Analyse de l'efficacité des régulations bancaires résultant de la crise des subprimes sur la prévention du risque systémique

Abstract

The financial crisis that started ten years ago with the collapse of the american housing market has resulted in one of the most destructive global economic recession in history. If its origins are not so different from those of previous crises, the speed and extent of its spread are unprecedented.

Globalization has indeed made global economies more connected and more interdependent than ever before. The same applies to financial institutions that have grown in a totally disproportionate way during recent decades and have become incredibly powerful and dangerous. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, that happened almost 10 years ago, has created a new source of uncertainty in financial markets : the risk of a reaction of cumulative losses due to the failure of an institution called « too big to fail ».

This thesis focuses on the evolution of banking regulation, and more specifically on the impact this regulation has on the systemic risk prevention.

After analysing systemic risk and its various components, a synopsis of the banking deregulation policies was reviewed in order to highlight the after-effects of the global financial crisis.

Subsequently, an ethical reflection around the global financial system and its activities was conducted.

With regard to the pragmatic part of this research thesis, an empirical analysis is developed based on both scientific papers and interviews with experts from the banking and economic fields.

The outcome from the applied research is mixed : from a positive point of view it can be concluded that the banking regulations resulting from the crisis had a constructive influence on the systemic risk prevention. Nevertheless, procedures do not appear to be sufficient to fully control this risk which origin is deeply embedded in the current financial system.