Pour les entités d'intérêt public en Belgique, existe-t-il d'autres systèmes viables de rétribution et de nomination des services d'audit dans l'économie actuelle qui permettraient d'améliorer la qualité de l'audit et l'indépendance des auditeurs ?

Abstract

Numerous scientific studies have pointed out that the current system of remuneration and appointment in audit, where the audited entity directly compensates and appoints audit firms to verify its annual accounts, can lead to conflicts of interest and compromise auditor independence and audit quality. High fees may incentivize auditors to prioritize client retention, potentially compromising independence and audit quality. Additionally, the current auditor appointment system poses risks such as auditor shopping, where for instance companies strategically replace or retain auditors to conceal accounting irregularities. This thesis aims to analyze alternative systems of remuneration and appointment of audit services that could enhance audit quality and auditor independence. Three alternatives are proposed, the external audit committee option, involving a committee responsible for auditing most public interest entities, the financial statement insurance alternative where entities obtain insurance covering financial statements, with insurers appointing and compensating external auditors and a random selection of auditors for public interest entities from a predefined pool, with fixed remuneration and mandates.