Les partenariats public-privé : traitement statistique du PPP du tram de Liège

Abstract

The case of the Liège tram is a very controversial subject, politically and financially speaking. The PPP market used for the tram is a DBFM market and has been refused three times by Eurostat. The transition from SEC 95 to SEC 2010 is a very important factor in this choice made by Eurostat, as it is now mandatory for public authorities to have the prior opinion of Eurostat for the acceptance of the off-balance sheet treatment.

The purpose of this thesis is to explain the various reasons that have led Eurostat to give three negative opinions for the PPP of the tram of Liège. Before doing this analysis, this thesis will define the concept of PPP and the various applicable European standards, analyze the situation of PPPs in Belgium and analyze the contract of the tram of Liège as well as the various players in this market. Secondly, the analysis of Eurostat's refusals will be based on an analysis of the risks and rewards of the PPP contract. Concerning the methodology, the guide on the statistical treatment of PPPs drawn up by EPEC in 2016, Eurostat and the EIB will serve as a basis for understanding the allocation of risks according to the public partner and the private partner.

The results show that the Walloon Region has failed to transfer the risks sufficiently to the private partner Mobiliège S.A. Indeed, the analysis of the private partner is the main cause of the first two negative opinions of Eurostat. In addition, the risk analysis indicates 10 problematic points for the initial contract, 3 problematic points for the first modified contract and 5 points for the second and final contract. This results in a risk threshold each time exceeded by the SRWT and the Walloon Region. Finally, the analysis of economic ownership is the third analysis that goes against the off-balance sheet treatment of the PPP.