The impact of terrorism on sensitive export controls after 2001 : the International and European level

Abstract

The object of this work is to analyse since when the topics of terrorism and non-proliferation merged on the International and European agenda in relation to trade control of sensitive goods . From 2001 we seek to analyse how in Multilateral fora and European institutions the issue of WMD non-proliferation has been related to the appearance of a branched network of terrorism, and what have been (if any), the consequences of such a connection on trade control systems, or more generally on non-proliferation policies. Since when is terrorism introduced as an assessment criterion in the trade of sensitive goods? And there have been other measures undertaken on the issue of counter-proliferation? The first chapter introduces a brief description of the main terms referred to in this work, namely terrorism, export control and and dual-use. The second chapter is focused on the on the measures agreed at the International level, with regard to the role of the UN and the principal multilateral arrangements of export-control and non-proliferation. In the first section is presented the reaction of the UNSC through the analysis of key resolutions. The second section is about the initiatives promoted by the UNGA in the field of counter-terrorism in its link to CBRN proliferation. The third section examines how the international export-control and non-proliferation groups addressed the threat constituted by the risk of diversion to terrorists. The third chapter deals with the role played by the European Union. The first section concerns the elaboration of the main policy guidelines and strategies agreed by the EU institutions to cope with the threat and the possible consequences posed by terrorist attacks and the resort to the use of WMD related materials. The second section analyses the strongholds of the current EU trade control system of dual-use goods, as well as the proposed lines of development of its upcoming revision. Finally, the third section draws the attention on the role of the European Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU measures in preventing and responding the risk arising from terrorism and proliferation. The conclusions show that after 2001, and with revived emphasis after 2004, the principal multilateral fora as well as the EU acknowledged the critical connection between terrorism and WMD proliferation. The most important measures have been to require State to establish domestic export controls, to strengthen the controls of traded items or to provide tools for their extension to non-listed goods. The EU will agree on a number of new strategies to counter these threats, playing a role in between the implementation of the international obligations as agreed in the UN and multilateral arrangements, and the promotion of counter-terrorism and non-proliferations policies in its relationship with Third Countries.