-guinee-a-paris-le-11-avril-2017	N	

Appendix 2	Date	Title	Link	Paternalism Y/N	Criteria
1	19 May 2017	Speech to forces at Barkhane base, Gao Mali	Speech: https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/05/19/discours-aux-forces-francaises-a-gao	Y	A E
2	19 May 2017	Joint Press conference with President of Mali	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/05/19/conference-de-presse-conjointe-a-gao-avec-le-president-du-mali	Y	A
3	12 June 2017	Statement with President of Senegal	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/06/12/declaration-conjointe-d-emmanuel-macron-et	Y	C F
4	12 June 2017	Statement with President of Cote d'Ivoire	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/06/12/declaration-conjointe-demmanuel-macron-avec-m-alassane-ouattara-president-de-la-republique-de-cote-divoire	Y	E F
5	2 July 2017	G5 Sahel: Opening speech	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/07/03/discours-demmanuel-macron-lors-de-louverture-du-sommet-du-g5-sahel	Y	A E
6	3 July 2017	Press conference with Mali president	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/07/03/conference-de-presse-commune-du-president-de-la-republique-francaise-et-du-president-du-mali-g5-sahel	N	
7	3 July 2017	Conference with Mali president Boubacar	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/07/03/declaration-conjointe-demmanuel-macron-et-dibrahim-boubacar-keita-au-g5-sahel	N	
9	8 July 2017	Speech at G20 Summit	https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/emmanuel-macron-africa-france-colonial-past-not-that-liberal-a7836056.html	Y	B
10	27 August 2017	Speech First Ambassadors Conference	https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/news/ambassadors-week/prior-editions/ambassadors-week-edition-2017/speech-by-president-emmanuel-macron-ambassadors-week-2017/	Y	A C D E G

11	28 August 2017	Speech at Euro-African Summit	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/08/28/declaration-d-emmanuel-macron-lors-du-mini-sommet-euro-africain-avec-les-chefs-d-etat-et-de-gouvernement	N	
12	31 August 2017	Conference with President of Côte d'Ivoire	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/08/31/declaration-conjointe-demmanuel-macron-et-de-lassane-ouattara-president-de-la-republique-de-cote-divoire	N	
13	20 September 2017	UN General Assembly: Macron speech	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/20/discours-d-emmanuel-macron-devant-la-72e-assemblee-generale-des-nations-unies	Y	A C E F G
14	25 September 2017	Joint declaration with President of Central African Republic	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/25/declaration-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-et-de-m-faustin-archange-touadera-president-de-la-republique-centrafricaine	N	
15	28 November 2017	Speech at University of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/11/28/discours-demmanuel-macron-a-luniversite-de-ouagadougou	Y	A C D E F G
16	30 November 2017	Speech on construction of metro line in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/11/30/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-lors-du-lancement-des-travaux-de-construction-de-la-ligne-1-du-metro-d-abidjan	Y	E
17	29 November 2017	Speech at inauguration of power plant in Zagtouli	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/11/29/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-lors-de-l-inauguration-de-la-centrale-solaire-de-zagtouli	N	
18	30 November 2017	Declaration at independence square of Accra, in Ghana	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/11/30/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a-lindependance-square-daccra-au-ghana	Y	C

19	23 Decemb er 2017	Joint press conference with President of Niger	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/12/23/conference-de-presse-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-et-de-m-mahamadou-issoufou-president-de-la-republique-du-niger	Y	A C
20	23 Decemb er 2017	Speech at Niamey air base, Niger	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/12/23/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a-la-base-aerienne-de-niamey-niger	Y	A
21	24 Jan 2018	Speech at World Economic Forum in Davos	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/01/24/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-au-forum-economique-mondial-a-davos	N	
22	2 Feb 2018	Address to French community in Senegal	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/02/02/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-a-la-communaute-francaise-du-senegal	Y	G
23	8 Februar y 2018	Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID)	https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/development-assistance/news/2018/article/interministerial-committee-for-international-cooperation-and-development-a-new	N	
24	5 March 2018	Statement with president of Benin	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/03/05/declaration-conjointe-demmanuel-macron-et-de-patrice-talon-president-de-la-republique-du-benin	Y	F
25	20 March 2018	Speech at institute de France on ambition for French language and plurilingualism	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/03/20/discours-demmanuel-macron-a-linstitut-de-france-sur-lambition-pour-la-langue-francaise-et-le-plurilinguisme	Y	G E
26	04 June 2018	Press conference with President of Niger	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/06/04/conference-de-presse-demmanuel-macron-avec-mahamadou-issoufou-president-de-la-republique-du-niger	Y	E
27	01 July 2018	Joint press release following Official visit to Mauritania	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/07/02/communiqu-conjoint-a-l-issue-de-la-visite-officielle-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-en-mauritanie	N	
28	02 July 2018	Macron declaration on	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/07/02/declaration-darrivee-	N	

		arrival in Mauritania	du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a-nouakchott-en-mauritanie		
29	03 July 2018	Press conference with president of Nigeria	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/07/03/conference-de-presse-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-avec-muhammadu-buhari-president-de-la-republique-federale-du-nigeria	N	
30	04 July 2018	interview during visit to Lagos	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/07/04/interview-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-lors-de-sa-visite-au-new-afrika-shrine-a-lagos-nigeria	Y	F
31	05 July 2018	Speech at school in Lagos	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/07/05/allocution-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-au-lycee-francais-louis-pasteur-a-lagos-nigeria	N	
32	27 August 2018	Speech as Ambassadors Conference	https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/news/ambassadors-week/ambassadors-week-edition-2018/article/speech-by-president-emmanuel-macron-ambassadors-conference-2018	Y N <i>Return of African heritage</i>	D G
33	25 September 2018	Speech at 73 rd UN General Assembly	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/09/26/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a-la-73e-assemblee-generale-des-nations-unies	Y	C A
34	23 November 2018	Report on reinstitution African heritage	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/11/23/remise-du-rapport-savoy-sarr-sur-la-restitution-du-patrimoine-africain	N	
35	17 December 2018	Interview with President of Burkina Faso	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/12/17/entretien-du-president-de-la-republique-avec-roch-marc-christian-kabore-president-du-burkina-faso	Y	E F
36	22 December 2018	Speech at Christmas meal with Operation Barkhane troops	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/12/22/emmanuel-macron-tchad-reveillon-noel-militaires-barkhane	Y	F
37	23 December 2018	Meeting with President of the Republic of Chad	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/12/23/rencontre-president-tchad-idriss-deby-discours	N	

38	23 December 2018	Meeting with Chadian women at Maison de la Femme in N'djamena	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/12/23/rencontre-femmes-tchadiennes-emmanuel-macron-tchad-ndjamena	Y	B C
39	13 March 2019	Statement after meeting President of African Union	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/13/g7-afrique-lutter-ensemble-contre-les-inegalites	N	
40	13 March 2019	Joint declaration with President of Djibouti	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/13/etape-1-djibouti	N	
41	20 March 2019	Speech on ambitions for the French language	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/20/une-ambition-pour-la-langue-francaise-et-le-plurilinguisme	Y	G
42	26 March 2019	Declaration with China on preserving multilateralism and improving global governance	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/26/declaration-conjointe-entre-la-republique-francaise-et-la-republique-populaire-de-chine-sur-la-preservation-du-multilateralisme-et-lamelioration-de-la-gouvernance-mondiale	N	
43	10 May 2019	Ceremony on National Day of Remembrance of Slavery	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/05/10/ceremonie-a-loccasion-de-la-journee-nationale-des-memoires-de-la-traite-de-lesclavage-et-de-leurs-abolitions	Y	F G
44	5 July 2019	Speech on empowering women and girls through education	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/07/05/innover-pour-emanciper-les-filles-et-les-femmes-par-education-g7-france-unesco	N	
45	11 July 2019	Interview with President of Ghana	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/07/11/entretien-avec-le-president-du-ghana-m-nana-akufo-addo	N	

46	25 August 2019	G7 Biarritz: Joint press conference dedicated to Sahel	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/08/26/g7-biarritz-conference-de-presse-conjointe-consacree-au-sahel	Y	A
47	26 August 2019	Interview with Macron following G7	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/08/27/g7-biarritz-interview-du-president-au-jt-de-20h	N	
48	27 August 2019	Press conference after G7	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/08/27/g7-biarritz-conference-de-presse-a-lissue-du-sommet	N	
49	27 August 2019	Speech at Ambassadors Conference	https://lv.ambafrance.org/Ambassadors-conference-Speech-by-M-Emmanuel-Macron-President-of-the-Republic	Y	C F
50	28 August 2019	Summary of G7	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/08/28/g7-biarritz-quest-ce-qui-a-ete-decide	Y	B C
51	September 2019	Speech at UN General Assembly	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/09/24/discours-du-president-emmanuel-macron-a-la-tribune-de-lassemblee-generale-onu	N	
52	20 December 2019	Speech at Christmas meal with forces in Côte d'Ivoire	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/12/20/repas-de-noel-partage-avec-les-forces-francaises-en-cote-divoire	Y	D F
53	21 December 2019	Meeting students INFAS in Côte d'Ivoire	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/12/21/a-abidjan-rencontre-avec-les-etudiants-de-linfas-linstitut-national-de-formation-des-agents-de-sante	N	
54	21 December 2019	Meeting with French	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/12/21/rencontre-avec-la-communaute-francaise-en-cote-divoire	Y	A E

		community in Côte d'Ivoire			
55	21 December 2019	Inauguration of sports agora 'win-win' in Koumassi	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/12/21/inauguration-de-lagora-socio-sportive-winwin-de-koumassi	N	
56	21 December 2019	Press conference with President of Côte d'Ivoire	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/12/21/a-abidjan-conference-de-presse-du-president-emmanuel-macron-avec-lassane-ouattara-president-de-la-republique-de-cote-divoire	Y	A E F
57	22 December 2019	Press point with President of Niger	https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/12/22/au-niger-point-presse-du-president-emmanuel-macron-et-du-president-mahamadou-issoufou	N	