Comment les auditeurs externes peuvent-ils mieux identifier les signaux de défaillance concernant la continuité d'exploitation et activer efficacement la procédure d'alerte ?

Abstract

The going concern assumption is a fundamental principle of financial reporting and external auditing. Recent corporate failures, such as Carillion, Wirecard, and NMC Health, have highlighted the limitations of current audit practices in identifying early warning signs of financial distress. This thesis explores how external auditors can better detect failure signals that may compromise the going concern of an entity and how they can effectively activate the alert mechanisms provided by applicable standards and national regulations. The research is based on a qualitative methodology, using semi-structured interviews with experienced audit professionals (managers, senior managers, partners, and statutory auditors) from different jurisdictions (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Morocco), all of whom apply the International Standards on Auditing (ISA). The study combines a theoretical analysis of the ISA 570 (Revised) standard, national legal frameworks (including the Belgian “safeguard procedure”), and academic literature on audit judgment and business continuity, with empirical insights drawn from professional experience. The results reveal significant challenges in detecting and interpreting weak signals of distress, especially when they are non-financial or context-dependent. The activation of the alert procedure remains rare in practice and is often constrained by relational, legal, and reputational considerations. However, several good practices and recommendations are proposed to enhance auditors’ ability to identify risks and to strengthen their role in the early prevention of corporate failure.